hewigovens/gist:de344a4a9a109cb7a66a0b67b14afddf

## gistfile1.txt
	•	The overall “separate Signer app” concept is clear and aligns with WebAuthn/FIDO-style separation of concerns; it’s a reasonable direction for reducing hot-wallet attack surface.
	•	The CAIP positioning may benefit from clarification: today it reads like a CAIP-style draft, but it does not yet leverage common CAIP interoperability primitives (e.g., chain/account identifiers, scoped authorization). It might be better to either explicitly scope it as “CAIP-inspired,” or introduce CAIP-2/CAIP-10 objects plus a simple scopes model (chains/accounts/methods/expiry).
	•	For ecosystem adoption, the current encoding stack is somewhat multi-layered (custom big-endian header + CBOR wrapper + COSE + AEAD/AAD). This is feasible in-house, but can be harder for third parties to implement consistently across languages.
	•	The Method field being int8 (with response codes in 128–255 potentially appearing negative) could be a portability footgun; using unsigned types (uint8) is often simpler for cross-language SDKs.
	•	The benefit of maintaining a bespoke binary header in addition to CBOR is not fully obvious. If compactness is the goal, it might be simpler to express version/status/method/request-id/length as a single CBOR envelope (small integer keys) and reduce parsing/offset rules.
	•	The spec would likely be easier to implement consistently with a machine-verifiable schema (e.g., CDDL for CBOR or an IDL like Protobuf/FlatBuffers) plus a small set of conformance test vectors.
	•	Replay/correlation semantics could be tightened: a 16-bit rolling Nonce is small and its role is a bit ambiguous. It might be better to add an explicit requestId (e.g., uint64 or 16-byte random ID) and recommend keeping a recent-window cache to reject replays.
	•	Session key derivation appears correct at a high level, but could be strengthened by binding more handshake context into the KDF (e.g., both ephemeral public keys, selected suite/curve, protocol version, roles), and optionally deriving directional keys (client→signer / signer→client).
	•	Transport guidance is helpful, and the iOS limitations are accurately called out; it may be worth adding UX guidance that “origin/caller is unverified” on platforms where cryptographic attestation is not available, to avoid false trust signals.
	• The overall “separate Signer app” concept is clear and aligns with WebAuthn/FIDO-style separation of concerns; it’s a reasonable direction for reducing hot-wallet attack surface.
	• The CAIP positioning may benefit from clarification: today it reads like a CAIP-style draft, but it does not yet leverage common CAIP interoperability primitives (e.g., chain/account identifiers, scoped authorization). It might be better to either explicitly scope it as “CAIP-inspired,” or introduce CAIP-2/CAIP-10 objects plus a simple scopes model (chains/accounts/methods/expiry).
	• For ecosystem adoption, the current encoding stack is somewhat multi-layered (custom big-endian header + CBOR wrapper + COSE + AEAD/AAD). This is feasible in-house, but can be harder for third parties to implement consistently across languages.
	• The Method field being int8 (with response codes in 128–255 potentially appearing negative) could be a portability footgun; using unsigned types (uint8) is often simpler for cross-language SDKs.
	• The benefit of maintaining a bespoke binary header in addition to CBOR is not fully obvious. If compactness is the goal, it might be simpler to express version/status/method/request-id/length as a single CBOR envelope (small integer keys) and reduce parsing/offset rules.
	• The spec would likely be easier to implement consistently with a machine-verifiable schema (e.g., CDDL for CBOR or an IDL like Protobuf/FlatBuffers) plus a small set of conformance test vectors.
	• Replay/correlation semantics could be tightened: a 16-bit rolling Nonce is small and its role is a bit ambiguous. It might be better to add an explicit requestId (e.g., uint64 or 16-byte random ID) and recommend keeping a recent-window cache to reject replays.
	• Session key derivation appears correct at a high level, but could be strengthened by binding more handshake context into the KDF (e.g., both ephemeral public keys, selected suite/curve, protocol version, roles), and optionally deriving directional keys (client→signer / signer→client).
	• Transport guidance is helpful, and the iOS limitations are accurately called out; it may be worth adding UX guidance that “origin/caller is unverified” on platforms where cryptographic attestation is not available, to avoid false trust signals.
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